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Abstract
This dissertation’s guiding question is: What was the impact of Martin Heidegger’s early
philosophy on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology? I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his
technical term for human existence, provides Bonhoeffer with important conceptual tools for
developing his Christology, from which the rest of his theology follows.
Part of recognizing Heidegger’s importance to Bonhoeffer involves understanding the
latter’s critiques of previous notable philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. As
Bonhoeffer evaluates these philosophers, they lead to theologically unacceptable positions.
Heidegger, in contrast, has come to a theologically profitable understanding of human existence
and epistemology. Though there are theologically useful elements in Heidegger’s philosophy,
there are elements that require significant alteration, and even rejection. Heidegger recognizes
that epistemology must be based on actual human existence, and he can account for the historical
continuity of human existence; however, because of Heidegger’s anthropocentric philosophy, he
cannot account for God’s transcendence necessary for proper theology. Bonhoeffer then applies
the conceptual tools he has appropriated from Heidegger to revelation, Christology, and the
church. This eliminates the anthropocentrism that made transcendence impossible, while
maintaining the benefits of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for Christian existence.
Understanding Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Heidegger is additionally important for
understanding Heidegger’s potential relation to theology. This dissertation concludes by placing
Bonhoeffer in the context of other theological appropriations of Heidegger. In light of this
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context and Heidegger’s own understanding of philosophy’s relation to theology, I argue that
Bonhoeffer represents one, viable theological use of Heidegger.
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Introduction
The publication of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was a generally agreed upon watershed
event in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. As a consequence of its publication,
Heidegger, who had been struggling to find a permanent academic position, received immediate
fame, even filling Edmund Husserl’s position at Freiburg. Of course with the publication of
Being and Time, philosophy had to respond. Describing the general reactions to Heidegger in
1929, Heinrich Petzt recounts, “It seemed as if Heidegger dominated the intellectual scene of the
university even where he was not actively involved—finding opposition as well as agreement.
While some were enthusiastic about him, others resisted and mocked him.” 1 And Hans-Georg
Gadamer, one of Heidegger’s most notable students, remarks that “the brilliant scheme of Being
and Time really meant a total transformation of the intellectual climate, a transformation that had
lasting effects on almost all the sciences.” 2 It is well-known that Heidegger and his Being and
Time had immediate and enduring effects on such notable philosophers as Hannah Arendt,
Herbert Marcuse, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Being and Time is now a ranking member of the
philosophical canon.
It was not merely philosophy that felt the need to respond to Heidegger, however; so too
did theology. Looking back from 1956, Rudolf Bultmann writes, “[T]he work of existential
philosophy, which I came to know through my discussions with Martin Heidegger, has become
of decisive significance for me. I found in it the conceptuality in which it is possible to speak
1

Heinrich Wiegand Petzt, Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 12.
2
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976), 139.
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adequately of human existence and therefore also of the existence of the believer.” 3 In response
to such open reliance on Heidegger and repeated attempts on Bultmann’s part to bring Karl Barth
and Heidegger together, Barth replies in 1931, “I can only repeat that with your [Bultmann’s]
well-known attachment to Heidegger you have done something that one ought not to do as an
evangelical theologian (not because he is Heidegger but because he is a philosopher, who as such
has nothing to say to and in theology).” 4 Bultmann and Barth represent two opposed and extreme
options for theology’s engagement with Heidegger specifically and philosophy generally.
Bultmann, for his part, may appeal to the long and illustrious theological practice of drawing on
philosophical sources to expound and restate traditional theological doctrines. Notable examples
include Augustine’s use of neo-Platonism and Aquinas’ use of Aristotle. Barth, for his part, has
an equally well-established tradition to appeal to including Tertullian’s rejection of Athens in
favor of Jerusalem.
Theologians did not have to, nor did they in fact always, choose one or the other of these
extremes. Between Bultmann’s explicit and extensive use of Heidegger and Barth’s obstinate,
principled silence on Heidegger, which was only broken now and then to reaffirm it, there are
responses by other notable theologians such as Emil Brunner and Erich Pryzwara. Barth, for
example, accuses Brunner of holding a position that one may arrive at from following Heidegger
or Kierkegaard. 5 It is true that Brunner does not outright reject Heidegger and his possible
theological use as Barth does. But neither does he accept Heidegger as easily as Bultmann.
Rather Brunner believes that a good theologian will seriously ask what consequences for faith

3

Rudolf Bultmann, “Autobiographical Reflections,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann,
trans. Schubert Ogden (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), 288.
4
Bernd Jaspert and Geoffrey W. Bromiley, eds., Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters 1922-1966, trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981), 65. Translation altered.
5
Karl Barth, “No!,” in Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1946), 114.
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result from appropriating philosophical concepts. 6 From his brief tussle with this question,
Brunner concludes that while “Heidegger’s ontology may do [theology] the service of sharply
discerning the being and understanding of being of the natural humans” there is still “every
reason for guarding against drawing too close a connection with it.” 7 Przywara, a Catholic
theologian, for his part worries that Heidegger’s understanding of being closes the world in on
itself leaving it incapable of relating to anything transcendent. 8 Yet Przywara also believes that
Heidegger’s ontology, particularly its understanding of the relation between existence and
essence, has the ability to renew Thomistic Scholastic theology and philosophy, particularly their
understanding of the anologia entis (analogy of being). 9 The theological reactions to
Heidegger’s Being and Time are diverse.
There was another contemporary theological reaction to Heidegger deserving an extended
analysis, that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer does not categorically reject Heidegger as
Barth does. Nor, however, does he offer unqualified praise and simply adopt Heidegger as one
might say of Bultmann. Like Brunner’s general position, Bonhoeffer is open to the possibility of
theology’s use of philosophy, yet always mindful of possible inappropriate appropriations.
Bonhoeffer then represents some intermediate position between Bultmann and Barth. This in
itself might be enough to warrant a closer examination. However, as I will argue, Bonhoeffer
does not simply adopt some elements from Heidegger’s philosophy which appeal to him and
discard those that do not; rather, he theologically transforms central elements of Heidegger’s
philosophy, especially fundamental and essential elements of his existential analytic of Dasein.
Bonhoeffer’s complex and nuanced reaction to Heidegger is succinctly captured in the seemingly
6

Emil Brunner, “Theologie und Ontologie, oder: Die Theologie am Scheidewege,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und
Kirche 12 (1931): 114.
7
Ibid., 121–2.
8
Erich Przywara, “Drei Richtungen der Phänomenologie,” Stimmen der Zeit 115 (1928): 252.
9
Ibid., 264.
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disparate assertions, which occur in the same paragraph of his post-doctoral dissertation Act and
Being, that Heidegger’s philosophy must be “highly instructive” and yet “inappropriate” for
theology. 10
Taking Bonhoeffer’s statements seriously the present work asks: What, if any, influence
did Heidegger’s early philosophy have on Bonhoeffer? What are the specifics of that influence?
And what can Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger tell us about the theological implications and
possibilities of Heidegger’s early philosophy? Such questions should be taken seriously by both
Bonhoeffer and Heidegger scholars, particularly those concerned with Heidegger’s relation to
theology. 11
Bonhoeffer’s assessments and uses of Heidegger are not uninformed and, therefore,
require serious attention; in fact, by the time he encountered Being and Time, Bonhoeffer was
well-positioned to critically and accurately engage it. Describing his work in a 1930 Curriculum
vitae, Bonhoeffer writes, “I have also continued to study the newer and most contemporary
philosophy, especially phenomenology.” 12 This retrospective self-assessment is also supported
by earlier accounts of his work and the actual use he makes of phenomenology prior to
encountering Being and Time. “After I finish Weber, I intend to read Troeltsch’s work on the
social teachings of Christian ethics and work through Husserl,” so Bonhoeffer reports to his
mother in 1924. 13 Though Bonhoeffer owned a copy of Husserl’s Ideas, cites Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, and explicitly assesses Husserl in his post-doctoral dissertation, Act and Being,
Husserl himself does not make much of an appearance in Bonhoeffer’s 1927 doctoral
10

DBWE 2: 72-3 (DBW 2: 66-7).
To date the best general and judicious treatment of these questions is Stephen Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the
Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” in Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, ed. Peter Frick (Tübingen, Germany:
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 301–32, which states that more than “a single essay” is needed to do proper treatment to the
subject.
12
DBWE 10: 235 (DBW 10: 190).
13
DBWE 9:133 (DBW 9: 141).
11
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dissertation, Sanctorum Communio; 14 other phenomenologists and students of Husserl, however,
do have prominent positions. Most notably, Max Scheler makes many positive appearances in
Sanctorum Communio; though Bonhoeffer’s appraisals of Scheler will be largely negative by Act
and Being. Bonhoeffer also cites a 1922 article by Edith Stein, Husserl’s student and Heidegger’s
friend, published in the former’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung,
the same publication where Heidegger’s Being and Time was first published. 15 Bonhoeffer,
therefore, seems to have been in a good position to engage Heidegger’s Being and Time. And it
is most likely through his cousin, Hans-Christoph von Hase, a student at Marburg, that
Bonhoeffer first learned of Heidegger. 16 Nothing remains of Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on first
encountering Heidegger. What is certainly clear is that Bonhoeffer was well-versed in the
phenomenological tradition, primarily in the form of Husserl and Scheler and that by Act and
Being the positive role these earlier phenomenologists played is replaced by Heidegger’s
“genuine ontology.” 17
The brevity of Bonhoeffer’s direct engagement with Heidegger is perhaps one of the
greater obstacles to taking the question of Heidegger’s influence seriously; yet, brevity does not
in itself negate the intensity of Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Heidegger, nor the pivotal
function Heidegger plays at this formative period in Bonhoeffer’s theology. Bonhoeffer directly
and explicitly engages Heidegger roughly between 1928 and 1932. The evidence and content of
this engagement is isolated to Bonhoeffer’s post-doctoral dissertation, Act and Being, his
Inaugural lecture based on, and a lecture in the 1931-32 Winter semester, of which unfortunately
14

DBWE 1: 30-1n[4] and 70n5 (DBW 1: 17n[10] and 43n5).
DBWE 1:30-1n3 (DBW 1: 16n3).
16
Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography, ed. Victoria Barnett, Revised edition (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2000), 82–3. Cf. DBWE 10: 596 (DBW 10: 593). Plant cautiously suggests that it is possible that Bonhoeffer
received notes of Heidegger’s lectures from von Hase. Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and
Bonhoeffer,” 314n40.
17
DBWE 2: 60 (DBW 2: 54).
15
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nothing remains save some fragmentary notes on Heidegger and Eberhard Grisebach. Though
admittedly brief, there is some circumstantial evidence that indicates the significance of
Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Heidegger. Again, Bonhoeffer was engaged in the developing
phenomenological tradition, of which Heidegger was the latest and most explosive addition. In
Act and Being, Heidegger makes a comparable appearance; he is cited more often than Barth and
comes second only to Martin Luther. 18 While “Dasein,” which has made its way untranslated
into common English technical philosophical parlance thanks to Heidegger, is a common enough
German word, there is not one instance of it in Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, Sanctorum Communio;
in Act and Being, however, it becomes the central anthropological term. The very title itself, Act
and Being, and the project of combining the two title terms may be an indication of Heidegger’s
influence, who sought to overturn the philosophical assumption prominent since Plato that being
and time are strictly divided. And most importantly, there are Bonhoeffer’s own statements that
Heidegger achieved some form of solution to the problem of act and being with his concept of
Dasein, which, I believe, should be charitably interpreted as sincere and, therefore, significant.
If Bonhoeffer is sincere, then he has credited Heidegger with solving a problem that, according
to Bonhoeffer, has plagued philosophy until Heidegger and plagued theology until Bonhoeffer.
Because Heidegger’s contribution to Bonhoeffer’s theology is intimately connected with
Bonhoeffer’s unique formulation of the problem of act and being, it is necessary to fully
elucidate the nature of this problem. Those unfamiliar with Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being are
surely as likely to be unfamiliar with the meaning of the phrase “the problem of act and being.”
To my knowledge, no one but Bonhoeffer and those drawing on Bonhoeffer talk about the
problem of act and being. The term itself and the presentation of the problem are unique to
18

Christiane Tietz points to this as sufficient reason to take Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Heidegger seriously.
Christiane Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1999), 59; Bethge,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography, 133.
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Bonhoeffer; however, the general contours of the problem are not. During the argumentative
development of Act and Being, Bonhoeffer identifies various manifestations of the problem of
act and being in philosophy and theology. One or more of these manifestations are likely to be
familiar to the reader. As a philosophical example, one can see, as Bonhoeffer does, the
development from Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegelian idealism as centered
around the problem of act and being. Put simplistically, Kant’s epistemology is concerned with
the relation between the knowing act of the subject and the being of the phenomenal object of
knowledge. There is a strong sense in which the act of the subject creates the being of the
phenomemal object; yet the knowing act of the subject is importantly limited by the noumenal
thing-in-itself. Hegel, also simplistically put, finds this limit unsatisfactory arguing that the limit
itself is the creation of the knowing act and thereby subjects all being to the act of the knowing
subject. As a theological example, one may take the debate surrounding the point of contact
(Anknüpfungspunkt). For Brunner, there must be something in the being of humans, some point
of contact, predisposed to receive the act of divine revelation. 19 If there were no point of contact,
according to Brunner, it would be difficult to talk about the mechanisms of grace, what roles
church, sermon, and sacrament play in such grace, and human responsibility vis-à-vis sin and
grace. For Barth, in constrast, there is no point in the being of humans ready-made to receive
divine acts. 20 Such a doctrine risks, for Barth, limiting God’s completely free act of revelation. 21
Though not immediately obvious, for Bonhoeffer these are particular manifestations of the
common problem of act and being.
19

Emil Brunner, “Nature and Grace,” in Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock
Publishers, 2002), 31.
20
Barth, “No!,” 89.
21
In more practical confessional and historical terms, according to Barth, Brunner’s advocating for a point of
contact makes it difficult to distinguish him “from a Thomist or Neo-Protestant” and may earn “the applause of the
‘German Christians’,” a fairly harsh criticism, but one that points to the urgency of issues encompassed in
Bonhoeffer’s “problem of act and being.” Ibid., 90.
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A full elucidation of the problem of act and being is also necessary to properly assess
Heidegger’s role in helping Bonhoeffer come to a theological solution to the problem.
Bonhoeffer’s formulation of the problem is complex and multifaceted. It would have to be to
allow for so many apparently disparate manifestations. The problem may manifest as too act- or
too being-oriented; it occurs at different conceptual levels; and there are a number of criteria that
any possible solution must meet in order to qualify as an actual solution for Bonhoeffer. Without
fully grasping the complexity of the problem it is easy to misinterpret Bonhoeffer’s presentation
and assessment of a particular philosopher or theologian. According to Bonhoeffer, various
theologians and philosophers, such as Heidegger, have met some criteria and failed at others.
Without a full conceptual map of the problem, we may unduly focus on particular failures,
successes, or misinterpret one for the other. Chapter one will then be devoted to explaining the
intricacies of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the problem of act and being.
In light of Bonhoeffer’s assessment, Heidegger is most notable for coming closer than
any previous philosopher has to an actual solution to the problem. To appreciate this general
compliment Bonhoeffer has paid Heidegger and its particulars, it is first important to understand
Bonhoeffer’s assessments of previous philosophers. Part A of Act and Being is “The Problem of
Act and Being Portrayed in a Preparatory Manner as the Epistemological Problem of an
Autonomous Understanding of Dasein in Philosophy.” 22 Here there are, in addition to
Heidegger, four other notable representatives of philosophical attempts to solve the problem:
Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. Kant is notable for providing Bonhoeffer with some
essential elements necessary for a solution to the problem; though as we shall see much has to be
done, according to Bonhoeffer, to shore up these positive elements and avoid its slip into
idealism. Husserl, Scheler, and particularly Hegel represent, again for Bonhoeffer, failed
22

DBWE 2: 33 (DBW 2: 27).
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attempts at a solution. These attempts also differ from one another manifesting different forms
of failures and successes. Presenting Bonhoeffer’s synopses and assessments of these
philosophical attempts is useful for providing more concrete representations of his criteria of
success. This should make Bonhoeffer’s presentation and assessment of Heidegger more
comprehensible since he holds Heidegger to the same standards. It should also make the degree
of Heidegger’s success more apparent.
It is also important to note the word “preparatory” in the chapter title for it indicates that
Bonhoeffer’s purpose in going through the philosophical attempts of Kant, Hegel, Husserl,
Scheler, and Heidegger is to test and indicate what features of such attempts may be transformed
into a viable theological solution. This philosophical section is, then, not isolated from the rest
of Act and Being. Understanding the philosophical attempts prepares us for understanding
Bonhoeffer’s theological attempt. Chapter two is then devoted to presenting Bonhoeffer’s
understanding and assessments of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler.
Following on the heels of the assessments of previous philosophical attempts, Bonhoeffer
says that Heidegger has reached a “genuine coordination” (wirkliche Zusammenordung) of act
and being, a statement of high praise which deserves a detailed explanation and analysis. 23 Part
A, the philosophical section, of Act and Being is, again, preparatory. Theological counterparts to
the philosophical failures should, for Bonhoeffer, be avoided. Philosophical successes, however,
should be theologically adapted. If Bonhoeffer’s praise is genuine, then those elements in
Heidegger’s philosophy that were instrumental in that success should reappear in theological
clothing. Such theological clothing, however, may hinder attempts to recognize their
philosophical origins. To mitigate this hindrance we must know what such elements are and how
they contribute to Heidegger’s success at the problem of act and being.
23

DBWE 2: 71 (DBW 2: 65).
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Heidegger’s philosophical success is not the complete account, however. Shortly after
crediting Heidegger with coordinating act and being in such a way that it “must be highly
instructive for theology,” Bonhoeffer states that “Heidegger’s concept of being […] remains
unsuitable for theology.” 24 This does not negate the previous attributions of success. Rather the
standards of success have shifted slightly. Most simply put, Heidegger’s solution is adequate to
philosophy. What Bonhoeffer, the theologian, is searching for, however, is a theological solution.
Given important differences between these two sciences (Wissenschaften), solutions in
philosophy do not straightforwardly translate into theology.
Clearly cataloging, explaining, and evaluating the successes and failures of Heidegger’s
philosophy is particularly important in light of the complexity of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of
the problem of act and being with its different conceptual levels, manifestations, and criteria of
success. Not doing so can lead to a number of problems. First, one might not adequately explain
or appreciate Heidegger’s successes from Bonhoeffer’s perspective. This is the most common
problem of secondary literature dealing with Bonhoeffer’s relation to Heidegger. The origin of
this inadequacy might, however, lie in Bonhoeffer’s account itself. Bonhoeffer will identify a
success or element of Heidegger’s philosophy that contributes to its success and quickly move on
with little to no elucidation of the point. Secondary literature often follows suit, however. Tomi
Karttunen, rightly I think, identifies Heidegger’s intimate relating of human existence and
historicity as a successful element. 25 Without further explanation, however, he immediately
moves to how this is still inadequate. Christiane Tietz identifies, also quite rightly, Heidegger’s
concept of temporality as important for Bonhoeffer, but does not explain how or why this is. 26

24

DBWE 2: 72-3 (DBW 2: 66-7).
Tomi Karttunen, Die Polyphonie der Wirklichkeit: Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie in der Theologie Dietrich
Bonhoeffers (Joensu: Joensuun yliopisto/Teologinen tiedekunta, 2004), 230.
26
Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft, 76.
25
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Or Michael DeJonge claims, again quite rightly, that Dasein’s structure itself presupposes the
interrelation of act and being. 27 Obviously, with Being and Time’s nearly five-hundred pages, the
structure of Dasein is quite detailed and complex. What specifically about the structure of
Dasein presupposes an interrelation of act and being? Overcoming this difficulty, then, requires
clearly identifying an element of Heidegger’s success and returning to its origin in Being and
Time in order to provide a fuller explanation.
A second problem that often arises from not properly distinguishing Heidegger’s
successes and failures is the tendency to allow Bonhoeffer’s theological critiques to overshadow
the genuine positive appraisals. For example, the ways in which Karttunen and Tietz intermix
the successes and failures of Heidegger could, even if unintended, give the impression that
Bonhoeffer believed Heidegger ‘cheated’ in coming to a solution. 28 This only arises, however, if
one expects Bonhoeffer to expect philosophy to be able to arrive at a complete solution that
would be equally applicable to theology. Or, in other words, if one believes Bonhoeffer holds
philosophy to the same exact standards as he holds theology. This is not so and arises from not
adequately distinguishing between the subtle variation in standards between philosophy and
theology. That Bonhoeffer is a theologian and Heidegger is a philosopher is fairly obvious.
What is perhaps less obvious is Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the relation between philosophy
and theology. For Bonhoeffer, philosophy’s relation to truth can range from completely and
dangerously wrong (Hegel) to getting important aspects right, though falling short of the whole
truth (Kant and Heidegger). Even the best philosophy, as it stands, is inadequate for theological
purposes, unless it is appropriately transformed according to proper theological standards.

27

Michael DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and Protestant Theology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 30.
28
Karttunen, Die Polyphonie der Wirklichkeit, 95. Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft, 73
and 73n360.
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It is important to address the concern that Bonhoeffer might have arrived at this solution
without Heidegger’s help. Jens Zimmermann, for example, states: “We have little evidence that
Heidegger’s influence extended beyond serving as a useful philosophical justification to conjoin
human reflection to action and to confirm Bonhoeffer’s own incarnational instinct that Christian
theology must ever be historically conscious. Both of these tendencies, moreover, are already in
Bonhoeffer’s first dissertation, Sanctorum Communio.” 29 Zimmermann is quite right to point to
these tendencies as pre-existing in Sanctorum Communio. There are also, in fact, other important
tendencies in Act and Being that are already present in Sanctorum Communio. Another
interpretation, perhaps equally plausible and conjectural, is that these pre-existing tendencies
predisposed Bonhoeffer to find Heidegger a valuable philosophical source. But tendencies are
not solutions. Clifford Green also argues that many, if not most, of the important themes and
issues that will orient Bonhoeffer’s future work originate in Sanctorum Communio. Yet Green
also notes that Bonhoeffer’s concept of person in Sanctorum Communio is overly act-oriented by
Act and Being’s standards. 30 There might just then be important advances from Sanctorum
Communio to Act and Being. This coupled with Bonhoeffer’s assertion that Heidegger must be
“highly instructive for theology” warrants at least the provisional view that Bonhoeffer’s use of
Heidegger was not merely and disingenuously pragmatic. Yet it is still important to account for
what is and is not already present in Sanctorum Communio, and what does and does not undergo
important alterations by the time of Act and Being. Though dealt with as needed, this topic will
also have particular priority in chapter three.

29

Jens Zimmermann, Humanism and Religion: A Call for the Renewal of Western Culture (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 292.
30
Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999),
70.

12

Chapters three and four are devoted to overcoming these problems by clearly
distinguishing, explaining, and evaluating the successes and failures of Heidegger’s philosophy
from Bonhoeffer’s perspective. Chapter three is specifically devoted to Heidegger’s
philosophical successes; while chapter four is devoted to the theological inadequacies of the
same. Along the way, though particularly in chapter four, Bonhoeffer’s understanding of
Heidegger will be evaluated for correctness, something also often lacking in the secondary
literature. 31 By clearly cataloging the successes and failures of Heidegger’s philosophy to solve
the problem of act and being with all its various nuances we should then have a good resource
for determining what successes Bonhoeffer anticipates maintaining in his theology and what
failures he wishes to avoid. This again is Bonhoeffer’s intent in treating various philosophical
attempts at solutions to the problem of act and being.
Bonhoeffer, in fact, makes considerable use of Heidegger’s philosophical successes in
coming to a theological solution to the problem of act and being. Bonhoeffer transfers many of
these successes from Heidegger’s human Dasein to the person of Jesus Christ and Christ as the
church. This also has the effect of theologically avoiding or rehabilitating Heidegger’s failures,
many of which occur, for Bonhoeffer, simply because it is philosophy and not theology.
Demonstrating that this is the case, how Heidegger’s Dasein is theologically transformed, and
how Bonhoeffer’s theology works in light of this are the subject of chapter five.
Bonhoeffer does not grapple with Heidegger merely because Being and Time exploded
on the philosophical scene; Bonhoeffer found in Heidegger valuable tools for dealing with a
central problem in contemporary theology. The central tool Bonhoeffer adapts from Heidegger is

31
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the former’s explanation of Dasein’s temporality in order to account for revelation’s relation to
time and history. Bonhoeffer was the academic child of two competing theological schools,
liberal theology and dialectical theology, between which at times arose rancorous conflict. A
central problem between these two schools was revelation’s relation to time and history and the
nature of the theological method that arises from the different answers. The differences and the
apparent impasse between them are perhaps best exemplified in the 1923 publication debate
between Adolf von Harnack and Barth, the most prominent exponents of liberal theology and
dialectical theology respectively. Harnack rhetorically asks in question fourteen of his “Fifteen
questions to the despisers of scientific theology,”
If the person of Jesus Christ stands at the center of the gospel, how else can the basis for
reliable and communal knowledge of this person be gained but through critical-historical
study so that an imagined Christ is not put in place of the real one? What else besides
scientific theology is able to undertake this study? 32
That is, the objective analysis of history is the only means to come to proper theological truths.
The assumption that Christ and revelation have a positive relation to time and history lies behind
this position. Simply put, Christ and revelation are in time and history and, therefore, available to
historical analysis. Barth replies,
Whoever does not yet know […] that we no longer know Christ according to the flesh,
should let the critical study of the Bible tell him so. The more radically he is frightened
the better it is for him and for the matter involved. This might turn out to be the service
which “historical knowledge” can render to the actual task of theology. 33
For Barth, Harnack’s critical-historical method can serve only a negative function. It can only
tell us that Christ or revelation are not available through an analysis of history. 34 That Christ or
32
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revelation are opposed to or beyond time and history lies behind Barth’s rejection of Harnack’s
position. Bonhoeffer finds both positions unacceptable. The liberal theological position risks
making Christ one object among others available to human understanding apart from divine
revelation. The Barthian position risks making Christ completely unavailable and thereby
jeopardizes key theological tasks and themes such as preaching, ecclesiology, the foundation of
Christian identity, and theological ethics. As we will see, particularly in chapters three and five,
Bonhoeffer theologically adapts Heidegger’s concept of temporality to solve the problem of act
and being for theology and move beyond this impasse. For Bonhoeffer, Christ or revelation are
neither opposed to time and history nor straightforwardly in time and history; rather, Christ is
temporality from which time and history extend.
Heidegger’s influence is not merely limited to Act and Being and its immediately
surrounding period. If Heidegger’s influence were limited to the period of Act and Being, then
perhaps Heidegger’s influence is only of minor import. If, however, Heidegger was important for
Act and Being and if the constructive theological position that Bonhoeffer comes to in Act and
Being continues to influence his later, more mature works, then Heidegger’s influence should
also be present in Bonhoeffer’s later works as well. This would make Bonhoeffer’s relation to
Heidegger important for a significant portion of Bonhoeffer’s corpus. I believe this is the case
and there is some scholarly precedent for believing so. Plant, with reasonable caution, argues that
Heidegger is still important for Bonhoeffer’s “Lectures on Christology.” 35 I believe Plant is quite
right here; though, as I hope to show, one does not have to be quite so cautious. Consider, for
example, Bonhoeffer’s opening and guiding question of the lecture: “So the christological
question is in its essence an ontological question. Its purpose is to bring out the ontological
structure of the who, without getting caught in either the Scylla of the ‘how question’ or the
35
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Charybdis of the ‘that question’.” 36 This is certainly a Heideggerian opening and framing of the
issue. And Bonhoeffer’s answer maintains and expands on many of the themes and answers that
he adapted from Heidegger in Act and Being.
Bonhoeffer’s analysis and use of Heidegger represents one of the earliest, most thorough,
and accurate Protestant theological engagements with Heidegger. Though Bultmann knew
Heidegger since the latter’s move to Marburg in 1923, it was not until the 1928 publication of
Bultmann’s “The Eschatology of the Gospel of John” that Heidegger’s influence became
apparent. 37 And Bultmann did not give an explicit account or defense of his use of Heidegger
until the 1930 publication of “The Historicity of Dasein and Faith” in response to Kuhlmann’s
1929 “Towards the Theological Problem of Existence: Questions to Rudolf Bultmann.” 38 Emil
Brunner did not theologically tackle Heidegger until his 1931 “Theology and Ontology.” 39 And,
of course, Barth was largely silent on the matter. Again, Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being, begun in
1929, was accepted in 1930. Despite this, and the general accuracy and uniqueness of
Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger, it has not gained the attention it deserves. For example, in her
otherwise excellent works, Heidegger’s Eschatology and Heidegger and Theology, Judith Wolfe
examines the above figures’ relations to Heidegger; yet, Bonhoeffer is conspicuously absent. To
understand exactly how Bonhoeffer offers a unique theological adaptation of Heidegger, it is
necessary to place him in context with his contemporaries grappling with the same issue,
particularly Bultmann.

36
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Based on the criteria of Heidegger’s own philosophy, his understanding of its relation to
theology, and the theological sources Bonhoeffer and Heidegger shared, Bonhoeffer, I will
argue, offers a unique and viable theological engagement with Heidegger. Though Barth and
Heidegger are ironically close to one another on a number of important and general points, such
as the division of theology and philosophy, they rarely spoke about or reacted to one another.
The usefulness of Barth’s reaction to Heidegger is then quite limited. Bonhoeffer, compared to
Brunner, has a much more accurate and detailed understanding of Heidegger’s Being and Time.
Brunner’s brief and superficial analysis of Heidegger is, then, of little import as a viable
theological reaction to Heidegger. Given Bultmann’s lengthy and direct personal relation to
Heidegger, his understanding of Heidegger is undoubtedly the most accurate. Despite or perhaps
even because of Bultmann’s close relationship with Heidegger, he does not adhere to the rather
strict division of theology and philosophy as Heidegger understood it. It is here that Bonhoeffer
has a distinctive advantage over Bultmann. For Heidegger, the division of theology and
philosophy, with only a rather small window of interaction between the two, was integral to the
success of both theology and philosophy. Bultmann’s use of Heidegger breaches this division in
a way that Bonhoeffer’s use does not. From a Heideggerian point of view, this makes
Bonhoeffer’s use a credible theological alternative to Bultmann. Evaluating Bonhoeffer’s
theological use of Heidegger by Heidegger’s own standards and comparing that use to Bultmann
in order to validate Bonhoeffer as a viable alternative is then the goal of chapter six.
Before turning to the main tasks of my argument there is an unfortunate and delicate
topic that must be addressed. On the 1st of May 1933, Heidegger joined the National Socialist
party. By contrast, Bonhoeffer was executed on the 9th of April 1945, in part, because of his
peripheral involvement in the failed coup attempt on the 20th of July 1944. This raises one
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question that may take many different forms. Its most visceral formulation would be something
like the following: How much use could a person martyred by Nazis find in the work of a
Nazi? 40 Obviously my answer is “Much,” which requires some defense. First, there are a few
historical points to keep in mind. Bonhoeffer only knew and made use of Being and Time, 41
which was published in 1927 six years before Heidegger joined the National Socialists.
Bonhoeffer’s most explicit and direct use of Heidegger is from 1928 to 1932. Technically, there
was no “Heidegger, the Nazi” at this time. There is, then, a sense in which the question is itself
historically inappropriate. For some plausible reasons this answer might still be unsatisfactory.
There might be some important connections between Heidegger’s life and his philosophy such
that his joining the National Socialists is a live issue that reverberates back to Being and Time.
There are various routes one might take to address this concern. I could try to mitigate,
justify, or explain away Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis. One could say that Heidegger’s
involvement with the Nazis was neither intensive nor extensive enough to be concerned about;
the contamination did not run so deep or for so long. By comparison to some or many during this
time this is undoubtedly true. For those, however, that find the above question troubling, it may
be that there is a qualitative difference between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer for which no
quantitative quibbling could account.
Perhaps the most frequent and serious approach directly addresses the relation between
Heidegger’s life and his philosophy. This option contains perhaps the worst and best possible
answers. First, one might say that there is a strict divorce between his philosophy and his life; in
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other words, Heidegger’s Nazism does not lead to his philosophy and, more importantly for our
present concerns, that his philosophy does not lead to his Nazism. This simply cannot hold.
Heidegger attests to some kind of relation between the two in both general theoretical and in
particular practical terms. One of the premises on which Heidegger’s philosophy is built is that a
philosophy arises from a philosopher’s life and this is explicitly Heidegger’s method of
philosophizing, which is in fact, as we will see in chapter three, one of Heidegger’s key
theoretical successes according to Bonhoeffer. As Heidegger states to Karl Lӧwith in 1921: “I
work concretely and factically out of my ‘I am’—out of my spiritual and thoroughly factic
heritage, my milieu, my life contexts, and whatever is available to me from these, as the vital
experience in which I live.” 42 And according to Lӧwith, Heidegger specifically linked Being and
Time, particularly his understanding of historicity, to his joining the National Socialist party. 43
Though life and philosophy cannot be strictly divorced neither can they be directly,
causally linked. To say that Heidegger’s philosophy directly and necessarily leads to something
like Nazism is as fallacious as strictly separating the two. In theology, for example, it seems to
be impossible to make a definitive link between the theology of a particular theologian and their
acceptance or rejection of Nazism. 44 Friedrich Gogarten and Barth were close personal and
theological friends until Gogarten’s outspoken support of Hitler and Barth’s staunch rejection of
the same. Similarly, Heidegger had too many philosophical kin and protégés that did not join the
National Socialists to claim a direct link between his philosophy and Nazism.
The real answer must lie somewhere in the middle or in some more nuanced position. I
believe this is, in its general contours, a Bonhoefferian, and perhaps a Heideggerian, response:
42

Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, eds., Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings,
1910-1927 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 99.
43
Karl Löwith, My Life in Germany before and after 1933: A Report, trans. Elizabeth King (London: Continuum,
1993), 60.
44
For example, see Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

19

There must be some links between the life that Heidegger led, the philosophy that such a life
gave rise to, and his eventual involvement with the National Socialists, but this cannot tout court
make him of no use to Bonhoeffer (or us). Once Heidegger’s philosophy is appropriated into
one’s life, it is in some way altered by the new life it enters. At that point, Heidegger’s
philosophy is no longer strictly or only Heidegger’s. How Heidegger interprets himself and his
philosophy, and what use he puts it to is not then the sole, authoritative option. The philosophy
or theology that arises from that life might then be importantly transformed by someone like
Bonhoeffer without it inevitably leading to something like joining the Nazi party. Or to give it a
more theological twist, which I believe Bonhoeffer might approve of: Philosophy is something
that occurs under the Law. Though lacking important elements of the truth or being improperly
oriented to the truth, good philosophy can get something right, and therefore cannot simply be
discarded. A theologian, if doing theology properly, may take and transform that philosophy in
light of a life in faith. Through such a transformation, theology may place philosophy in the truth
and ‘redeem’ it.
Finally, as Plant notes, “Of course it matters that Heidegger was a Nazi because
Heidegger’s life was the ‘sphere of the familiar’ in which his ideas came to presence. But that is
no reason to dismiss him […] one must weigh the texts.” 45 With that, the best support I can give
for my answer that Bonhoeffer gains much from Heidegger’s early philosophy, despite
Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis, is the detailed analysis that follows.
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Chapter One: The Problem of Act and Being
As the title, Act and Being, suggests, Bonhoeffer’s Habilitationschrift seeks to come to some
understanding concerning the concepts of act and being, and the opening section, “The
Problem,” provides the reader with some “general and preliminary” characteristics of “act” and
“being.” 1 Temporally, act is discontinuous, discreet, and momentary; some forms of act-concepts
are even atemporal. Being, on the other hand, is characterized by continuity and duration through
time. Because act is discrete, that is discontinuous with previous and subsequent acts and not
necessitated by the conditions of previous acts, it is modally contingent. Being, however, is
understood as potentiality and possibility, and more specifically being exists out of its own
possibility. Relationally, act must always relate to an other; 2 while being is confined to itself
because it exists from its own possibility. 3 Concerning the actual concepts of “act” and “being,”
this is all Bonhoeffer provides the reader before moving on to evaluate particular philosophies. It
is quite understandable, then, that a reader would be frustrated by the opaque and formal nature
of Bonhoeffer’s characterizations of these central, organizing concepts. It is therefore necessary
to do what Bonhoeffer did not, i.e. slow down and parse out the details of the work’s central
concepts and organizing problem.

1
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First, it is important to keep in mind that “act” and “being” for Bonhoeffer do not
primarily designate things, but different ways or orientations of thought; philosophies and
theologies are generally either oriented more toward act or toward being. Bonhoeffer’s concern
is not merely to come to an understanding of what “act” and “being” are. As the above “general
and preliminary” characteristics suggest, Bonhoeffer already has a general understanding of what
he thinks constitutes “act” and “being.” Though Bonhoeffer will concern himself with particular
instances of “act” and “being,” such as the knowing act of the subject and the being of the object
of knowledge, this is also not his primary focus, save his ultimate concern with understanding
revelation as both “act” and “being.” Bonhoeffer’s primary concern is to understand how
philosophical and theological thought can manifest primarily act- or being-characteristics.
One of the primary uses to which Bonhoeffer puts the concepts of “act” and “being” is
then to divide different theologies and philosophies into camps. In other words, there are
philosophies and theologies that are primarily act-oriented, and those that are primarily beingoriented. By dividing philosophies and theologies in this way, Bonhoeffer is not stating that, for
example, a being-philosophy has no “act” characteristics or is not concerned with act. Rather,
Bonhoeffer is mapping general characteristics that a philosophy or theology may have. Scheler,
for example, frequently uses both the words “act” and “being.” Yet because Scheler privileges
the being of phenomena over the act of the subject coming to know phenomena, Bonhoeffer
classifies him as a being-philosopher. And this strategy of classification applies to all the other
major philosophers and theologians with whom Bonhoeffer engages. Kant and Hegel are
primarily act-oriented philosophers. Scheler and Heidegger are primarily being-oriented
philosophers. Barth and Karl Holl are act- and being-oriented theologians respectively.
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Act and Being is not simply about the general tendency for philosophies and theologies to
be oriented either towards act- or being-concepts; Act and Being seeks to solve problems that
arise when either act or being are overemphasized. 4 As the opening sentence of Act and Being
states, “The most recent developments in theology appear to me to be an attempt to come to an
agreement about the problem of act and being.” 5 As might be apparent from the above general
characterizations of the categories of act and being, they are oppositional in nature. The problem
of act and being, however, is not a question of deciding whether to emphasize act- or beingconcepts. 6 Again, all philosophies and theologies will contain some aspects of both act and
being. As inherently oppositional, however, an overemphasis on either side tends to override or
dominate the other. The general and formal problem of act and being is then the problem of
coordinating act- and being-concepts. 7 The need to coordinate act and being, for Bonhoeffer, is
manifested in and affects many particular philosophical and theological problems. Examples of
such questions and problems include: How are the successive acts of seeing portions of a house
made into the unified perception and understanding of the being of the house? 8 How can
philosophy understand identity such that it is not composed of completely free and unrelated
acts, yet such that acts arising from one’s being or identity may themselves affect one’s being? 9
4
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How can the continuity of the existence of the church in history be brought together with the
discrete acts, both communal and individual, of revelation that create the church? How can the
discrete acts of revelation themselves be made continuous such that they are not arbitrary? These
are particular problems that have gripped modern philosophy and theology. Bonhoeffer’s
contention is that all these more particular problems share a general form; they are all trying to
understand the respective phenomena according to what Bonhoeffer calls the categories of act
and being. However, satisfactory solutions to these more localized problems have eluded
philosophy and theology because they have not understood the general framework and problem
that these particular problems manifest, i.e. the need to coordinate act and being.
The historical scope to which Bonhoeffer applies this problem of act and being is
simultaneously extensive and yet localized. As Bonhoeffer tells the story, the inability to
coordinate act and being is evident at least as far back as the birth of modern philosophy with
Descartes and with intimations that some major Medieval Scholastic debates might also manifest
this problem. 10 However, the earliest figures that Bonhoeffer focuses on are Kant and Hegel.
Even these earlier figures, though, are read and evaluated, at least in part, through
contemporaneous religious and theological appropriations of them. The opening line of Act and
Being indicates that “the most recent developments in theology,” that is early 20th century
theologies and their philosophical presuppositions, are Bonhoeffer’s real concern. 11
This is, in fact, more than an actual reader of Act and Being gets in its opening pages
before Bonhoeffer turns to evaluating instances of act- and being-philosophies, leaving the
Notre Dame Press, 2007), 205 and 214. In aesthetics, Gadamer’s characterizations and critiques of “aesthetic
differentiation” and the experience (Erlebnis) of art may also be good examples. Here the continuity of the work of
art and one’s experience (Erfahrung) is jeopardized insofar as the world in which the work of art is imbedded is
abstracted out. In Bonhoeffer’s terms, the experience (Erlebnis) of the work of art is an isolating act that threatens
the continuity of the being of the work of art and one’s experience of it. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method,
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Second Revised edition (New York: Continuum, 2004), 74.
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reader understandably frustrated. Bonhoeffer’s initial characterizations of “act,” “being,” and the
need to coordinate them is rather opaque and formal. It also apparently covers a large historical
scope and various philosophical and theological schools of thought. A problem that can include
and guide an interpretation of so many divergent theological and philosophical schools of
thought could be seen as so formal as to risk vacuousness. However, a close reading of the work
in its entirety does provide the reader with actual content to the problem. As Bonhoeffer
understands the need to coordinate act and being, it must occur at three different, yet nested,
conceptual levels, and there are four criteria any philosophy or theology must meet in order to
count as an adequate solution at any of these three levels.
For our purposes, it is particularly important to understand these nuanced aspects of
coordinating act and being in order to understand Bonhoeffer’s evaluations of Heidegger.
Heidegger works at a particular conceptual level of the problem and meets the four criteria in
particular ways. In such a way, in fact, that Bonhoeffer will find Heidegger valuable for
coordinating act and being for theology.
The Three Conceptual Levels of the Problem of Act and Being12
For Bonhoeffer, the problem is not simply a matter of coordinating act- and being-concepts in
general; rather one must coordinate such concepts at three distinct, though importantly related,
conceptual levels: the epistemological, anthropological, and theological. Bonhoeffer is not as
explicit on this point as the reader might like, but in the opening section of Act and Being,
Bonhoeffer does say that
the encounter with the problem of knowledge provides the first clarification of the
problem of act and being […] Here, the question of knowledge is the understanding of
Dasein trying its wings, seeking in reflection to adapt to a world, that is, to find itself in
12
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it. It is, in other words, the question of human beings. Though the latter does not follow
from the former, it is their connection that is essential: the meaning of epistemology is
anthropology […] But because the concept of knowledge comprises in itself the necessity
of transcending the known through the process of knowing, and vice versa, the
understanding of Dasein in reference to transcendence is, in one form or another, part of
the question of knowledge. This suggests that the question of God is a part of it, too. 13
The details of the above quotation might still be rather opaque, but what we do get is that there
are these three conceptual levels of epistemology, anthropology, and theology.
It is not simply, however, that there are these three levels, but that these levels are related
in a particular, nested way. The coordination of act and being at the epistemological level
requires a coordination at the anthropological level that itself requires coordination at the
theological level.
According to Bonhoeffer, most of modern philosophy and theology has given too much
attention to the problem of act and being at the epistemological level and missed the fact that any
solution for a theory of knowledge must first depend on a solution in anthropology. 14 According
to Bonhoeffer this epistemological obsession has been prevalent since the birth of modern
philosophy with Descartes. 15
It had been the basic mistake of Descartes and all his followers that, in explicating the
cogito sum, they neglected to put the question of being to the sum. But this question
cannot be raised unless there ‘is something like an understanding of being’. 16
As the quotation shows, Bonhoeffer takes the position that to properly engage in epistemology
and develop a theory of knowledge one must be grounded in a proper understanding of that kind
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of existence that can know. 17 Modern philosophy’s concern with coordinating the act of the
knowing subject with the being of the known object has blinded modern philosophy to the fact
that any solution here in epistemology depends on a correct anthropology. Act- and beingconcepts must be coordinated in human existence. This is, in fact, where Heidegger makes his
first and most obvious contribution to Act and Being. According to Bonhoeffer, Heidegger has
solved the problem of act and being at the anthropological level. 18
For Bonhoeffer the theologian, however, the true and complete solution to the problem of
act and being must occur at the theological level. Just as a solution at the epistemological level
depends on the anthropological level, so too does a solution at the anthropological level depend
on the theological level. According to Bonhoeffer, all philosophies either begin with or slide into
a conception of the self as an “autonomous I understanding itself only in terms of itself and
subject only to itself.” 19 A fuller explanation of what Bonhoeffer means here and why he
believes he is justified in saying it will have to wait; suffice it to say, for Bonhoeffer, if one
remains at the problem of act and being at the anthropological level, then one will only ever be
concerned with an account of human existence isolated from others and God. Without a solution
to this problem of isolation, it is impossible, according to Bonhoeffer, for the self to be properly
open to the other, whether that other is the object of knowledge, fellow humans, or God. A
proper anthropology that would solve this problem then depends on coordinating act and being at
the theological level.
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A solution at the theological level would involve coordinating act and being in the
concept of revelation, specifically revelation as the person of Jesus Christ. Just as the problem of
coordinating the act of knowing with the being of the object known is nested in the problem of
human existence, so too is the problem of human existence as both act and being nested within
the problem of coordinating act and being in the person of Jesus Christ. 20 This will become
clearer when we move from Bonhoeffer’s appraisals of Heidegger’s anthropological solution in
chapters three and four to Bonhoeffer’s theological use of Heidegger in chapter five. But I might
succinctly state it as follows: Just as the knowing subject and known object occur in and arise
from Dasein for Heidegger, so too does Dasein occur in and arise from the person of Jesus Christ
particularly as the church for Bonhoeffer.
One cannot, however, simply begin with a theological solution and work back up, as one
might think given the nested relationship of the three levels. The theological level is not
immediately accessible, and, despite modern philosophy’s misguided obsession with
epistemology, that obsession has garnered fruitful and convenient material for understanding the
problem of coordinating act and being in general. 21 Bonhoeffer’s procedure is to begin with the
epistemological and work down to the anthropological before turning to the theological and
working back up through theological anthropology and theological epistemology. It is true that
each stage of this procedure is a testing ground for what will eventually be Bonhoeffer’s
theological solution. Bonhoeffer does say, for example, that “the problem of knowledge provides
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the first clarification of the problem of act and being.” 22 But it does not appear to be simply that.
First, the problem at a higher level, such as anthropology, is a manifestation of the problem at a
more fundamental level, such as theology. If we understand the problem at the higher level of
epistemology, then we are better equipped to understand the problem at the more fundamental
level of anthropology. Second, as a larger historical practice, “the question of knowledge is […]
Dasein trying its wings, seeking in reflection to adapt to a world, that is, to find itself in it.” 23 It is
not only a preparatory stage in Bonhoeffer’s systematic work, but a preparatory stage for
Dasein’s understanding. The epistemological level is in some sense the easiest level with, by
Bonhoeffer’s time, nearly three hundred years of trial and error.
Though developments at the anthropological level are rather recent, culminating in
Heidegger’s Being and Time with hints of antecedents in Kierkegaard and Dilthey, it is no less
structurally necessary to pass through that level before coming to the theological level. The
anthropological level tells us something about human existence as “person.” 24 Since Bonhoeffer
believes that a theological solution involves coordinating act and being in the concept of
revelation understood as the person of Jesus Christ, the anthropological level has much to
contribute to the theological level.
Once the problem is solved for theology only then may one move back through the
anthropological and epistemological levels. This point is clear in Bonhoeffer’s initial, formal
suggestion at a solution presented in Act and Being’s opening section. A proper theological
solution to the problem of act and being must, according to Bonhoeffer, use both “purely
transcendental” and “purely ontological” solutions, represented by Kant and Heidegger
respectively. Joining such solutions in order to provide an act-being coordinated account of
22
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revelation then allows one to come to a theologically acceptable “concept of the person.” 25
According to this theological concept of person “the theological concepts of object and
knowledge […] must be recast.” 26
The conceptual and hermeneutic importance of the different levels of the problem of act
and being cannot be overemphasized. Missing it risks misinterpretations of key aspects of Act
and Being or even the work in its entirety. To my knowledge no one misses the point that Act
and Being is theological. But what kind of theology? Theological epistemology, theological
anthropology, ecclesiology, etc.? These are all important topics of Act and Being, yet none are
the heart of the work; they are all secondary and tertiary concerns. Bonhoeffer’s goal is to reach
to the fundamental level of the problem of act and being. Only by addressing the problem at its
deepest can the secondary and tertiary manifestations finally be solved. This fundamental level is
theological ontology, or how revelation itself is a coordination of act and being. 27 Often
secondary scholarship stops at some secondary or tertiary problem. Eberhard Bethge stops at the
interrelation of theological epistemology and ecclesiology. 28 Heinrich Ott sees the sociological
and ecclesiological as central, rather than secondary; he makes theological epistemology
secondary rather than tertiary; and coming right to the central focus of Act and Being, a
theological ontology of revelation, he makes it secondary, again, to the sociological. 29 Because of
his not unjustified focus on sociality throughout Bonhoeffer’s corpus, Green locates the central
25
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focus of Act and Being in theological anthropology. 30 In a similar fashion and for related reasons,
Ernst Feil sees Act and Being as an attempt to clarify theological epistemology by addressing the
anthropology implied in that epistemology. 31 Larry Rasmussen straightforwardly calls Act and
Being epistemological. 32 These interpretations all have some element of truth to them, but by
misunderstanding the central goal—i.e. to work out an act-being coordinated ontology of
revelation—and the overall conceptual structure—to work down and back up through the three
conceptual levels—various particular and important interpretive issues arise, which will be dealt
with as they become pertinent to the following argument.
Not recognizing that there are these three levels and that they are nested within one
another may also lead to particular problems when transitioning from Bonhoeffer’s work on one
level to another. As stated above, the problem of act and being is quite general and formal; it
penetrates all three levels. As such the way in which the problem occurs at all three levels will
have some basic similarities, though there will also be some important differences. Navigating
these similarities and differences can be difficult, particularly if one does not recognize that there
are these different levels and that Bonhoeffer transitions between them. Because of the general
similarity of the problem at all three levels, what one learns at one level will be informative for
dealing with the problem at another level; hence, statements by Bonhoeffer such as “The
encounter with the problem of knowledge provides the first clarification of the problem of act
and being” and “[I]t must be highly instructive for theology to see worked out in philosophy a
metaphysical definition of the interrelationship of act and being.” 33 One cannot, however, expect
tout court transfers of solutions at one level to another, again, because a true solution at a higher
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level requires a solution at a lower level. This can lead to some confusion as Bonhoeffer often
jumps from praise to critique with little to no indication that such assessments are framed by
criteria dependent on the particular level within which he is working. It is, therefore, important
to be mindful of the general moves that Bonhoeffer makes and that are applicable at each level,
while also noting the particular, important differences that occur between each level. If one
simply asks oneself what level Bonhoeffer is working on at any particular time, then many
confusions and apparent contradictions in Act and Being can be avoided.
The Four Sub-Criteria for a Solution to the Problem of Act and Being
As if these three nested levels of the problem of act and being did not complicate the problem
enough, there are additionally four interrelated sub-criteria or sub-problems that any possible
solution must meet in order to actually count as a solution at any given level, at least as far I have
been able to identify. These are the problems of transcendence, boundary, continuity, and
concreteness. Bonhoeffer does not explicitly and conveniently list these four sub-criteria, but all
four are prevalent in Bonhoeffer’s praises and critiques of various philosophies and theologies.
They are also all identified in secondary scholarship; though to my knowledge no instance of
secondary scholarship has included all four or disambiguated some of the more closely related
ones. 34 But identifying and disambiguating these sub-criteria is necessary for appreciating the
complex assessments Bonhoeffer makes of philosophical and theological attempts at a solution
to the problem of act and being. And they are crucial in understanding and appreciating the fine
line that Bonhoeffer’s own attempt at a solution is trying to walk. As such these sub-criteria will
help in the following chapters to structure the reconstruction and evaluation of Bonhoeffer’s
34
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presentation and appraisals of philosophical attempts to solve the problem of act and being. As
all four criteria are operative at all three levels, I will also attempt to give some indication of how
they function at each level. Though Bonhoeffer does not bring all four sub-criteria to bear on
every philosophical attempt to solve the problem of act and being, they are his guiding standards
and all four will have their role to play in Bonhoeffer’s assessment of Heidegger. With some
minor caveats to be disclosed later, of all the philosophical attempts Heidegger’s comes closest
to satisfying these criteria.
Of the four, transcendence is perhaps the most easily identifiable and the first with which
Bonhoeffer deals in any detail. 35 It is first important to note that Bonhoeffer takes for granted the
Kantian and post-Kantian assertion that the mind is not merely passive in coming to know the
world, but is actively structuring and ordering the information it receives. The active mind,
through its structuring faculties and the application of categories and concepts, is a constant
threat to transcendence. For any solution to the problem of act and being to be viable it must
allow for and maintain transcendence. That is, it must maintain otherness, particularly of God
and other human beings. There must be something, such as the thing-in-itself or God, that
reason and human existence is in relation to, yet cannot completely grasp. Here the danger is
most pertinent for act-theologies and -philosophies. There is always the danger that act will not
simply be in relation to the being of the other, but that act will determine or create the being of
the other according to its own nature. Each level has its own particular other or transcendent that
must be maintained. For epistemology, it is the being of the object of knowledge. As we will
see in chapter two, for example, Kant does well with the criterion of transcendence in
epistemology. While the being of the phenomenal object is a creation of the subject’s rational
activity, the being of the thing-in-itself is safeguarded against such activity. For anthropology, it
35
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is both one’s own Dasein and the Dasein of others; there must be a sense in which one’s own
existence cannot be merely at one’s disposal nor can that of other Daseins. 36 Finally, the real
motivation for Bonhoeffer’s concern with the criterion of transcendence is the theological
concern for maintaining God and revelation as transcendent. The general similarity across the
three levels is that such transcendents must not merely be at thought’s disposal such that the
human act of knowing creates their being. Doing so leaves the person isolated because, rather
than actually encountering these transcendents, the person is only encountering themselves
through that which they have created. There are also particular ways in which the three levels
relate concerning transcendence centering around Bonhoeffer’s theological concerns.
Maintaining transcendence in epistemology bolsters the ability of maintaining the transcendence
of God and revelation at the theological level. If our own Dasein and the Dasein of others
remains transcendent, then God and revelation become all the more necessary for accessing the
truth of our existence.
Though the criterion of boundary (Grenze) is closely related to transcendence, it is
important to distinguish them, at least for analytic purposes. 37 A boundary is what maintains
transcendence through the bounding of human reason or existence; however, it is possible to
correctly identify some transcendent, such as the being of the object of knowledge or God,
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without properly identifying the nature of the boundary that maintains it. 38 In fact, of the four
criteria this seems to be the most difficult to satisfy, making it all the more important to
disambiguate it from transcendence. Not one philosopher or theologian evaluated by Bonhoeffer
correctly identifies and maintains a boundary suitable for safeguarding transcendence. For
example, Kant correctly identifies the epistemological transcendent of the thing-in-itself. The
boundary, however, is established by reason itself and, therefore, the idealist temptation to move
beyond it is a constant threat. What is needed is an anthropological boundary, one which bounds
human existence (Dasein), which Heidegger establishes through his philosophy of finitude. 39
Yet, this is established from within Dasein itself and therefore is not a true boundary either. The
final answer, according to Bonhoeffer, is to locate the theological boundary in Christ and work
back up to epistemology through anthropology based on this true boundary that cannot be selfestablished. 40
Though the criterion of continuity does not appear much at the epistemological level, at
the anthropological and theological levels it is equal in importance to the criterion of
transcendence. 41 While transcendence is most closely linked to act-concepts, continuity is most
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closely linked with being-concepts. With act-concepts, and their general characteristics of
discreteness and momentariness, continuity is threatened at the various conceptual levels of the
problem of act and being. Again, Bonhoeffer does not discuss the criterion of continuity at the
epistemological level much, but his concern does seem to be similar to Kant’s in his “Analogies
of Experience.” 42 There must be something that joins the discrete acts of the knowing subject in
constituting the being of the object of knowledge and maintains the continuity of experience. At
the anthropological level an overly act-oriented philosophy risks making the self a mere
succession of acts of knowing and decision. This makes it difficult to account for a unified and
continuous self living a life. Rather than inaccurately portray concrete existence as
discontinuous, theologies and philosophies must express the continuity of existence. 43 In
theology, if act-concepts dominate, then revelation would also seem to be a mere succession of
discreet acts of revelation on God’s part. One would not be able to account for a continuity of
God or of God’s relation to the world. This would then work back up to theological
anthropology and epistemology. Revelation is what imparts theological knowledge and the
actual state of being a Christian. If revelation is then merely a succession of discreet acts, then
one cannot account for any continuity of Christian knowledge or identity. Being-concepts must
then be properly coordinated with act-concepts in order to account for continuity at all three
levels.
Just as boundary was closely tied to transcendence, so too is concreteness related to
continuity. 44 It is possible for a philosophy or theology to maintain continuity in the abstract and
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yet not fulfill the criterion of concreteness. The criterion of concreteness is concerned with
whether a particular philosophy or theology both begins with and can return to life as it is
actually lived. 45 For example, though Bonhoeffer admits that Hegel’s idealism appears to have
coordinated act and being, Hegel fails, among other reasons, for having written “a philosophy of
angels, but not of human Dasein.” 46 As Bonhoeffer reads Hegel and the idealist tradition, they
fail at concreteness because they cannot adequately account for historical existence. History is
abstractly approached and made to conform to a presupposed system. 47 A significant aspect of
Bonhoeffer’s positive appraisal of Heidegger is that, for Heidegger, “Dasein is neither a
discontinuous succession of individual acts nor the continuity of a being that transcends time”;
rather, “Dasein is the existence of human beings in their historicity.” 48 An atemporal continuity
or a continuity that does not take historical existence into account does not qualify as having
satisfied the criterion. Continuity must affect existence for it to be at all viable. 49 At the
epistemological level this would mean that knowledge of objects must be determined by the
actual ways in which we live in relation to those objects; here one may think of Heidegger’s
distinction between the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand where the former is the practical and
privileged, though traditionally neglected, knowledge we have of equipment in the world. 50 For
anthropology, ourselves, others, and our relation to others must be understood as a dynamic

45

DBWE 2: 31-2, 39, 54, 56, 108, 114-5, and 123 (DBW 2: 26, 32-3, 48, 50, 105, 111-2, and 120-1). Concreteness
is important for Bonhoeffer well beyond Act and Being, as Feil correctly points out. Feil, The Theology of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, 45. Bonhoeffer’s concern with concreteness is also present prior to Act and Being ; see DBWE 9: 285
(DBW 9: 305-6) and DBWE 1: 48 (DBW 1: 28); however, his actual meeting of this criterion becomes quite
different beginning with Act and Being, which is the point from which his later concerns with concreteness develop.
For example, see DBWE 10: 377 (DBW 10: 344) and DBWE 6: 49, 73, 220, 379 (DBW 6: 33-4, 59-60, 219, and
382).
46
DBWE 2: 42 (DBW 2: 35); translation altered.
47
Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 36–7.
48
DBWE 2: 71 (DBW 2: 65-6); cf. SZ 374. All page references to Being and Time refer to the marginal German
paginations.
49
DBWE 2: 114 (DBW 2: 110-11).
50
SZ 69-76.

37

rather than a static continuity; 51 it must account for our existence as temporal and historical, as
individuals participating in actual traditions. At the theological level, one must account for how
one can concretely encounter revelation as the person of Christ, how the church is a temporal and
historical entity constituted by revelation, and how one’s Christian identity is constituted by
actually living in the church.
The above four sub-criteria necessary for a solution to the more general problem of act
and being are intended to avoid the construction of a totalizing system. 52 For Bonhoeffer all
thought is under the constant temptation, even need, to construct a system: “At the basis of all
thinking lies the necessity of a system. Thinking is essentially systematic thinking, because it
rests upon itself, it is the last ground and criterion of itself. System means interpretation of the
whole through the one, which is its ground and its center, the thinking ego.” 53 This need to think
systematically or create a system is the constant threat looming behind all philosophies and
theologies. It is the danger to which the movement from Kant to Hegel ultimately succumbs and
which lies hidden in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Scheler. 54 Even Heidegger cannot
completely escape this final problem given his atheistic philosophy of finitude. 55
The historical and theological origin of this problem lies in one of Luther’s definitions of
sin as cor curvum in se (the heart turned in on itself) or ratio in se ipsam incurve (reason turned
in on itself). 56 Luther’s, and with him Bonhoeffer’s, concern is that human reason and existence
sees itself as the foundation of the world and is then only ever able to encounter itself and never
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God. Bonhoeffer presents the logic of his theological concerns as follows: “Through the act of
knowing, the known is put at the disposition of the I; it can be classified within the system of
knowledge. As something known, it ‘is’ only in this system. The aim of cognition is to close this
system. If this happens, the I has become lord of the world.” 57 Essentially, then, Bonhoeffer’s
concern to avoid a closed, totalizing system is a concern to avoid an intellectual form of sin. In
creating a system, reason or human existence places itself in a position properly held by God.
Therefore, as Bonhoeffer says, “revelation stands against the system, for God is lord of the
world, and the true system is but an eschatological possibility.” 58
Transcendence, boundary, continuity and concreteness are all intended to break the
temptation to construct a totality or a system into which everything collapses. 59 Transcendence
properly identifies that which cannot fall under the power of human reason and existence
allowing humans to be actually encountered by that which is outside. Proper boundaries safeguard transcendence by letting what is truly transcendent, rather than ourselves, set such
boundaries. Continuity would seem to be an exception; the construction of a totalizing system
would seem to be an easy means to assuring continuity. Here Bonhoeffer’s concern is entirely
theological. If a theology does not allow for continuity in revelation’s relation to history, then
one is thrown back on the question of continuity at the anthropological level. If continuity is
merely reached at the anthropological level, then the continuity is achieved by human means and
apart from God. The person is, then, trapped within themselves. Concreteness insures that a
dynamic, changing historical existence is constantly thwarting attempts at constructing totalizing
systems.

57

DBWE 2: 94 (DBW 2: 89).
DBWE 2: 94 (DBW 2: 89-90).
59
Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 102; Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 55–9.
58

39

It is important to note that Bonhoeffer does make a distinction between a true system and
untrue systems. The true system is an eschatological possibility into which we are placed by
God. Bonhoeffer does not provide much clarity beyond that. What is important, however, is
Bonhoeffer’s assertion that until this eschatological possibility is met there is no escape from
untrue systems. Rather we must continually meet the above criteria in order to continually
disrupt untrue systems. 60
The above account of Bonhoeffer’s problem of act and being is intended to function as a
road map for the chapters to follow. We now know that the general problem of act and being
occurs when one of the two categories of concepts dictates the other. We also know that this
general problem occurs at three nested conceptual levels, the epistemological, anthropological,
and theological. And the solution at one level requires a solution to the problem at successively
more fundamental levels. Yet it is important to understand the problem at each level before
moving on to the next. At each level the construction of a totalizing system that traps the person
within themselves must be avoided by fulfilling the requirements of transcendence, boundary,
continuity, and concreteness. With this general road map in place, it is possible to move on, in
the next chapter, to the various attempts at a solution to the problem of act and being at the level
of philosophical epistemology.
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Chapter Two: Epistemological-Philosophical Attempts at a Solution
Bonhoeffer on Philosophy and Its Lutheran Context
Act and Being is theological from beginning to end. This means that Part A, “The Problem of
Act and Being, Portrayed in a Preparatory Manner as the Epistemological Problem of an
Autonomous Understanding of Dasein in Philosophy,” despite its focus on philosophy, is also
theological. While explicating and evaluating the various epistemological-philosophical
attempts at a solution to the problem of act and being, Bonhoeffer already has his final
theological solution in mind, and therefore he also already has in mind how each philosophical
attempt will contribute to that solution. This makes the structure of Act and Being a hermeneutic
circle. Having some general sense of his presupposed theological framework is then necessary
for appreciating Bonhoeffer’s presentation and evaluation of philosophy in Part A. Otherwise,
one might misunderstand Part A as Bonhoeffer merely flexing his philosophical muscles or as an
evaluation of philosophy by strictly philosophical standards. While Bonhoeffer will use and
endorse some philosophical arguments, it is always because such arguments serve his larger
theological purpose, particularly when philosophical arguments are self-destructive. 1 Before
moving to these philosophical attempts it is then necessary to understand the theological stance
from which Bonhoeffer is judging them.
1
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As I pointed out in the introduction, Bonhoeffer takes up a nuanced position amid the
surrounding debate concerning how theology could properly relate to philosophy. Bultmann,
with his unabashed and near in toto appropriation of Heidegger, is an example of one extreme
whereby theology operates from a particular philosophy. Barth, in contrast, clearly assumed the
complete independence of theology from philosophy. Bonhoeffer’s approach is more complex,
with theology being the final arbiter of truth that may take over philosophy as long as it makes
the appropriate theological transformations. 2 As the title of Part A of Act and Being indicates,
Bonhoeffer sees philosophy as preparatory. That is, it functions as a preparation for his own
theological solution. And throughout Part A Bonhoeffer makes statements such as the following:
“In what follows, nevertheless, genuine transcendental philosophy and genuine ontology—as
distinct from idealism and phenomenology—are said to make a contribution to the understanding
of the problem of act and being within the concept of revelation.” 3
That Bonhoeffer has a generally more positive, yet still theologically determined and
nuanced understanding of theology’s relation to philosophy is clear throughout his corpus. 4 This
is an approach that has precedent in Sanctorum Communio, where he uses sociological and social
philosophical concepts to inform his ecclesiology. For example, in describing Sanctorum
Communio’s method, Bonhoeffer says that “it will be carried out on the foundation of Christian
theology and will make fruitful for theology the insights that derive purely from social
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philosophy and sociology.” 5 In his “The Theology of Crisis and Its Attitude toward Philosophy
and Science” (1930/31), Bonhoeffer says, “it has to be confessed that Protestantism as yet lacks
its proper philosophical terminology,” 6 implying that theology does need philosophy for
conceptual and terminological clarity. Recounting Bonhoeffer’s 1933 seminar on Hegel’s
philosophy of religion, Ferenc Lehel captures Bonhoeffer’s general treatment of philosophy in
Bonhoeffer’s specific treatment of Hegel:
Bonhoeffer read the philosophy of Hegel as a theologian, in fact as an ecclesiologically
oriented theologian. He looked for theology in the philosophy. You feel the joy of
discovery, in which even we had been involved. Just as the expert in monument
restoration is delighted when he has scraped free and reached the oldest layers and most
valuable structural components and caresses it affectionately, so Bonhoeffer delights in
church, world, incarnation, creation, reality, and history. The lofty system that had been
built thereupon did not fascinate him. The joy over what has been found speaks louder
than the aggravation with the stylistically alien [i.e. to theology] edifice. In a certain
sense, Bonhoeffer treats Hegel eclectically by examining Hegel’s philosophy of religion
and highlighting what, to him, the theologian, appeared valuable. 7
This interest in a fruitful engagement with philosophy is still conceptually supported by the
penultimate/ultimate distinction in his Ethics, 8 and Bonhoeffer continued to read philosophy
while in prison. 9 Throughout his corpus, then, Bonhoeffer holds a complex understanding of
philosophy as theology’s useful and necessary handmaiden. 10
This life-long engagement with philosophy, which is particularly strong in Bonhoeffer’s
early works, arises from and is oriented by an equally long confessional commitment to Martin
Luther, particularly Luther’s law/gospel distinction. As Wolf Krӧtke correctly states, without
exaggeration, “Luther is present more than anyone else at every stage of [Bonhoeffer’s] path and
5
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in every dimension of his thought. This is obvious from even a cursory glance at both
Bonhoeffer’s life and his writings.” 11 To understand Bonhoeffer on philosophy it is therefore
also important to understand the Luther from which he is drawing in order to come to his basic
position on philosophy.
Luther’s law/gospel distinction is a basic, though complex, one that guides his entire
theological enterprise. The law/gospel distinction guides his biblical hermeneutics, political and
social theology, ecclesiology, and most centrally his soteriology. One’s understanding of the
law/gospel distinction is, therefore, Luther’s litmus test for a true theologian: “Therefore
whoever knows well how to distinguish the Gospel from the Law should give thanks to God and
know that he is a real theologian.” 12
In general, the law has two uses or functions, its civic use and its theological use: “Here
one must know that there is a double use of the Law. One is the civic use. God has ordained civic
laws, indeed all laws, to restrain transgressions.” 13 First, it is important to recognize that this first
use of the law is not autonomous, standing apart from God. God in fact ordains this sense and
use of the law. Also, this ‘civic’ use should be understood in the broadest sense possible.
Anything that restrains acts of sin or immorality is included under this first use of the law. So not
only ‘ordinances’ created by states or governments but also “parents” and “teachers” are
included. 14 As we will see, philosophy has a perfectly acceptable role, according to Luther, to
play in this first use.
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The second use of the law, its theological use under the gospel broadly conceived, rather
than restraining sin, shows the gravity and inescapability of sin. 15 The gospel’s use of the law, as
Luther often formulates it, convicts the conscience. 16
The other use of the Law is the theological or spiritual one, which serves to increase
transgressions. This is the primary purpose of the Law of Moses, that through it sin might
grow and be multiplied, especially in the conscience [….] Therefore the true function and
the chief and proper use of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery,
wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, judgment, and the welldeserved wrath of God. 17
This second, theological use of the law is where the law and gospel overlap. The gospel
in its broadest conception is the preaching of both law, in its theological use, and gospel, in its
narrower sense. The gospel, in the broad sense, uses the theological law to show that one
completely and continually fails to live up to the perfect demands of God, then provides the
gospel, in the narrower sense, to tell the listener that such sins are freely forgiven in faith by the
grace of God: “After the Law has humbled, terrified, and completely crushed you, so that you
are on the brink of despair, then see to it that you know how to use the Law correctly; for its
function and use is not only to disclose the sin and wrath of God but also to drive us to Christ.” 18
What is particularly important for our present purposes is that the second, theological use of the
law must be under the gospel. Only the gospel can properly use the theological law. By extension
this then means that only in faith can one recognize and understand this second use of the law.
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Though Luther is often stereotyped as a despiser of philosophy, instances in his writings
allow for the proper use of philosophy as captured under the category of law. 19 Philosophy most
naturally operates, for Luther, under the first or ‘civic’ use of the law, the use by which
immorality is restrained:
God wants the Law to be taught, and He Himself reveals it; nay, He even writes it upon
the hearts of all human beings, as Paul demonstrates in Rom. 2:15. From this natural
knowledge have originated all the books of the more sensible philosophers, such as
Aesop, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, and Cato. It is a good idea to set these books
before uneducated and unruly individuals, that their wicked impulses may in some
measure be counteracted through this training. 20
This quotation tells us three things: First, philosophy, like civil laws, may be used to restrain
“wicked impulses.” Second, there is a type of natural knowledge that one might know apart from
faith or the gospel. Philosophy can know enough about the natural world and humans to be
effective at restraining immorality; this opens a door through which Bonhoeffer is able to bring
philosophy to bear on more than straightforward ethical matters. And third, there are distinctions
between good and bad philosophy, depending on a particular philosophy’s ability to properly
access this natural knowledge; similarly this opens the way for Bonhoeffer to distinguish
between good philosophy, e.g. Kant and Heidegger, and bad philosophy, e.g. Hegel and Husserl.
While even good philosophy cannot access the truth of the gospel or truth only available in faith,
it is not without some access to truth.
While philosophy cannot on its own access the gospel or faith and the truth contained
therein, it can be used by theology in the service of faith or the gospel. The ‘civic’ and
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theological uses of the law are not unrelated. ‘Civic’ law may tell us that murder is wrong.
Incorporated under the broader concept of the gospel, one learns that anger is also a sin. The
gospel may appropriate and transform the truth contained in the first use of the law such that it is
useful under the second use of the law for the gospel and the theologian. Thus, Luther can say,
for example,
According to the theologians, the concept of law necessarily includes the counsel of a
devout man who controls the law as cases develop; thus it does not become harmful, but
the purpose of the law is maintained, namely, to be beneficial and to preserve the peace.
If a law is in conflict with love, it is no law. Love is the mistress and teacher of the law,
who commands a law to keep silence; for in certain cases the law teaches injustice, not
justice. It does this if someone should want to follow it without moderation[….]
Therefore you must learn that peace and love are the moderator and administrator
of all virtues and laws, as Aristotle beautifully says about clemency in the fifth book of
his Ethics. 28
Admittedly, this theological use of philosophy by Luther still falls short of Bonhoeffer’s
theological use of philosophy as I am arguing here. I am arguing not only that, according to
Bonhoeffer, philosophical epistemology, especially in Kant, and philosophical anthropology,
especially in Heidegger, can get some things right; rather, I am also arguing that according to
Bonhoeffer these can be theologically useful for getting the gospel in the narrower sense right as
well. This does push the boundaries of Luther’s views on the profitable use of philosophy by
theology, but it is not without some precedent in Luther himself:
And these five stages in some way are always in motion in man. And whatever is found
in the nature of man—except for the first stage of nonbeing and the last form of
existence, for between these two, nonbeing and being acted upon, there are the three
stages which are always in movement, namely, becoming, being, and acting—through his
new birth he moves from sin to righteousness, and thus from nonbeing through becoming
to being. And when this has happened, he lives righteously. But from this new being,
which is really a nonbeing, man proceeds and passes to another new being by being acted
upon, that is, through becoming new, he proceeds to become better, and from this again
into something new. Thus it is most correct to say that man is always in privation, always
in becoming or in potentiality, in matter, and always in action. Aristotle philosophizes
28
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about such matters, and he does it well, but people do not understand him well. Man is
always in nonbeing, in becoming, in being, always in privation, in potentiality, in action,
always in sin, in justification, in righteousness, that is, he is always a sinner, always a
penitent, always righteous. 21
This is an admittedly dense and opaque passage but deserved to be quoted in full because here
Luther praises and draws on Aristotle to provide an ontological account of the movement from a
state of unrighteousness to a righteous one and to philosophically justify one of Luther’s more
well-known accounts of individuals in faith as simul justus et peccator (simultaneously justified
and sinner). This is philosophy being used to account for a matter properly placed under the
gospel in the narrow sense. 22
One might summarize the positive strand of Luther’s relation to philosophy as follows:
Good philosophy may access natural truth apart from faith or the gospel. It can do so because, as
a proper instance of the first use of the law, it too is ordained by God. Though even good
philosophy cannot access faith, good theology, which works from faith, can turn such philosophy
to the service of the gospel. The way in which Bonhoeffer relates to philosophy, particularly in
Act and Being, is an updated instantiation of this general Lutheran approach to philosophy.
There are particular and general structural indications that demonstrate that Bonhoeffer is
applying this general law/gospel rubric throughout Act and Being (and, again, beyond) and in his
particular engagements with philosophy. First, Bonhoeffer believes that philosophy can be
“preparatory” as the title of Part A indicates. “Preparatory,” here, does not, however, mean that
philosophy has full access to natural truths that need only be completed or capped off by truths
gained from faith or theology. For Bonhoeffer, the complete truth and the full meaning of
philosophy can still only be gained from the standpoint of proper theology. But good philosophy
can prepare the way for theology because it has “thoroughly grasped and thought through the
21
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philosophical problem of act and being.” 23 That is, philosophy has done much of the work to
show the general contours of the problem.
Second, proper philosophies can provide the conceptual tools that proper theology may
appropriate. At the end of Part A, the philosophical section, Bonhoeffer says that an
interpretation of revelation according to act and being can be put “in the sharpest possible
manner” because philosophy has provided such tools. Because of this, such philosophies “are
basically amenable to a theological interpretation and, therefore, of help in the understanding of
the concept of revelation.” 24
In keeping with the law/gospel relation, however, proper theology cannot simply adopt in
toto even good philosophy. The gospel in the broader sense can see the true meaning of the first
use of the law and also that it is incomplete. Proper theology can see the true meaning and
incompleteness of even good philosophy. Even good philosophy is trapped in the cor curvum in
se, trapped in the autonomous ‘I’ understanding itself from itself. 25 Just as the gospel must
reorient the first use of the law to be appropriately used for the gospel, so too must proper
theology reorient good philosophy. Proper theology must replace the autonomous ‘I’ as the
center with Christ as the center, as Bonhoeffer will do.
Third and most importantly, this general law/gospel rubric supports Bonhoeffer’s
understanding of the different conceptual levels of the problem of act and being, and the way in
which Bonhoeffer works through the three levels is evidence of Bonhoeffer’s acceptance of this
general rubric. Bonhoeffer begins with philosophical epistemology. Good philosophy, having
some admirable qualities and some access to truth, must contain something beneficial for
theology at the level of epistemology. Kant is representative of good philosophical epistemology.
23
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Because, however, the meaning of epistemology is anthropology, philosophy can and must do
better. It must move down to the anthropological level. Again, good philosophy must be able to
offer something of theological use here. Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein does so. This
is precisely where even good philosophy must stop according to Bonhoeffer. Here philosophy
has met the limit of the first use of the law. The meaning of anthropology is theology and the
only means to the theological level is through revelation. “Philosophy, per se,” according to
Bonhoeffer, “can leave no space for revelation unless it knows revelation.” 26 Proper theology,
which does know revelation, must then take over. From within a position of faith, theology may
adapt the truths discovered by philosophical epistemology and anthropology. Having completed
an ontology of revelation that coordinates act and being with partial help from philosophy,
theology may disclose the full truth of the anthropological and epistemological levels as
theological. This is the overall structure of Act and Being, which may be obscured by the fact
that philosophy cannot access the theological level and that theology must alter philosophical
epistemology and anthropology by placing Christ at the center to come to solutions even at those
levels.
It is important to keep this general understanding of Bonhoeffer’s relation to philosophy
in mind in order to avoid misinterpretation. First, one cannot say without a good degree of
nuance that in Act and Being Bonhoeffer “attacks all philosophy.” 27 Since good philosophy can
get something right at the epistemological and anthropological levels, one should not expect
Bonhoeffer to completely reject philosophy. As such, there cannot be a disjunct between the
philosophical Part A and the rest of Act and Being, as Green seems to imply when he says that
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“Act and Being begins with a critique of philosophical anthropology, proceeds to interpret
revelation […] and concludes by building on this foundation a more concrete Christian
anthropology.” 28 It is, therefore, incumbent on the interpreter to discern how Part A’s influence
carries through the rest of the book. Second, since the truth of even good philosophy is
incomplete and obscured and it is the job of theology to properly disclose and alter such truth,
the interpreter must always have the larger theological framework of Act and Being in mind.
Otherwise such an interpreter may unfairly find Bonhoeffer’s appraisals of philosophy far less
convincing than they otherwise might be. Third, for Bonhoeffer theological judgments of
philosophy involve rejecting what is completely theologically unacceptable and altering what is
theologically useful. Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler, for example, will be completely rejected as
theologically inappropriate. Kant and Heidegger will be altered to suit theological needs. One
should not misinterpret alteration for rejection. Admittedly, Bonhoeffer could have been of more
help here by flagging instances of his adapting philosophical solutions in his theology. Still, to
truly understand Bonhoeffer’s theological solution one must see its philosophical sources, which
involves tracing the alterations they undergo as Bonhoeffer alters them.
Turning now to Bonhoeffer’s engagement with philosophical epistemology, we may
focus on what Bonhoeffer sees as complete failures and partial successes at this level. The
complete failures are those that Bonhoeffer finds both philosophically and theologically
unacceptable. The partial successes are more complex. Sometimes a partial success will be a
success in philosophical epistemology at one or more of the criteria of transcendence, boundary,
concreteness, and continuity, but because of failures at other criteria such a success is
jeopardized or moot. Scheler, for example, makes some gains in relation to concreteness with
his focus on ethics and philosophy of religion; yet, those gains are lost given the way he
28
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addresses the criterion of continuity. A partial success may even initially appear to be a direct
theological success, but because the success arises from a philosophical position such a success
is not immediately useful to theology. Kant, for example, identifies God as transcendent, an
important position Bonhoeffer will maintain in his theology; yet, as we will see, his failure in
relation to the criterion of boundary leads to Hegel and the complete reversal of the God’s
transcendence. It is important to catalogue these successes and failures both for understanding
Bonhoeffer’s theological solution as a whole and for understanding why Bonhoeffer found
Heidegger to be a notable improvement for philosophy. While Bonhoeffer will find Heidegger
theologically wanting, Heidegger improves on many of the failures of his predecessors while
also maintaining many of their successes. Following Bonhoeffer’s own presentation, we now
turn to his presentation and evaluation of Kant as “genuine transcendentalism.”
Kant and Pure Transcendentalism
For historical and theological reasons, Bonhoeffer’s decision to begin with Kant is a natural
choice. The entirety of Act and Being is predicated on the assumed truth of the basic Kantian
position that the mind is not merely a passive recipient of information from the world, but
actively imposes its own order on that information. From such a basic Kantian presupposition
Bonhoeffer finds philosophical support for the intellectual correlate of Luther’s cor curvum in se.
If the mind is always active in constructing and understanding the world, then human thinking is
under the constant threat of creating a totalizing system that leaves the subject in self-contained
isolation unable to be truly affected by others. Without such a presupposition and its
corresponding threat, then the general need to coordinate act and being in order to forestall such
a danger would not be as pressing.
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Also, in early twentieth century German theology, whether in the form of dialectical
theology or neo-Kantian philosophy of religion, Kant was a vibrant resource. One might begin
with the question, “Is it possible and desirable for theologians to recover from Kant?”, finding
that Kantian epistemology is an undue hindrance to theology and philosophy of religion. For
Barth, Bonhoeffer’s primary theological interlocutor, this was not the case. For Barth, Kant had
done theology a great service with his philosophical ‘proof’ of the inaccessibility of God by
human reason. 29 Kant is often, then, the philosophical shadow under which Barth and his cohort
are working.
Despite Kant’s general importance, for constructive and argumentative reasons,
Bonhoeffer does not attempt to present Kant’s epistemology in all its nuances. Rather
Bonhoeffer describes his presentation of Kant and subsequent German idealism as “stylized.” 30
Bonhoeffer intends to present Kant as a “pure transcendental philosopher, which he never was
entirely.” 31 For Bonhoeffer, then, Kant functions as a representative and ideal case for an
extreme act-oriented philosophical attempt to solve the epistemological problem of act and
being. There is also a Heideggerian imposition that Bonhoeffer places on Kant, which
Bonhoeffer’s constant use of “Dasein” even in the Kant section makes apparent and which he
expressly attributes to Heidegger: “The concept of Dasein as the kind of being [Seinsart] of
humans as distinct from other entities [Seienden] is taken over from the terminology of
Heidegger.” 32 Bonhoeffer is also reading and presenting Kant through contemporary theological
29
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applications of Kant, particularly that of Hinrich Knittermeyer. 33 There are, then, inevitably
points at which one may challenge the accuracy of Bonhoeffer’s presentation of Kant. Again,
however, Bonhoeffer is more concerned with the role such a stylized Kant can play in coming to
understand the problem and resolve it at the theological level. I will point out inaccuracies in
Bonhoeffer’s presentation when it is necessary for understanding Kant’s role in Bonhoeffer’s
theology and Act and Being; though, this is not my main concern. Again, my concern is with
what Bonhoeffer thinks philosophers leading up to Heidegger get right and wrong, and how this
frames Bonhoeffer’s reactions to Heidegger.
Bonhoeffer categorizes Kant as an act-philosopher dealing with the problem of act and
being at the epistemological level. Bonhoeffer, in fact, opens his presentation of Kant with the
question of whether or not Kant should be given “the title of epistemologist par excellence of
Protestantism.” 34 While Bonhoeffer never directly answers his own question in Act and Being,
the implication of Bonhoeffer’s subsequent evaluation of Kant would seem to suggest that the
answer is “no” given the dire results, i.e. Hegelian idealism, that arise when Kant’s system is
pressed to its logical conclusion. 35 As Bonhoeffer bluntly puts it in his “Theology of Crisis”:
“Kant still believed, [sic] critical philosophy could make room for faith by means of limiting
reason by reason. But he failed.” 36 This, however, does not mean that Kant is useless for
Bonhoeffer’s project. Next to Heidegger, Kant seems to provide some of the most valuable
33
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lessons concerning the problem of act and being. And Bonhoeffer does mine Kant for such
benefits.
As an act-oriented philosopher Kant, as pure transcendentalist, is particularly suited for
dealing with the criterion of transcendence. One of the characteristic features of “act” is that it is
relationally open; it must always refer to an other that is outside of the act itself. Bonhoeffer
understands this to be the defining characteristic of Kant: “It is integral to the concept of genuine
transcendentalism that thinking refers to something transcendent which, however, is not at its
disposal.” 37 That Kant makes thought or the epistemic act always in reference to some
transcendent is one of the first and most valuable elements he provides. By “in reference to” (in
Bezug auf), Bonhoeffer means that for Kant thought must always be directed towards a
transcendent that thought can never fully grasp or have access to. More specifically, the
referential and transcendental nature of thought occurs in two directions, prospectively and
retrospectively. 38
The thinking act, when prospective, is directed outwardly and in reference to the thing-initself. In being so directed, thought creates, from the thing-in-itself, the object (Gegenstand) of
knowledge, which for Bonhoeffer, literally stands against the knowing act. 39 This has the
consequence of making all being in reference to the act of the knowing ‘I’. While Bonhoeffer
does not go into any further detail, this does seem basically true of Kant’s position. First, through
the faculty of sensibility we receive impressions or data concerning the thing-in-itself, 40 which is
immediately formed by the intuitions of space and time that originate in the subject and yet do
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not apply to the thing-in-itself. 41 Through intuition, then, we receive a manifold or multiplicity of
sense data about what exists. Here what is important is that the multiplicity of sense data is not
yet combined in such a way that thought may arise. The understanding, by means of synthesis,
combines the multiplicity of sense data into a unity, into a true object of knowledge. 42 Then,
through the concepts contained in the understanding, the object of knowledge presented by
intuition is thought. For Bonhoeffer this means that truth is not, for Kant, “the correspondence of
knowledge with the object of knowledge,” but rather truth is contained in “the necessity of the a
priori synthesis.” 43 This synthesis is entirely an act of the subject. Truth is then not in the being
of the object, but in the knowing act of the subject, which has created the being of the object;
“Thus, the concept of being is resolved into the concept of act.” 44
When the thinking act is directed retrospectively, it is directed at the self, or more
specifically for Bonhoeffer’s reading of Kant, at transcendental apperception. 45 For Kant,
transcendental apperception is the means by which we take what would be otherwise disparate
and unrelated experiences and connect them according to laws to make a single, unified
experience. 46 This itself requires an underlying, unified consciousness, what Kant refers to as the
transcendental consciousness, 47 or, perhaps misleadingly, what Bonhoeffer refers to as the
“ego.” 48 Just as when thought is in reference to the thing-in-itself and thereby creates the object
of knowledge from the manifold of sense data, so too do I receive a manifold of inner intuitions
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which I unite to construct an appearance of myself. 49 As a consequence and as it was for the
thing-in-itself, the transcendental apperception or more technically correct, the transcendental
consciousness, cannot be directly grasped by reason, rather one may only direct oneself in
reference to it. For Kant, one does not have one’s self at one’s disposal: “[T]his [inner] sense
represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in
ourselves.” 50
With this we have, by Bonhoeffer’s estimation, Kant’s most crucial successes, which, in
general, arise from Kant’s epistemic humility. Kant has tried to place reason within its
boundaries by establishing the transcendent thing-in-itself and transcendental consciousness.
Though Dasein is “the world’s reference point” and truth is only in the thinking act, 51 Kant
places important boundaries on thought. “The transcendence itself does not enter thinking.” 52
The general problem of act and being occurs, again, when either act or being dominates the
other. Kant, as an act-oriented philosopher, runs the risk of making all being succumb to the act
of thinking. However, Kant has made the thing-in-itself and transcendental consciousness
inaccessible to thought. Whatever being the thing-in-itself and transcendental consciousness
have, it is not determined by the thinking act. One of Bonhoeffer’s concerns is, again, allowing
for some relational openness, for the ability of something not determined by ourselves to affect
us. Bonhoeffer believes that the boundary created by the thing-in-itself and transcendental
consciousness has the potential to do just that.
According to Bonhoeffer’s account, the means by which Kant maintains the epistemic
transcendence of the thing-in-itself also leads to the theologically significant transcendence of
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God. First, because the thinking I is bounded by the thing-in-itself, it is not the total creator of
the being of the world. As such “the Creator’s integrity is honored in principle.” 53 Second, God is
also transcendent. For Kant, this follows from the fact that God cannot be an object of
intuition.54 As Bonhoeffer explains it, the objectivity of God is impossible because being (Sein)
is always understood as an entity (Seiende), which only occurs in the a priori synthesis as a
“there is” (es gibt). 55 Because God cannot be an object of knowledge, God does not become
merely another object of the world that is essentially oriented toward the ‘I’ and exists only for
the ‘I’. 56
Kant’s third notable success, by Bonhoeffer’s estimation, is that we are not completely
graspable by our own means. The ability to do so is a particular theological concern for
Bonhoeffer, as we will see when we turn to his critiques of Hegel. For now, however, Kant
seems to have succeeded here. While we might be able to know our empirical selves through
inner intuitions, there is still the core transcendental self that is inaccessible. In one respect, this
avoids the meta-critique that applies to all philosophy according to Bonhoeffer: the cor curvum
in se. Here, the ‘heart’ or reason is not entirely curved in on itself because it cannot fully grasp
itself. This creates a theological window through which Bonhoeffer, with some important
alterations, can advocate the need to be directed toward an other, in the form of objects, other
humans, and God, in order to come to know one’s self. With these three transcendents, the
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danger of the Lutheran cor curvum in se is potentially, though not completely, mitigated. 57 Here
Dasein is understood as, and, more importantly, understands itself as, existing between or among
these transcendents.
This being of Dasein as between two transcendents, the thing-in-itself and transcendental
consciousness, is in fact the first scraping of the surface of the problem of act and being at the
anthropological level. The being of humans, Dasein, is composed of acts relating to these
transcendents. Act then creates not only the being of the object of knowledge, but the being of
humans. What Bonhoeffer finds useful here, again, is the idea that humans can only come to
know themselves by relating to or being directed at (actus directus) that which is not at their
disposal: “To know oneself to be oriented towards transcendence and, consequently, to be the
world’s reference point is what, in transcendentalism, constitutes human Dasein.” 58 Bonhoeffer’s
theological solution will involve making human acts of knowing and existing always in relation
to Jesus Christ as transcendent.
There are, however, a number of problems that will require substantial modifications
before Kant’s anthropology can be theologically useful for Bonhoeffer. The first general
problem is that this anthropology is epistemologically defined. 59 The being of humans is created
in acts of knowing. As we saw in chapter one, however, Bonhoeffer presupposes the opposite to
be true, namely that the meaning of epistemology is anthropology. The nature of human
existence or Dasein precedes acts of knowing. The full negative import of reversing the
conceptual levels of epistemology and anthropology will not be felt until we turn to Bonhoeffer’s
critiques of Hegel.
57

Here, Bonhoeffer is drawing primarily on Knittermeyer’s theological use of Kant. Hinrich Knittermeyer,
“Transzendentalphilosophie und Theologie. Eine kritische Erinnerung zum 22. April 1924,” Christliche Welt 38
(1924): 259. Also see Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft, 24.
58
DBWE 2: 35 (DBW 2: 28-9).
59
Bonhoeffer already makes this assertion in Sanctorum Communio; DBWE 1: 40 (DBW 1: 22).

59

This reversal of order, to be corrected in Heidegger, combined with Kant’s overly actoriented epistemology, creates problems for maintaining continuity. The inability to fully grasp
one’s self through one’s own faculties, though a positive characteristic, has a concomitant
failure. Kant’s position cannot adequately account for the continuity of Dasein:
The object of understanding here should be Dasein itself—that is, Dasein in its unity—for
there is no ‘understanding’ save on the basis of unity. If Dasein is so structured that the
will-to-understand-itself belongs to its essence, the problem arises of how the unity of
Dasein can be gained by means of self-understanding from, or out of, the self [Sich-aussich-selbst-verstehen]. The eye does not see itself. 60
Kant, himself, states Bonhoeffer’s point more clearly: “The consciousness of oneself in
accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical,
forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances.” 61
The unity of experience, both in terms of objects of knowledge and of ourselves, is based on a
more fundamental unity, the transcendental unity of apperception, that cannot be proven and
guaranteed but only presupposed. The essence of the problem here is that if our being is
constituted by referential acts in relation to a transcendent, then the discreteness of these acts
makes our being also discrete and therefore discontinuous. One cannot account for how our
being at one moment is necessarily related to our being the next moment. One cannot simply
turn to Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception for a satisfactory answer, at least not for
Bonhoeffer.
This then causes the related problem of how to account for the unity in our knowledge of
objects. Again, the transcendental unity of apperception is intended to account for the unity of
our experience, but it must be assumed from the fact that there appears to be such a unity. It
does not in itself account for the nature of the unity. What was once a laudable aspect of Kant’s
60
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philosophy, the inability to access the thing-in-itself and ourselves, becomes a hindrance.
Without some access to that which gives our existence continuity, there is no way to give an
adequate account of continuity.
The most pressing problem for Bonhoeffer, however, is Kant’s inability to properly
secure the boundaries of transcendence. This inability, however, only becomes apparent for
Bonhoeffer with Hegel and idealism to which we now turn.
Hegel and Idealism
Over the course of Bonhoeffer’s work, his relationship to Hegel represents probably one of the
more complex and enduring of his interactions with a philosopher. Hegel and idealism figured
prominently and not quite as negatively in Sanctorum Communio. In Act and Being, Hegel
functions as a cautionary tale that tells us what in philosophy and theology should be avoided.
In the summer semester of 1933, Bonhoeffer still found Hegel’s relation to theology important
enough to warrant a seminar entitled “Dogmatics: Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” of which
unfortunately only fragmentary student notes survive. 62 And the struggle with the threat of
idealism seems to have lurked in the background of his Creation and Fall. 63
There is some debate concerning how well Bonhoeffer actually knew Hegel at any
particular time. “At the time of Sanctorum Communio,” so says one source, “Bonhoeffer had
absorbed the bourgeois Hegelian renaissance but hardly Hegel himself.” 64 Yet in reaction to this
comment, Bonhoeffer’s cousin, von Hase, asserts that Bonhoeffer was quite familiar with The
Phenomenology of Spirit and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. 65 It is certainly true that
Hegel makes frequent and not always negative appearances in Sanctorum Communio. Though
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wary even in Sanctorum Communio of the dangers of idealism, Bonhoeffer found, for example,
Hegel’s distinctions and relations between subjective, objective, and absolute spirit useful. 66
In Act and Being, as with Kant so with Hegel, Bonhoeffer is more concerned with an
idealized portrayal of the extremes of Hegel’s philosophy read through theological adaptations,
such as Friedrich Brunstäd’s Idee der Religion. Just as with Bonhoeffer’s presentation of Kant,
one may find considerable room to critique Bonhoeffer’s presentation of Hegel. Again, however,
my concern is less with the presentation’s accuracy and more with its overall function in Act and
Being.
Hegel is a reoccurring interlocutor for Bonhoeffer because, by Bonhoeffer’s estimation,
Hegel represents the worst and most dangerous of philosophical options, i.e. idealism. Idealism,
for Bonhoeffer, is essentially the philosophical equivalent of Luther’s cor curvum in se where all
of reality is collapsed into the subject, and the subject becomes the creator of itself and its world.
Immediately after critiquing Hegel for writing a “philosophy of angels” Bonhoeffer, with
noticeable vitriol, says, “In the experience of being totally turned-in-on-himself, -persisting, resting, he who only needs to come to himself in order to be God must end up in the terrifying
disappointment of the tormenting desolation and sterility of utter solitude.” 67 As the
representative of the worst that can happen in philosophy by Bonhoeffer’s standards, it is
important to take note of exactly where and how it can go so drastically wrong.
Not only does Hegel function as an important foil in many of Bonhoeffer’s writings, but
for present purposes understanding Bonhoeffer’s appraisal of Hegel’s idealism will be important
for understanding Bonhoeffer’s appraisals of Heidegger. Bonhoeffer nearly credits Hegel with
solving the problem of act and being: “Idealism, especially Hegel, in fact appears to have
66
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reached a synopsis of act and being that would be capable of satisfying the demands of the
problem, if only those doing the philosophizing themselves did not founder on the resistance of
their own reality to this philosophy.” 68 Later, when crediting Heidegger with solving the problem
for philosophy, Bonhoeffer states, “This solution, though reminiscent of Hegel is fundamentally
different from Hegel’s theory, in that being is Dasein, ‘being in the world’, existing in
temporality.” 69 Essentially, as we will see later, Heidegger’s solution is superior to Hegel’s in
that the former is able to simultaneously meet the criteria of continuity and concreteness.
The essence of Hegel’s failure actually begins with an inherent weakness in Kant’s
concept of boundary. Concerning the boundary set by Kant’s thing-in-itself, Bonhoeffer asks,
and takes seriously, the idealist question: “If it can never be objectively knowable, how can
reason fix its boundaries over against something unknown?”70 That is, if the thing-in-itself is
truly unknowable, how can reason know the simple fact that it cannot know the thing-in-itself?
The only explanation, again according to Bonhoeffer, is that rather than being bounded by the
nature of the thing-in-itself, reason has set this boundary itself. This is, according to Bonhoeffer,
Hegel’s fundamental insight. 71
This may not be an immediately noticeable problem, but as Bonhoeffer understands it,
this jeopardizes every success that Kantian epistemology can claim in relation to the problem of
act and being. First, one of Kant’s central successes was to make thinking and human existence
in reference to the transcendent that could not be fully grasped. Being in reference to the
68
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transcendent also necessarily meant that thinking and Dasein were in reference to the boundaries
that protected the transcendent. If, however, these boundaries are created by reason itself, then
reason is only seeing its own reflection in those boundaries. Reason becomes in reference to
itself. Rather than thought and human existence being relationally open to the other, it is now
closed in on itself. It has succumb to the cor curvum in se.
With the collapse of Kant’s boundaries the second and most crucial of Kant’s successes,
establishing transcendence, is also threatened. If reason has created these self-imposed
boundaries, then there is a sense in which reason has already transgressed them in order to even
know that there is something beyond them. If these boundaries are self-created and reason has
already in some way moved beyond them, then there would seem to be no reason to maintain
them. As Bonhoeffer states it, “The miscarriage of the endeavor to ascertain the boundaries of
reason is due to the fact that there are for reason essentially no boundaries, for even the
boundaries are thought away until they are no longer genuine boundaries.” 72 If there are no
boundaries between reason and the transcendent, then reason is free to grasp the transcendent.
Though Bonhoeffer does not go into the details of Hegel’s argument, this is essentially Hegel’s
point. According to Hegel, the thing-in-itself, which for Hegel also includes the mind and God, is
simply reason abstracting all particular properties away. Reason creates the thing-in-itself by
stripping away these properties. As Hegel straightforwardly concludes, “Hence one can only
read with surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. On the contrary
there is nothing we can know so easily.” 73
Here we arrive at Bonhoeffer’s crucial distinction between Kant’s “in reference to” and
Hegel’s “through.” Again, for Bonhoeffer’s Kant, reason and Dasein are always merely in
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reference to transcendence. This makes the world as we can know it in reference to us, yet not
entirely graspable by us, not entirely created by us. By removing the boundaries to reason and
allowing reason access to transcendence, Hegel has allowed the world to be created through us.
It is true that the world was created by the active ordering of reason, but for Kant this was always
checked by the ungraspable nature of the transcendent thing-in-itself. The world was in reference
to us, but not created by us. With Hegel, the breakdown of the boundary protecting the thing-initself, and the easy graspability of the thing-in-itself, makes the world created by us. Here all
being is entirely reduced to act for according to Bonhoeffer’s reading of Hegel, “where there is
no knowing consciousness, there is also no being.” 74 Wherever reason turns, it now only ever
sees itself making it impossible to ever be truly affected by an other and thereby exacerbating the
cor curvum in se.
This failure to maintain appropriate boundaries also has its concomitant effects at the
anthropological level. Again, Bonhoeffer approves of the Kantian assertion that we are not able
to grasp ourselves as we are in ourselves. Yet there seems to be an inherent problem here as
well. As Bonhoeffer formulates the problem, it is a question of whether thinking precedes the I
or the I precedes thinking. 75 The transcendental subject cannot be thought as it is in itself because
it is the necessary condition of thought. “The I logically precedes thinking.” 76 Yet insofar as the
transcendental subject seems to simply be the act of thinking itself, then thinking is logically
prior to the I or the transcendental subject. As Bonhoeffer understands Kant and Hegelian
idealism, this apparent contradiction arises from Kant’s splitting of the self into the
transcendental and the empirical selves. This, again, however is a division created by reason or
thought itself. As such it is vulnerable to the same maneuver Hegel applied to the thing-in-itself.
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Just as the thing-in-itself was a construction of reason via abstraction, so too is the transcendental
subject an abstraction created by reason. 77 With Bonhoeffer’s Hegel we are given easy access to
ourselves eliminating yet another of Kant’s successes.
Kant’s anthropological position that Dasein is suspended between the two transcendent
poles of the thing-in-itself and the transcendental subject has collapsed with Hegel. Through the
knowing act of the subject both the being of the thing-in-self and the being of the transcendental
subject collapses into the being of the subject. Yet the being of the subject is the knowing act, the
act of consciousness coming to know itself. “[I]n original transcendentalism” as Bonhoeffer
understands it, “the human spirit was suspended between transcendence and, consequently,
irrevocably in reference to them, now the movement of the spirit is turned in upon itself.” 78 This
collapsing of being into act and act into being will form an important clue both for how to and
how not to solve the problem of act and being.
Finally and most offensively for Bonhoeffer the theologian, there is, for Hegel, no
boundary between us and God, thereby pulling God into thought. 79 Hegel, himself, seems to say
as much:
It [philosophy] presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature, showing
that nature, otherness, is implicitly divine, and that the raising of itself to reconciliation is
on the one hand what finite spirit implicitly is, while on the other hand it arrives at this
reconciliation, or brings it forth, in world history. This reconciliation is the peace of God,
which does not “surpass all reason,” but is rather the peace that through reason is first
known and thought and is recognized as what is true. 80
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“This means,” for Bonhoeffer, “that God once again becomes ‘objectified’ in consciousness and
is thereby taken into the unity of transcendental apperception, becoming the prisoner of the
consciousness.” 81 The danger of this position, however, does not stop there for Bonhoeffer. This
position may not only make God another object and creation of human reason, thereby
unraveling one of Kant’s successes, but may devolve further into equating I and God. 82
With the tendency for Kant’s pure transcendentalism to devolve into Hegelian idealism
and all its accompanying problems, transcendental philosophy, as Bonhoeffer sees it, is left with
two options. First, “thinking can submit to this self-limitation, in the manner of genuine
transcendental thinking.” 83 The second option, upon realizing that these limits of reason are selfimposed, is to succumb to “the great temptation for all genuine philosophy” where thinking
raises “itself to the position of lord over what is nonobjective [transcendent].” 84 Though
Bonhoeffer does not state so directly, following his theological presuppositions, this is, in fact,
not a genuine choice. First, this choosing is still an act of reason. It is nothing but a reiteration of
the problem in Kantian epistemology that led to Hegelian idealism in the first place. The
problem began with reason choosing its own boundaries. This new option really only amounts to
reason choosing to choose its boundaries. Second, there is nothing internal or external to reason
to impose the preferable choice of maintaining the boundaries of transcendence: “Nothing can
oblige thinking, precisely as free thinking, not to draw the unconditional into itself and to take
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control of its I.” 85 Third, this is tantamount to intellectually willing oneself out of the cor curvum
in se. Given Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran presuppositions, this is no different than willing or working
oneself out of sin, which is impossible. If the weaknesses in Kantian transcendentalism are not
shored up, then philosophy will always in one form or another succumb to the great temptation
represented by Hegelian idealism.
All of this has allowed Hegel, in Bonhoeffer’s terms, to combine act and being; however,
obviously in the most inappropriate way. For Kant there was an important division between act
and being. For Kant, the knowing act or reason did create the being of the object of knowledge
and our empirical selves, yet being did not completely devolve into the knowing act. The being
of the thing-in-itself, the transcendental subject, and God remained beyond the bounds of the
knowing act. With Hegel, however, all being, in the form of the objects of knowledge and the
world, others, one’s self, and God completely collapse into the knowing act. 86 Here all being is
contained within act. Yet Hegel’s act also becomes being. In coming to know what for Kant
was other and transcendent, the ‘I’ is really coming to know itself. For Bonhoeffer this really
means that what was an apparent movement or act of the I is really, in fact, the ‘I’ coming to rest
in itself. But this absolute rest is, for Bonhoeffer, absolute being. 87 Act has, then, also been
resolved into being. However, the general problem, which Heidegger will solve for philosophy at
the epistemological and anthropological levels, is that Hegel has equated act and being. A viable
solution must coordinate, not equate, the two. The subtle difference here, which will become
clearer in chapter three with Heidegger’s solution, is that act and being must presuppose one
another without devolving into one another.
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Hegel’s solution, which is in some respects a logical continuation of Kant, has come at
too high a price. Hegel has met the criterion of continuity. Using Hegel one can account for the
continuity of the self, objects of knowledge, God, and so forth. This continuity only arises,
however, because Hegel has collapsed everything into the singularity of the ‘I’ or reason. This
singularity arises because Hegel has failed at all of Bonhoeffer’s other criteria. Hegel
transgressed the boundaries set by Kant thereby collapsing transcendence into reason. With the
loss of transcendence there is nothing that can break in from outside to disrupt the system.
Whatever might do so from concrete historical existence is reincorporated into Hegel’s system.
This then means that human existence and knowledge cannot actually be affected by concrete
historical existence. By Bonhoeffer’s standards, then, Hegel has constructed a metaphysical
system of the worst kind and represents the most dire intellectual form of the cor curvum in se.
“If the transcendental approach is not to end once again in the system of reason, it clearly
requires a new formulation of the ‘boundaries’ of reason.” 88 What is needed and will not come
until Bonhoeffer’s theological joining of Heidegger and Kant, is for the boundary of reason and
Dasein to be actually imposed from outside. Such an alteration will be the centerpiece of
Bonhoeffer’s theological alteration of Kant and Heidegger, as Bonhoeffer foreshadows: “There
is a boundary only for a concrete human being in its entirety, and this boundary is called
Christ.” 89 Yet the more philosophically pertinent issue behind the inability to correctly locate and
maintain boundaries, and therefore also transcendence, has its origin in Kant and Hegel’s overly
act-oriented philosophies. Act was given too much dominance over being. Act, whether in the
form of thought or existence cannot be bounded, if being is not guarded from them. Perhaps
philosophies with a greater emphasis on being might succeed in ways that transcendentalism and
88
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idealism have not. With that we, following Bonhoeffer, turn to Husserl and idealist
phenomenology.
Husserl and Idealist Phenomenology
Bonhoeffer’s move to Husserl and phenomenology marks a shift from a focus on act-oriented
philosophies to being-oriented philosophies. As we saw in the above accounts of Kant and Hegel
an overly act-oriented approach to the problem of act and being is unsuccessful. An overly actoriented approach culminates in an unacceptable collapsing of act and being into one another.
Because being-oriented philosophies begin on the opposite pole of the problem, they may be
more successful, or at the very least disclose different aspects of the problem useful in coming to
a solution.
Bonhoeffer does not turn to Husserl, however, simply because he is next in chronological
order or because he founded the school that would lead to Heidegger. Rather, Husserl, for
Bonhoeffer, is being-philosophy’s equivalent to Hegel, hence the appellation “idealist
phenomenology.” That is, Husserl, though he begins with a focus on being, results, much like
Hegel, in the collapse of act and being into one another. A distinctive feature of the problem of
act and being, as Bonhoeffer presents it, is that an overly zealous focus on either act or being
results in making the two equivalent. If both result in act and being simply equaling one another,
then failures on either side are roughly equivalent for Bonhoeffer’s purposes.
As with Bonhoeffer’s presentations of Kant and Hegel, Bonhoeffer might be charged
with being overly simplistic, particularly by those concerned with the nuances of such
philosophers. Even those more concerned with Bonhoeffer’s broader theological moves
disparage Bonhoeffer’s general and reductionist collapse of obviously distinct philosophies into
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idealism. 90 There is certainly a healthy degree of merit to these complaints; yet this misses
Bonhoeffer’s hermeneutic use of the problem of act and being. Bonhoeffer is certainly not saying
that Husserl simply rehearses Hegel with new vocabulary. The problem of act and being allows
for multifarious manifestations of failure. Bonhoeffer is simply more concerned with cataloging
the general moves that lead to a complete failure at the problem of act and being. 91 Husserl is one
means through which Bonhoeffer does so.
There is, in fact, good evidence that Bonhoeffer was familiar with the nuances of the
phenomenological tradition. As presented in the introduction, Bonhoeffer consistently engaged
the phenomenological tradition at least since 1924. Bonhoeffer explicitly describes his method
of investigating the phenomena of the church in Sanctorum Communio as phenomenological. 92
While there were few explicit citations to Kant and Hegel, Bonhoeffer makes comparatively
frequent and accurate citations to Husserl’s Ideas and Logical Investigations in Act and Being.
While Bonhoeffer might unfairly reduce Husserl to idealism, it is not because he did not know
Husserl.
Husserl (and Scheler with him) also provide Bonhoeffer with an excuse to get to
Heidegger. Bonhoeffer’s goal in evaluating Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger is to come to a
genuine ontology. Pure or genuine transcendentalism, represented by Bonhoeffer’s stylized
Kant, was the most acceptable act-oriented philosophy, Bonhoeffer is now looking for a beingoriented counterpart, a genuine ontology. Before turning to Husserl, Bonhoeffer outlines what
would characterize such a genuine ontology, and it is clear that he already has Heidegger in mind
for the job. Most generally and switching his vocabulary slightly, genuine ontology would
surrender the claim of the logos, or act, over őv, being, or, more specifically the movement of
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thought would belong to being. 93 In this regard, genuine ontology, in its own way, would also
respect transcendence. While pure transcendentalism makes thought always in reference to
being, genuine ontology makes being independent of thought; being would have priority over
thought. 94 An important element of success here is for ontology to avoid making being an
existing object (seiendes Objekt). 95 And if being does become obscured by some entity
(Seiende), then it is the task of ontology to clear the way (freilegen) to being. 96 Without much
explanation yet still mindful of Heidegger, this means that “ontology must be the pursuit that
ponders this fact of ‘always already existing’ [immer schon Dasein],” 97 which, as we will see,
maintains continuity and concreteness, such that “thinking must again and again be ‘suspended’
[‘aufgehoben’] in being.” 98 That is, thinking, or in Heidegger’s more technical terms presence-athand and assertive knowledge, 99 must always arise from actual concrete existing. Husserl will
not be able to meet these requirements. As Bonhoeffer says explicitly “Here the step from
Husserl-Scheler to Heidegger is foreshadowed.” 100
Husserl’s goal, according to Bonhoeffer, is to get to the essence of phenomena as given
to consciousness and thereby to get to the phenomenon of pure consciousness itself. The
investigation of phenomena as given to consciousness is supposed to get us the structures of
consciousness itself because, for Husserl, consciousness always refers to or intends some object
or entity. 101 In more technical Husserlian language, which Bonhoeffer adopts here, noesis, the act
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of consciousness, always refers to noema, an intended object of knowledge. 102 What will be an
important error on Husserl’s part, according to Bonhoeffer, this noesis-noema structure is
contained within consciousness itself. So investigating these phenomena and the structures
according to which they are presented also gets one to the essential structures of consciousness
itself.
The method by which one gets to these essential structures of consciousness involves the
phenomenological-eidetic reduction. The phenomenological reduction involves bracketing the
question of existence of the intended object. The eidetic reduction involves removing all
contingent and accidental characteristics of the intended object to get to the essential and
necessary characteristics. Both involve bracketing our everyday interpretation and engagement
with such intended objects and will constitute an important failure on Husserl’s part according to
Bonhoeffer. 103
As Bonhoeffer reads Husserl, reality or the question of existence must be bracketed
because such assumptions and questions already contain interpretation on the part of the subject.
Interpretation is tantamount, in Bonhoeffer’s language, to the logos making a claim on őv
(being). With the elimination of interpretation through the phenomenological-eidetic reduction
one can have a direct and purely conceptual perception of essence, an instantiation of the
category of being for Bonhoeffer. 104 In this way, these methods of reduction, at the very least,
attempt to meet the criterion of transcendence.
There are, then according to Bonhoeffer, two general and opposed trends in Husserl’s
philosophy, one overriding the other and leading Husserl into idealism. 105 First, the
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phenomenological reduction, whereby the question of existence is bracketed, means, at least for
methodological purposes, one neither affirms nor denies the existence of something external to
the knowing act. Here, and not unlike Kant, there is a degree of epistemic humility. In
Bonhoeffer’s terms, there is then a degree of respect for transcendence. Second, with the proper
methodological tools, we can have an unencumbered conceptual perception of essences. This
would seem to mean that there is something that stands independent of the act of the subject.
Numbers, for example, according to Husserl, are what they are independent of any conceptual
construction we might perform in relation to them. 106 Here, being, in this example of numbers,
would seem to take precedence over or be prior to our epistemic acts of knowing them.
Yet the small gains that follow from the first trend are negated by the second whereby all
being is resolved into the act of consciousness. Bonhoeffer is here thinking, in part, of the
noema-noesis structure. This structure, again, is immanent to consciousness. That with which
phenomenology is concerned and has access to given its methodological presuppositions is
entirely contained within consciousness or more precisely for Bonhoeffer within conscious acts.
All being that can be known can be known only within such acts of consciousness. This radical
emphasis on consciousness then entails that that which is transcendent functions as “only a rule
that consciousness projects beyond itself so as to order reality within it.” 107 Husserl, for example,
says, “The existence of what is natural cannot condition the existence of consciousness since it
arises as the correlate of consciousness; it is only in so far as it constitutes itself within ordered
organizations of consciousness.” 108 For Bonhoeffer, though the nuances of how and why might
be different, Husserl has, like Hegel, collapsed all being into act despite Husserl’s intentions.

106

Husserl, Ideas, par. 22.
DBWE 2: 63 (DBW 2: 57).
108
Husserl, Ideas, par. 51.
107

74

As with Kant and Hegel, an essential test of a philosophical approach to the problem of
act and being is how it accounts for God. Here Husserl does not fare well either, according to
Bonhoeffer. 109 First, according to Husserl, God must also be bracketed out. 110 This is not in itself
a problem, there is a sense in which this shares general similarities to Kant’s leaving God out of
epistemology. The way in which Husserl intimates how God might be brought make into
phenomenology is a problem, however. Husserl asserts that there must be some special intuitive
manifestations of God given to consciousness. 111 If this is so, then it should be possible to use
phenomenology to intellectually grasp God through pure consciousness. 112 Without explanation
Bonhoeffer then concludes that here “the I, or consciousness, is once again restored to the place
of God.” 113 The general problem here is that if God is grasped, itself a sign that a mistake has
been made, by the methods of phenomenology and the structures of pure consciousness, then
God, or more particularly revelation, must conform to the possibilities inherent in human
existence. Bonhoeffer, following some of his Barthian tendencies, assumes this to be
unacceptable because it would curtail God’s sovereignty and freedom.
Husserl’s greatest failure, at least vis-à-vis Heidegger according to Bonhoeffer, are the
phenomenological and eidetic reductions themselves. 114 Again, with the phenomenological
reduction the question of existence is bracketed out. With the eidetic reduction all contingent and
accidental characteristics of the way in which phenomena present themselves is removed in order
to get to the necessary and essential features of phenomena and consciousness. Here Husserl
fails at the criterion of concreteness, and what is perhaps worse, he does so by choice. The
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actual living that constitutes human existence and, as we will see with Heidegger, dictates the
parameters with which one encounters objects, others, and God are removed from philosophical
consideration to get at the atemporal structures of pure consciousness.
As Bonhoeffer reads Husserl, he was supposed to begin with and support the priority of
őv over logos, or being over act, yet the boundaries that maintain the transcendence and safety of
being over act are again rationally imposed thereby pulling being into the act of consciousness.
Husserl is then another instance of philosophy succumbing to the general problem of idealism
and the cor curvum in se. Husserl is also ill-equipped, even choosing to be so, to deal with
concrete human existence. Scheler makes some small gains on these two fronts.
Scheler and Phenomenological Epistemology 115
Though Scheler does not appear to hold a significant position in Act and Being or in any of
Bonhoeffer’s later works, he was nevertheless an important early influence. Bonhoeffer’s
‘person’, a central concept in Sanctorum Communio is highly indebted to Scheler. 116 And
although Bonhoeffer is not above critiquing Scheler in Sanctorum Communio, particularly for his
overly humanistic approach, 117 Scheler represents one of the better philosophical options for
understanding the phenomenological nature of community. In Act and Being, Scheler is also
understood as a notable improvement on past philosophical approaches, particularly Husserl’s;
however, the honorable position he held in Sanctorum Communio is now supplanted by
Heidegger.
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According to Bonhoeffer, Scheler conscientiously attempts to improve on the failures of
Husserl’s phenomenology. 118 One of the general improvements that Scheler makes over Husserl
merely concerns Scheler’s topical focus. Bonhoeffer notes that Scheler is not content to just
improve on Husserl in the field of phenomenology, but develops such improvements
“consistently in the fields of ethics and philosophy of religion.” 119 This will be important when
we turn to Scheler’s improvements with regard to the criterion of transcendence, but for now this
is a marked improvement on the criterion of concreteness. Speaking of Kant, Scheler’s primary
interlocutor and opponent in his Formalism in Ethics, Scheler says for example, “I am of the
opinion that this Kantian colossus of steel and bronze obstructs the way of philosophy toward a
concrete and evidential theory of moral values […], toward the order of ranks of these values
and the norms based on them. Kant's work therefore bars us from any true insight into the place
of moral values in man's life.” 120 Though Scheler does not always in fact apply phenomenology
to every aspect of the “totality of life,” Scheler recognizes both the possibility and the need to do
so. 121
Part of Scheler’s success, both with regard to concreteness and transcendence, is his
repudiation of the dominance of reason or thought. On Bonhoeffer’s reading of Kant, Hegel, and
Husserl, reason was the dominant faculty through which we came to knowledge and which,
through its acts of knowing, ultimately created being. Scheler, however, explicitly critiques the
dominance of reason: “For it is our whole spiritual life—and not simply objective thinking in the
118
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sense of cognition of being […] The emotive elements of spirit […] also possess original a priori
contents which are not borrowed from ‘thinking’, and which ethics must show to be independent
of logic.” 122 Breaking the hold of reason on philosophical thought is important at least insofar as
it opens the possibility that we may come to know the world through faculties that are exposed to
being, rather than creative of being. 123 Specifically in relation to the being of values, we are
given access to them through, variously put, “passionate beholding,” “the feeling of values,” or
“love.” 124
According to Bonhoeffer, Scheler’s conscientious attempt to improve on Husserl’s
phenomenology also makes gains with respect to the criterion of transcendence. As
representative of the phenomenological option for a solution to the problem of act and being,
Husserl was supposed to give priority to being, or őv, over act, or logos. Prioritizing being over
act could have potentially maintained the transcendence of being and kept human reason in
check. Husserl’s emphasis on the structures of consciousness dictating the presentation of
phenomena made this impossible. Scheler, according to Bonhoeffer, noticed the idealist
conclusion to which this would lead and attempted to forestall it by reorienting the guiding
question of phenomenology. 125 According to Scheler, the guiding question of phenomenology
should not concern the conditions for the possibility in consciousness for the givenness of
phenomena. Rather, the question should quite simply concern what is given, or the being of the
given rather than the conscious act that gives being. 126 The general answer to this question is that
being, or essence in Husserl’s and Scheler’s terms, contains within itself the conditions for our
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knowing it. Our ability to grasp being is not located in the formal structures of consciousness,
reason, the ego, or the knowing act: “The ego is neither the point of departure for the
apprehension nor the producer of essences. It is not an essence which unilaterally ‘founds’ all
other essences or even all essences of acts. In the lived pursuance of outer perception, nature
‘itself’ is immediately given, not a ‘representation’ or ‘sensations’ that belongs to an ego.” 127
Focusing particularly on ethics and value, we notice, according to Scheler, that there exists an
independent domain of being, particularly a domain of values. 128 And it is this domain of values
that creates the conditions for the presentation of ethical phenomena independent of the
consciousness of the subject. This then means, according to Bonhoeffer, that for Scheler there is
“being transcending consciousness.” 129
Despite Scheler’s notable advances regarding the problem of act and being, there are still
some notable failures, many of which forecast Bonhoeffer’s turn to Heidegger. First, as we might
expect, Scheler is also ultimately unable to maintain transcendence. Though Scheler was able
“to construct a world of the being of values transcending consciousness” and therefore give
definitive priority to being over act, there is no boundary concerning what consciousness can
know about being. 130 It is true that the knowing act of consciousness does not create the being of
objects of knowledge, values, God, and so forth. It is also true that our knowledge of being does
not merely or exclusively come through thought or reason, but also through other, particularly
so-called “irrational,” faculties. Though both are notable improvements, they do not go nearly as
far as Bonhoeffer would like. Bonhoeffer is wary not merely of giving acts of reason or thought
dominance over being, but of allowing any faculty or potentiality within human existence
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unfettered access to being. Bonhoeffer presupposes that the world cannot be entirely at a
person’s disposal by any means. Yet through this “passionate beholding” Scheler has done just
that. On Bonhoeffer’s reading of Scheler, “the person grasps the All within himself and can even
grasp God in passionate beholding.” 131 That reason is replaced by feeling ultimately makes little
difference to Bonhoeffer. Both options work under the premise that there is something in human
existence, some possibility, which of itself grants humans unimpeded access to being.
This unimpeded access to being is particularly problematic, for Bonhoeffer, when related
to God. According to Scheler, through our own feeling and intentionality of love for God we
gain pre-conceptual access to God’s being. 132 For Scheler, God is the highest value. Having
immediate access to the being of God, for Bonhoeffer, also means delivering over the value of
the world and oneself. 133 Through one’s own means, then, one is given immediate access to all
being. Again, given Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran presuppositions, this is untenable. While previous
philosophers with which Bonhoeffer was concerned were trapped primarily by the ratio in se
ipsam incurva, reason curved in on itself, Scheler is trapped in the more general formulation of
the cor curvum in se, the heart curved in on itself.
It also appeared, simply in virtue of Scheler’s focus on ethics and philosophy of religion,
that he had made advances concerning the criterion of concreteness. For Bonhoeffer, it is indeed
progress vis-à-vis Scheler’s predecessors. However, given the way in which Scheler maintains
continuity the progress is fairly hollow. On Bonhoeffer’s reading of Scheler, the being of values
belong to a static and atemporal realm. Human being also more properly belongs to the realm of
static and atemporal being. As such, human existence is also atemporal and static. 134 As a static
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and atemporal unity Scheler is able to maintain the continuity of human existence, but as we saw
in Bonhoeffer’s assessment of Hegel this is unsatisfactory. 135 Scheler cannot account, then, for
historical existence. His human being is untouched by historical contingency.
This all culminates in Scheler’s failure to truly ask the anthropological question, to truly
ask about human existence. Bonhoeffer presupposes, again, that to answer the question of
knowledge first requires asking about human existence. In one respect, Scheler does make an
advance here by trying to inquire about the totality of human life. Yet that advance is hindered
by the way in which Scheler treats human existence. Perhaps as the result of the combined
influence of Heidegger and the Christian presupposition of the uniqueness of human existence,
Bonhoeffer presupposes that the human being cannot be treated as merely one entity (Seiende)
among other entities. 136 Yet, according Bonhoeffer, by making human existence static and
atemporal Scheler has done just that. 137 Additionally, Scheler removes the impetus for even
properly raising the question of human existence. The question can only be raised and taken
seriously if one properly recognizes the inherent insecurity in human existence. The person has
unfettered access to values, to God, and to itself. There is then “not even the slightest notion that
the person […] finds himself in a truly questionable situation.” 138 Human existence conceived of
as such an entity is then “basically untouched by the fact that it must first inquire regarding
itself.” 139
***
Though from Kant to Scheler philosophy has gleaned some elements necessary, according to
Bonhoeffer, to arrive at a solution to the problem of act and being, they have ultimately failed.
135
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Aside from particular elements of any individual failure there are two general philosophical
reasons for this succession of failures. First, the attempts at a solution that Bonhoeffer has
evaluated have all overemphasized either act or being rather than coordinating them. Act- and
being-concepts must mutually entail one another. The act-orientation of the transcendental and
idealist attempts at a solution made it such that there was no being without act. The
phenomenological attempt, particularly Scheler’s, made it such that there was no act without
being. A proper solution must appropriately combine these two assumptions.
Even in those instances where there did appear to be a coordination of act and being, such
coordination was accomplished at the expense of one or more of Bonhoeffer’s four criteria for a
proper solution. Hegel, for example, collapsed all being into act and the way in which he did so
also made all act into being. Yet Hegel, on Bonhoeffer’s reading, could only do so my ignoring
historical contingency and actual human life. A solution must, then, not only make act and being
mutually entail one another, but meet the criteria of transcendence, boundary, continuity, and
concreteness.
The second general philosophical problem that has hindered the above attempts concerns
the way in which they understood the relation between epistemology and anthropology. In
general they all, according to Bonhoeffer, begin with the question: “How can I know?” Their
answers to this question unduly emphasize “know.” For Bonhoeffer, the nature of the “I” or
human existence is the more fundamental question. And to ask about the nature of human
existence is to ask about far more than the nature of human knowledge. Once one settles on a
proper account of human existence, then one can ask the more limited question about how such
an existence can know.

82

Though Heidegger will be found theologically wanting, he has surpassed his
philosophical progenitors on philosophical grounds. The Heidegger of Being and Time begins
with the anthropological question; he begins by asking about human existence or Dasein, only
then providing elements for a theory of knowledge. And Heidegger coordinates act and being in
a way that is particularly adept at meeting the criteria of concreteness and continuity. With the
past philosophical inadequacies in mind, we now turn in the next chapter to the details of
Heidegger’s philosophical and anthropological solutions that will later inform Bonhoeffer’s own
theological solution.
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Chapter Three: Heidegger’s Anthropological Success
In this chapter I now turn to Heidegger’s coordination of act and being for philosophical
anthropology as understood by Bonhoeffer. In the previous chapter we saw how, according to
Bonhoeffer, there has been a succession of failed attempts on the part of notable philosophers to
develop an act-being coordinated theory of knowledge. Heidegger, on Bonhoeffer’s reading,
breaks this pattern. In the course of evaluating Heidegger’s Being and Time, Bonhoeffer says,
“Seen from the problem of act and being, it is as it seems that a genuine coordination of the two
has been reached,” and “Heidegger has succeeded in forcing together act and being in the
concept of Dasein.” 1 The goal of this chapter is, then, to explain the details of this success.
In evaluating previous philosophers, Bonhoeffer has already anticipated many of
Heidegger’s successes. It may, therefore, be useful to review these premonitions in order to keep
them in mind as we go through the details of Heidegger’s success in philosophical anthropology.
Again, Bonhoeffer describes the goal of Act and Being in the final sentence of its opening
section as follows: “This entire study is an attempt to unify the concern of true transcendentalism
and the concern of true ontology in an ‘ecclesiological form of thinking’,” 2 which essentially
means conjoining the best of Kant and Heidegger. As we saw in the lead up to Bonhoeffer’s
evaluation of Husserl and Scheler, genuine ontology must prioritize being over thought or
consciousness such that thinking is continually suspended (aufgehoben) in being. 3 This continual
suspension of thought in being involves, in some yet unclarified way, pondering the fact of
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“always already existing” (immer schon Dasein) in its everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) that avoids
the positing of “timeless essences” in favor of historicity and temporality. 4 What follows is a
presentation of these successes and why they are successes for Bonhoeffer.
The ultimate and related rewards of the following exposition of Heidegger’s analysis of
Dasein are thrown-projection and temporality. Regarding the former, Boomgaarden is, to my
knowledge, the only one to notice the importance of Heidegger’s thrown-projection to
Bonhoeffer’s positive appraisals of Heidegger and to Bonhoeffer’s own theological coordination
of act and being. 5 However, a clearer exposition of exactly what thrown-projection is for
Heidegger is needed, which will subsequently allow us in chapter five to give a fuller account of
how thrown-projection works for Bonhoeffer at the levels of theological ontology, anthropology,
and epistemology.
Heidegger’s temporality has gained more attention. Boomgaarden, DeJonge, and Tietz all
note that temporality plays a vital and positive role in Bonhoeffer’s evaluations and uses of
Heidegger. 6 This is by no means, however, a settled matter. Plant, as a notable example, reads
Bonhoeffer as rejecting the use of Heidegger’s temporality in favor of God’s eternitiy. 7 This and
other positions on Heidegger’s place in Bonhoeffer’s theology, miss Bonhoeffer’s distinction
between the three levels at which one must coordinate act and being, the complex relation
Bonhoeffer has with philosophy presented at the beginning of chapter two, and, most relevant to
the following chapter, Heidegger’s distinction between time and temporality. Even those, such
as Boomgaarden, who note the difference between time and temporality, miss the intricacies of
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the distinction because they miss the importance of and Heidegger’s continual use of the method
of formal indication, an important component in Heidegger’s ability to meet the criterion of
concreteness.
What is required, then, is a careful reading and comprehensible presentation of
Heidegger, in part framed by what Bonhoeffer finds best in Heidegger, 8 that elucidates how
Heidegger begins with concrete existence and uses formal indication to move down to the
fundamental structures of thrown-projection and temporality. Bonhoeffer will positively
appropriate Heidegger on concrete existence, thrown-projection, and temporality for his
theology, which is the subject of chapter five.
Before continuing to such details, however, there is a preliminary matter that requires
attention, namely the argument made by Zimmermann that Heidegger does not constitute a
genuine influence because Act and Being does not contain any substantive changes from
Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, Sanctorum Communio.
From Sanctorum Communio to Act and Being: What Required Fixing
Given the thematic continuities of Bonhoeffer’s corpus as a whole, 9 and the fact that
Bonhoeffer’s explicit engagement with Heidegger is isolated to Act and Being and its
surrounding minor works, it is not uncommon to overlook or explicitly reject the importance of
Heidegger’s influence on Bonhoeffer. In his Humanism & Religion, Zimmermann says for
example,
We have little evidence that Heidegger’s influence extended beyond serving as a useful
philosophical justification to conjoin human reflection to action and to confirm
8

This clause is important. Being and Time’s presentation of Dasein is long, complex, and detailed. While
Bonhoeffer utilizes and addresses some of Being and Time’s most central concepts, Bonhoeffer’s presentation and
use is not exhaustive. Because I am concerned with how Bonhoeffer understood and used Heidegger, I am only
concerned with presenting and explaining what is essential for that.
9
Green, Bonhoeffer, 1; Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 4; DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological
Formation, 129–42.

86

Bonhoeffer’s own incarnational instinct that Christian theology must ever be historically
conscious. Both of these tendencies, moreover, are already in Bonhoeffer’s first
dissertation, Sanctorum Communio. 10
This is an important and reasonable objection to the general claim of my argument that
Heidegger is an important philosophical resource for Bonhoeffer. The objection seems to be twofold. First, even where Heidegger does seem to have an obvious influence, it is merely as a
useful tool to get to a conclusion that Bonhoeffer already had in mind. Second, what seems to be
a unique influence is not in fact unique because the main points in Act and Being are already
present in Sanctorum Communio prior to Bonhoeffer encountering Heidegger.
Addressing the first objection, there are notable elements to Bonhoeffer’s treatment of
Heidegger that makes that treatment unique vis-à-vis other philosophical attempts at a solution to
the problem of act and being, which lends at least circumstantial support to the position that
Heidegger was an essential source of insights into the problem of act and being for Bonhoeffer.
First, as already noted in the introduction, after Luther, Heidegger is the second most cited
source in Act and Being. Second, Bonhoeffer’s presentations of other philosophical systems,
particularly Kant’s and Hegel’s, were, by Bonhoeffer’s own admission, stylized; that is, not
immediately concerned with the particularities of these philosophies themselves, but their
possible extreme forms. And this stylized presentation was often read and presented through
contemporary religious and theological appropriations of them. Neither is primarily the case
with Bonhoeffer’s presentation of Heidegger. Bonhoeffer does deal with Pryzwara and
Bultmann, both of whom make theological use of Heidegger, but Bonhoeffer’s initial
presentation of Heidegger is dominated by Heidegger himself. Bonhoeffer begins his
presentation and evaluation of Heidegger with a two-page summary of Being and Time. Prima
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facie, perhaps not noteworthy, but this summary demonstrates that Bonhoeffer read the entirety
of Being and Time. The summary is also accurate, and, by my estimation, masterful. Bonhoeffer
took the effort to write it and write it well; an exercise he did not perform with Kant, Hegel,
Husserl, or Scheler. Heidegger then seems to be more than a “useful philosophical justification”
for Bonhoeffer’s intended solution, which, as this and chapter five will demonstrate, is not
isolated to the conjoining of human action and reflection, and making Christian theology
historically conscious. As we will see, Bonhoeffer integrated particularities of Heidegger’s
temporal presentation of Dasein into his theology in a sufficiently complex way to make
Heidegger important beyond merely instrumental value.
Finally and still addressing the first objection, Heidegger’s function and relation to past
philosophical attempts at a solution to the problem is analogous to Bonhoeffer’s relation to
previous theological attempts. Bonhoeffer begins with a survey and evaluation of past
philosophical attempts at a solution made by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. They all fail to
solve the problem. Heidegger, however, does solve the problem, at least for philosophy.
Bonhoeffer explains the purpose of this section as follows: “The critical idea that governs the
discussion of Section A [the philosophical section] must be the possibility of applying the
suggested solutions of the act-being-problem to Christian conceptions of God and revelation,
from which everything else proceeds.” 11 In Part B, he then moves on to theological attempts to
solve the problem in relation to revelation. Again, he critiques a number of theologians, such as
Barth and Holl, before offering his own solution. In terms of the overall structure of Act and
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Being, Bonhoeffer holds the same position in relation to previously critiqued theologies as
Heidegger does to the previously critiqued philosophical systems. 12
That Heidegger is uniquely treated and holds a similar structural position to philosophy
that Bonhoeffer does to theology indicates that Heidegger is more than an excuse for Bonhoeffer
to deal with issues he is already interested in, which brings us to the second objection.
Regarding Zimmermann’s second objection, he is quite right to say that central
tendencies in Act and Being are already present in Sanctorum Communio. First, it is important to
keep the chronological developments of Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being in mind. The
initial form of Sanctorum Communio was written between late 1925 to mid-1927. 13 The final,
extensively edited form was given to the publisher in March, 1930. 14 Act and Being was written
in the summer and winter of 1929, 15 and much of the research obviously occurred prior to that. It
is then probable that some of what Bonhoeffer learned in preparing for Act and Being was edited
back into Sanctorum Communio.
More importantly, tendencies are not solutions, and by Act and Being’s standards
Sanctorum Communio fails according to two general criteria. The first of these general criteria is
the need to coordinate act and being. By Act and Being’s standards, Sanctorum Communio is
overly act-oriented. 16 A central goal of Sanctorum Communio is to formulate a theologically
acceptable concept of person, both as individual and as community. Bonhoeffer’s concern with
12

There is another similar conceptual and argumentative parallel. Just as Barth’s understanding of God as subject is
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the concept of ‘person’ in Sanctorum Communio is primarily ethical. One of the conclusions that
Bonhoeffer arrives at is that the person is only created in the moment (Augenblick) in which the
person is ethically addressed. 17 Translated into Act and Being terminology, the being of a person
only arises in the act of being ethically addressed. The discontinuous and discreet nature of act
then translates into a discontinuous and discreet being of the person, which is quite apparent
when Bonhoeffer says that “the person ever and again arises and passes away in time […] the
person is re-created again and again in the perpetual flux of life.” 18 By Act and Being standards
Sanctorum Communio has failed at the criterion of continuity. By contrast, Heidegger is most
successful in addressing the criterion of continuity.
The second general shift that occurs between Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being
concerns the relation of epistemology and anthropology. According to Act and Being, modern
philosophy’s obsession with epistemology, which begins with René Descartes, is one, important
reason philosophy has been unsuccessful at the problem of act and being. 19 This assertion is, in
general, comparable to Heidegger’s own position as presented in Being and Time. Heidegger
says, for example,
Historiologically, the aim of the existential analytic can be made plainer by considering
Descartes, who is credited with providing the point of departure for modern philosophical
inquiry by his discovery of the “cogito sum.” He investigates the “cogitare” of the
“ego,” at least within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the “sum” completely
undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito. Our analytic
raises the ontological question of the being of the “sum.” Not until the nature of this
being has been determined can we grasp the kind of being which belongs to cogitations. 20
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The last sentence is of particular note. In Bonhoeffer’s terms, here Heidegger is essentially
saying that we cannot undertake a theory of knowledge until the being of that which knows,
Dasein, is understood; epistemology comes from anthropology. This may have been one aspect
of Being and Time that predisposed Bonhoeffer to find it useful. This basic position, however,
cannot have its origin in Heidegger; in Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer is already critical of
modern philosophy’s obsession with epistemology and locates the origin of that obsession with
Descartes. 21
There is an important shift, however, in that for Act and Being a theory of knowledge
must be founded on a concrete anthropology. For the Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer, the fact
that “the epistemological and the social spheres can differ so greatly in principle […]
demonstrates that neither sphere can be reduced to the other.” 22 By Act and Being, however,
there is not this strict categorical division between the epistemological and the social or
anthropological. “The theological concepts of object and knowledge are shown to be
determined,” so Act and Being Bonhoeffer states, “by the sociological concept of the person and
must be recast accordingly.” 23 Again, the origin of a mistaken or correct relation of act and being
at the epistemological level (as opposed to sphere) is at the anthropological level. In the course
of explaining and evaluating Being and Time, Bonhoeffer, borrowing from Heidegger, states that
what is important for our inquiry here is the unconditional priority given to the question
of being over that of thought. It had been the basic mistake of Descartes and all his
followers that, in explicating the cogito sum, they neglected to put the question of being
to the sum. But this question cannot be raised unless there ‘is something like an
understanding of being’. 24
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Now, like Heidegger and citing him specifically, Bonhoeffer takes the position that to arrive at a
proper theory of knowledge one must begin with an investigation into the kind of existence that
can know and more particularly into the concrete way such an existence lives that gives rise to
knowledge.
Sanctorum Communio, then, was overly act-oriented and improperly understood the
relation of epistemology to anthropology. As I noted at the conclusion of chapter two, these are
the same general flaws that previous philosophical systems suffered. In general, then, Sanctorum
Communio needed correction much like other past attempts at solutions to the problem of act and
being require correction. For philosophy, Heidegger provides that correction. Bonhoeffer,
learning from the details of Heidegger’s solution, will provide the same function for theology.
With that we turn to exactly how and why anthropology comes first for Heidegger in Being and
Time.
Anthropology and the Priority of Dasein
The priority that Heidegger gives to Dasein in Being and Time is dependent on the intended
purpose of Being and Time. Because Heidegger’s goal is somewhat different than the use to
which Bonhoeffer puts Being and Time, it is important to understand Heidegger’s goal. As
Heidegger clearly states in the opening page of Being and Time: “Our aim in the following
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely.” 25 What
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exactly Heidegger means by “being” and “the meaning of being” is itself contentious and
complicated. 26 Looking ahead to §32 of Being and Time, Heidegger defines meaning as “the
‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.” 27
Leaving aside for now the technical component of “the ‘upon-which’ of a projection,” we can
say that meaning is what allows us to understand something as something. So Heidegger looking
for the meaning of being is Heidegger asking how we can have an understanding of being at all.
What Heidegger means by “being” is also contentious. 28 The central cause of this issue is that
Heidegger never himself arrives at an answer to this question. In a generic sense I think it is safe
to say that Heidegger is asking how we can understand, not simply a particular entity or category
of entities, but how it is that we can understand the entity, Dasein, that has any understanding of
what it is to be. 29 What allows me to understand all the various ways in which something may be,
whether it is an everyday object such as a pencil, an abstract object such as a number, a ‘nonexistent’ unicorn, past events, and myself?
This question of the meaning of being has what Heidegger calls an “ontological
priority.” 30 According to Heidegger, all sciences (Wissenschaften) are systematic attempts to
come to know a particular region of being, such as biology’s investigation of life, sociology’s
investigation of society, theology’s investigation of the divine-human relationship, and so forth.
to give it the feel of being an entity. More particularly, it seems to give it the feel that it is the ultimate, sacred, or
divine Being, which in Being and Time it is not.
26
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They are most often enterprises examining the grounds for truth claims within their respective
regions: What can we know about this particular animal? What can we know about God? And so
forth. These epistemic methods and goals are based, however, on an often hidden, concealed, or
assumed regional ontology arising from pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting the
world. 31 The sciences are based on assumed positions concerning the nature of ‘what is’ or
entities (Seiende). 32 Biology, for example, assumes a position on what constitutes ‘life’ and
therefore delimits its domain of inquiry. The academic study of religion assumes a particular preontological understanding of what constitutes ‘religion’, ‘ritual’, and so forth. It is only based on
these assumptions that a science can then ask epistemological questions concerning its subject
(Sache) of inquiry. But because the sciences already assume much about the nature of what they
study, there is a degree to which their epistemology is predetermined. It is then, at times,
necessary for a science to question the nature of their fundamental concepts: What actually is
life? What actually is religion? What is the sacred? 33
According to Heidegger, for such regional ontologies to be truly clarified, it is not enough
to ask about the being of particular entities or domains of entities; rather, one must ask about the
meaning of being in general, or what he sometimes calls “fundamental ontology.” 34 For
Heidegger, this means not simply asking about the nature of this particular entity or region of
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entities, such that we can then know something about those entities; rather, one asks how any
entity whatsoever can appear and therefore how any understanding of such entities is at all
possible. The question is then “What is the meaning of being in general?” The relational
dependence of these kinds or levels of inquiry can then be encapsulated as follows: The
epistemology of a particular science is dependent on its particular pre-ontological assumptions.
These regional ontologies are in turn dependent on fundamental ontology.
How does one get to a fundamental ontology or the meaning of being in general? As
Heidegger says, “Being is always the being of an entity,” 35 yet being is not itself an entity. 36 This
means, first, that one cannot investigate being as if it were a chair, a number, or even God. One
cannot get directly to being. But one does have to go through a particular entity to get to being.
Presumably, one could go through just about any entity, but Heidegger has in mind a particular
entity with characteristics already well-suited to the task; that entity is Dasein.
When asking about the meaning of being, Dasein has particular, salient features that give
it priority over other entities. 37 First, according to Heidegger, Dasein has an ontic priority. 38
Dasein is unique among all other entities for the fact that “being is an issue for it.” 39 In other
words, Dasein cares about being. Because Dasein cares about being, it has always already, even
if only implicitly, asked and answered the question of the meaning of being. Acting in the world,
understanding and interpreting phenomena in the world, and so forth, are predicated on Dasein
already understanding being in general.
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This leads to the second aspect of Dasein’s priority, the ontological priority. Because
Dasein always takes a stance on being, it is already (pre-)ontological. There is a real sense in
which for Heidegger we already know what being is. The answer is already hidden ‘within’
Dasein; we need only expose and clarify it.
Particularly important for Bonhoeffer’s reading of Heidegger, is that the ontic and
ontological priorities of Dasein combine to form the third priority that Heidegger calls Dasein’s
“ontico-ontological” priority. 40 Here, Dasein is the “condition for the possibility of any
ontologies.” 41 The particular regional ontologies of the various sciences arise from Dasein’s prescientific engagement in the world. To clarify those ontologies one must first clarify Dasein itself
and its fundamental ontology. If a theory of knowledge is based on ontology and ontology is
based on Dasein, then epistemology is based on Dasein. Or, in Bonhoeffer’s words, the meaning
of epistemology is anthropology. 42 Therefore, we must first ask about Dasein.
There are two general questions one may ask of Dasein. One may inappropriately ask
“What is Dasein?” or one may ask the true question, “Who or how is Dasein?”43 The former
question presupposes that Dasein is something that is, in Heidegger’s terms, present-at-hand
(vorhanden). 44 Essentially this means that Dasein is seen as one entity or thing among other
entities or things. As Heidegger says in the History of the Concept of Time, a testing ground for
many of Being and Time’s concepts,
40
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This designation ‘Dasein’ for the distinctive entity so named does not signify a what.
This entity is not distinguished by its what, like a chair in contrast to a house. Rather, this
designation in its own way expresses the way to be. It is a very specific expression of
being which is here chosen for an entity, whereas at first we [normally] always name an
entity in terms of its what-content and leave its specific being undetermined, because we
hold it to be self-evident. 45
The most common way to see Dasein as a ‘what’ is to, as Descartes does, treat Dasein as a
subject. 46 Heidegger prefers to investigate Dasein as a “way to be.” Heidegger wants to know
how Dasein exists by investigating it as a process.
There are a number of problems with the assumption that Dasein is essentially just a
subject. First and foremost, such an assumption does not address the more fundamental question
of how a subject may be at all, or as the above quotation states, it “leaves its specific being
undetermined.” Second, by unreflectively assuming a subject amidst objects we run into the
epistemological problems that, according to Bonhoeffer, previous philosophers have tackled yet
failed to resolve. This subject/object division creates an assumed internal/external division.
There is a subject ‘in here’ and there are objects ‘out there’. A host of chimerical questions then
arise: “For only then can the problem arise of how this knowing subject comes out of its inner
‘sphere’ into one which is ‘other and external’, of how knowing can have any object at all, and of
how one must think of the object itself so that eventually the subject knows it without needing to
venture a leap into another sphere.” 47 Essentially, this assumption gives rise to the
epistemological problem of act and being; how can we understand and account for the relation of
the knowing act of the subject and the being of the object of knowledge when they seem to
belong to two distinct spheres? Third, assuming Dasein to be a subject assumes Dasein to be a
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static substance. This is a failure many, such as Scheler, 48 made and is contrary to both
Heidegger’s and Bonhoeffer’s assumption that human existence be related in some important
way to historicity and temporality. Finally, there is nothing, for lack of a better word, ‘personal’
about assuming Dasein to be a subject. Dasein as subject is contrary to or cannot account for the
seemingly obvious fact that there is me and there are others. It would seem that one subject is
just like another subject. But as Heidegger defines an essential aspect of Dasein, it is in each
case mine; I have existence; I have a life to live.
The more appropriate question to pose is “How is Dasein?” or “What is the way or
manner of Dasein’s existence?” With a new orientation in the investigation of Dasein and a new
route to get to the ‘how’ of Dasein we arrive at Heidegger’s success at the criterion of
concreteness.
Average Everydayness and Concreteness
As we saw with previous philosophical attempts to solve the problem of act and being,
particularly in Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler, they failed to account for human existence or Dasein
as it is actually lived. Hegel could only bring act and being together my creating “a philosophy
of angels.” 49 Though by focusing on ethics and philosophy of religion Scheler was concerned
with concrete questions, his ‘Dasein’ was not concrete and neither were his answers. And
Husserl intentionally foreclosed or bracketed questions about actual concrete human existence
through his method of phenomenological reduction. Bonhoeffer diagnoses pre-Heideggerian
phenomenology as follows:
Phenomenology since Husserl has itself done violence to a problem, the clarification of
which would have been indispensable for its very presuppositions: the problem of being
itself. Not until the arbitrarily bracketed existence, or ‘reality’, is put on a new
48
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ontological foundation can we expect a clarification of the problem of act and being,
which neither Husserl nor Scheler offers. 50
Fortunately, “precisely where Husserl ‘brackets’, Heidegger discloses being itself.” 51
In “securing the kind of access which will lead to Dasein” Dasein must, as Heidegger
puts it, “be shown as it is proximally and for the most part—in its average everydayness
[durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit].” 52 Nearly four hundred pages later Heidegger is kind enough
to explain what he means by the expressions “proximally and for the most part” and
“everydayness.” For example: “[W]hat we have primarily in mind in the expression
‘everydayness’ is a definite ‘how’ of existence by which Dasein is dominated through and
through ‘for life’.” 53 Essentially, these expressions mean the way in which most of us go about
living most of our lives. We must examine Dasein, at least initially, not at those exceptional
moments, but at those times that are most common. Reflection is one of these exceptional
moments. Those moments when we reflect on ourselves, others, and the things around us are not,
according to Heidegger, our usual way of living in the world. Most of our time is not spent
reflecting on what it means to be a parent, what it means to be responsible to others, or on how
we actually us a pencil. Most of our time is spent simply doing such things. This dominant
manner, ‘doing’, or ‘how’ of existence should be the initial starting point of getting to the
essential existential structures of Dasein.
This method itself has something like two ‘moments’ relating to two levels of inquiry
into the being of Dasein, the existentiell and the existential. 54 Existentiell relates to actual ways
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in which a particular Dasein lives. If a particular Dasein is a parent or a nurse, those are
existentiell characteristics of a particular Dasein. Examples of investigations at this level would
include anthropological, sociological, psychological, and so forth, examinations of particular
religious practices, particular social roles, and so forth. The existential level relates to the general
structures of Dasein that make any existentiell way of existing possible. The existential structure
of understanding (Verstehen), for example, allows for the particular possibility of understanding
one’s future goals as a parent or nurse. Heidegger’s intermediate goal, on the way to finding the
meaning of being, is to elucidate such general existential structures of Dasein that make meaning
or intelligibility and any particular existentiell way of existing possible.
What is particularly important at this point is Heidegger’s assertion that to get to the
existential structures of Dasein one must first go through particular, existentiell ways of
existing. 55 These two levels never, in fact, exist separately. Particular existential structures are
always enacted in a particular existentiell way. And particular existentiell ways of existing are
always formed by existential structures. So we only ever encounter existential structures as they
manifest in particular existentiell ways.
The means of going through the existentiell to get to the existential involves two related
approaches: the hermeneutics of facticity and the method of formal indication. The hermeneutics
of facticity is essentially human existence interpreting itself or the ways in which it actually
lives. Heidegger uses “facticity” (Faktizität) as a designation to mean the ways in which we
actually live or, more technically, Dasein’s “temporally particular ‘there’, its being ‘there’ for a
while.” 56 This is in contrast to “factuality” (Tätsachlichkeit) that is concerned with the
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“properties” of a human being such as height and weight. 57 Factuality is concerned with what
Dasein is, and facticity is concerned with how Dasein is.
Both ‘hermeneutics’ and ‘facticity’ highlight, again, that the study of human existence or
Dasein is not concerned with the objective or scientific investigation into objects with properties.
Dasein is not like such entities. First, interpretation is an essential possibility of Dasein itself.
Second, coming to understand Dasein is itself an activity of Dasein that, therefore, also involves
interpretation. The hermeneutics of facticity is facticity interpreting itself. 58 Even the practice
Heidegger is engaged in, i.e. the attempt to get to the existential structures of Dasein, is
existentiell.
But the roots of the existential analytic [of Dasein], on its part, are ultimately existentiell,
that is, ontical. Only if the inquiry of philosophical research is itself seized upon in an
existentiell manner as a possibility of the being of each existing Dasein, does it become at
all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence and to undertake an adequately
founded ontological problematic. 59
This only makes the interdependence of the existentiell and existential that much more
complicated. This and the fact that facticity, or the ways in which we actually live, is not itself
the object of study, but only a first stage requires Heidegger to find a special method to
disentangle them, clear away particular existentiell ways of existing, and get down to the
fundamental existential structures of Dasein. 60
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The method by which Heidegger clears away the particular existentiell ways of existing
in order to get to the existential structures is the method of formal indication (formale Anzeige). 61
Some of the details of the method are not important for our concerns, and perhaps best explained
through the examples to follow. For now it is important to note that Heidegger’s method of
formal indication is an attempt to get below what Bonhoeffer understands as the epistemological
understanding of act and being and the problems that arise from some of the common
assumptions presented in the previous chapter, particularly in their Husserlian form.
Formal indication is predicated on transforming Husserl’s noesis-noema structure. In
order to do justice to the importance of facticity, which Husserl intentionally bracketed,
Heidegger adds a third aspect to intentionality. Heidegger identifies three moments of
intentionality: the ‘what’ or content-sense (Gehaltssinn), which corresponds to Husserl’s noema;
the ‘how’ or relational-sense (Bezugssinn), which corresponds to noesis; and the enactment-sense
(Volzugssinn), the additional, third aspect of intentionality. 62 The content-sense or ‘what’ is
determined by the relational-sense or ‘how’ of the intentional act. In Bonhoeffer’s terms, the
intentional act is determinative of the being of the object intended. However, the enactmentsense is determinative of both the content- and relational-senses. The enactment-sense is the
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historical existence of Dasein. That is, Dasein’s historical existence is prior and gives rise to the
act of the subject and the being of the object. 63
Though I will use the fundamental structures of attunement (Befindlichkeit) and
understanding (Verstehen) as extended examples below, a brief example may help at this point.
If I am Husserl attempting to uncover the structures of consciousness, I may be sitting and
staring at a coffee mug. The coffee mug would be the content of the intention. In staring at the
coffee mug in such a way, I would be taking a theoretical stance in relation to the mug. This
would be the relational sense of the intention. What Husserl misses, according to Heidegger (and
Bonhoeffer), is that these are imbedded and enacted in an actual context. Change the context or
enactment and the content and relation change as well. So far the situation is a scientific or
objective one. If my situation changes to writing this particular work, then my relation to the
coffee mug changes. I am no longer relating to it in some theoretical way; I am relating to it as a
piece of paraphernalia in my practice of writing. Then the content changes as well. It is no longer
an object with determinate properties; it is a thing used for drinking. 64 The enactment makes all
the difference, and it is to the enactment that we should get.
Here Heidegger has undercut the Husserlian form of the act-being divide by advocating,
with his hermeneutics of facticity, that we turn to the way life is actually lived, which Husserl
explicitly brackets, and by arguing for a deeper structure of intentionality that is prior to
Husserl’s and is importantly based on actual historical existence.
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Heidegger later adds the “temporalizing-sense” (GA 58: 260-1; GA 61: 52-3); though it is already present in a
nascent form in his lectures on the phenomenology of religion; Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life,
44.
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ready-to-hand (zuhanden).
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Furthering the Husserlian scandal, Heidegger proposes his own form of bracketing,
which involves bracketing or “holding in abeyance” precisely what Husserl was seeking. 65 If the
historical existence of Dasein is prior to the way in which the subject understands the object,
then we should seek to understand that existence. Focusing on either content or relation misses
the deeper structures that give rise to both. We should try to get past the content- and relationalsenses to the enactment sense. Formal indication then requires that we suspend the content-sense
and the relational-sense in order to allow the enactment sense to come to the fore.
Here, from Bonhoeffer’s perspective, Heidegger has satisfied, for philosophy, 66 the
elusive criterion of concreteness. 67 Heidegger’s method focuses neither on the object nor on the
subject extracted from the historical and situational context, but rather precisely focuses on the
historical as the context within which the object, subject, and their interaction occur. According
to Bonhoeffer, neither Kant, Hegel, Husserl, nor Scheler worked out of the actual living of
historical life as Heidegger does.
It is also important to note that this method is pervasive throughout Being and Time.
Heidegger will often begin with everyday understandings of concepts, activities, and so forth,
then dig deeper to the existential structures using formal indication. It is important to present and
explain each relevant instance of Heidegger’s use of formal indication. Most interpretive
problems arise when one does not understand the particular instance of Heidegger’s use of this
method.
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Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 43–4.
The phrase “for philosophy” is important. As I have tried to stress throughout this work, Bonhoeffer sets different
standards for philosophy and theology. As we will see in the next chapter Heidegger is still not concrete enough by
the standards of proper theology; yet Heidegger has gone as far as one can legitimately expect philosophy to go in
satisfying the criterion of concreteness from Bonhoeffer’s perspective. This is no small victory; for Bonhoeffer will,
as chapter five will demonstrate, transmute this philosophical success into a theological one.
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To help illustrate how Heidegger’s method works and to further substantiate its meeting
the criterion of concreteness I will provide two examples: (1) How Heidegger moves from tuning
(Stimmung) to the deeper existential structure of attunement (Befindlichkeit), 68 and (2) how
Heidegger works from particular possibilities down to the existential structure of understanding
(Verstehen). Both of these examples will reappear in the next section when these structures are
joined in such a way that they fulfill the criterion of continuity.
Tunings, for Heidegger, are particular existentiell ways of being-in-the-world. And we
always find ourselves in some tuning or other, whether it is “undisturbed equanimity,” “inhibited
ill-humour,” “a pallid […] lack of [tuning],” “elation,” “fear” and so forth. 69 Heidegger warns us,
however, not to think of tunings as we ordinarily would: “Having a [tuning] is not related to the
psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an
enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and persons.” 70 That is, to translate back into
Bonhoeffer’s terms, tunings are not simply acts of a subject that impose themselves on the being
of an independent object. Rather tunings open up a world such that a subject can direct itself in
some particular way towards an object. Tunings reveal, simultaneously, the subject, objects, and
the relations between them in a particular way. 71
Heidegger uses the particular tuning of fear to illustrate three important elements of
tunings in general. There are (1) that in the face of which we fear, (2) fearing, and (3) that about
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MacQuarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit as “state-of-mind”; however, Heidegger intentionally avoids
using words like “mind” since they often carry presuppositions that would overly determine a particular
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economic choice; Polt, Heidegger, 64–5. Though Stimmung is generally translated as mood, and this is the everyday
German meaning of the word, I have also chosen to translate it as “tuning.” First, mood has an overly subjective
connotation that Heidegger explicitly wishes to avoid. Second, its linguistic relation to the word “attunement” in
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which we fear. 72 “That in the face of which we fear” corresponds to some entity in the world. 73
“That about which we fear” is Dasein itself. We find our existence threatened in some way,
whether in the form of loss of life, property, respect, and so forth. And we can fear about our
existence because our existence is an issue for us. 74 The relational “fearing as such” allows us to
see our existence, in some way or another, to be feared for in the face of some fearsome,
threatening entity.
It is important that all three of these elements are mutually determinative and
simultaneous. The tuning lies in the context, not in any definite property a subject or object
might have. A tiger may or may not be that in the face of which we fear. The situation of a zoo or
a jungle conditions the possibility of fearing a tiger differently. It would be a mistake to locate
fear in the tiger or object itself. This also means that fear does not merely arise in a subjective
vacuum. It is just as problematic to understand tuning as a merely subjective condition. Fear
arises in a complex arrangement of relations in which, because of the situation, another entity
may appear threatening to us. Both ourselves and phenomena around us simultaneously appear
in certain ways because of tunings. 75
To stop here, however, would be to mistakenly stop at the content- and relational-senses.
As Heidegger warns, “Phenomenally, we would wholly fail to recognize both what tuning
discloses and how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with what Dasein
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is acquainted with, knows, and believes ‘at the same time’ when it has such a tuning.” 76 If we
stopped here the risk would be two-fold. There is the risk of overly identifying a particular
tuning with one of its constituent and interdependent elements, and we cannot truly understand
tuning as such and its elements if we do not ask “How is tuning in general even possible?” We
must find that existential structure, attunement, that lies beneath any particular existentiell
tuning.
If we remove the particular content and relation of the tuning of fear we get many of the
characteristics of the existential structure of attunement. Attunement is that general existential
structure that allows for any particular tuning. As noted earlier, in actually living, existential
structures are always actualized by particular existentiell ways of living. Fear, love, indifference,
and so forth are particular ways of being attuned. They are, therefore, particular iterations of
what attunement in general does or allows for. Fear allows us to see entities in the world as
fearsome. Those particular entities then matter to us as threatening. The first characteristic of
attunement is that it allows phenomena to appear to us as mattering at all. 77
As we saw, fear allows entities to matter as threatening, but being threatening is not a
property held by an isolated object; it is dependent on the situation in which the subject and
object relate to one another. The fear reveals the entire situation as threatening. Attunement, as
that which allows for any particular mattering, then also allows for situations in general to
matter. As allowing me to be attuned in general to myself, surrounding phenomena, and my
relations to them, attunement therefore discloses or opens up “being-in-the-world as a whole,” 78
which constitutes attunement’s second characteristic. As the translators note, Befindlichkeit is
related to the everyday German question “Wie befinden Sie sich?” meaning “How do you find
76
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yourself?” or “How is it going?” 79 The structure of attunement is what allows you to answer this
question at all.
This then leads to the third characteristic of attunement. How do you find yourself? You
find yourself thrown into a world. Attunement reveals one’s “thrownness” (Geworfenheit). 80
That is, attunement reveals that you are always faced with what you have already been. You
always carry your past with you in the present in such a way that it determines the way in which
the world appears to you. Thrownness will become particularly important in the next section as
one element that maintains the continuity of Dasein. For now we may say that thrownness
corresponds to the past; though, as we will see with Heidegger’s understanding of temporality
later in the chapter, past is not understood in its the usual everyday sense.
Parallel to the tunings/attunement structure is the possibility/understanding structure.
Unfortunately, Heidegger is not as ‘concrete’ here. It is not difficult, however, to see the concrete
behind the theory and fill it in for him. It is not simply our tunings arising from attunement that
reveal entities as mattering in certain ways, possibilities do so as well. In any situation Dasein is
always presented with a range of possibilities, or abilities for Dasein to be something
(Seinkӧnnen). 81 Given a particular Dasein’s thrownness, it may have various open and salient
possibilities. Dasein could be a mother, instructor, meditation-enthusiast, and so forth. 82 Based
on which particular existentiell possibility we understand ourselves according to at any particular
time, different entities and other Daseins in the world will meaningfully appear in different ways.
79
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Students in a classroom, understanding themselves according to the possibility of being students,
also understand other entities in the classroom in a particular way. A fire marshal, existing from
the possibility of being a fire marshal, will see this same ‘objective’ environment differently.
Students may see the white board as a designated space meant for conveying important
information. The fire marshal may see the same white board as an object required to be a certain
distance from the ceiling. The students may see one another as similar Daseins engaged in
realizing a common possibility. A fire marshal may see the students as things to be counted and
compared to the maximum seating capacity of a room. How particular entities appear depends on
the particular existentiell possibility one is engaged in. Particular existentiell possibilities are
dependent on Dasein’s existential structure of possibility in general.
Particular possibilities and the existential structure of possibility are then dependent on
understanding (Verstehen). Understanding is the fundamental existential structure,
equiprimordial with attunement, that allows Dasein to pick up or choose a possibility and
incorporate entities into the chosen possibility. Again, however, we must work down past the
content and relation of any particular possibility to the general structure of understanding.
Possibilities, like tunings, reveal entities as mattering in certain ways. Here, however, the
mattering is oriented in relation to a futural ability to be something as opposed to a situation into
which one is thrown. Understanding is the general existential structure that allows Dasein to be
futurally oriented toward any possibility whatsoever. Its first characteristic, like attunement’s, is
to allow Dasein to grasp anything as mattering because it matters to a particular possibility. 83
Understanding’s second characteristic is to also reveal being-in-the-world. Particular
possibilities reveal situations in determinate ways as in the above contrasting examples of the
students and the fire marshal. Understanding is that which allows for a particular possibility and
83
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is therefore that which allows for all situations and, hence, being-in-the-world to appear at all.
At this point it is also important to note that entities that appear within a situation according to a
possibility also determine that possibility. This is structurally similar to the way in which the
relations within a situation were as determinative of a tuning as the tuning was of the way in
which particular entities appeared. We require desks, chairs, pens, and so forth to make up the
particular possibility of being a student as we understand it. As the equipment associated with the
possibility change, so too does the possibility. 84
Finally, just as attunement was essentially thrownness, understanding is essentially
projection. Understanding reveals that, not only do we find ourselves always in a world in a
particular way, but we are always already projecting ourselves into the future. 85 We understand
ourselves, others, and the entities around us because we are pressing, extending, or projecting
ourselves into the possibilities we have taken up. We understand a dry erase marker because it is
“in-order-to” (um-zu) write on a whiteboard. 86 This then refers to or is “towards-which” (Wozu)
the work of lecturing. 87 And all of this is for the sake of (Worumwillen) the possibility of being
an instructor or student. We understand the intermediate steps because we are constantly
projecting ourselves into various, particular possibilities.
These examples of attunement and understanding have hopefully clarified the concrete
method with which Heidegger is working. 88 Heidegger wants to draw on particular everyday
ways we live in the world and from there delve deeper into the structures of human existence that
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make those possibilities possible. Concreteness is also maintained at this apparently abstract
level if one always bears in mind that Heidegger’s separating of the existentiell and existential is
an analytic enterprise. He divides them primarily for conceptual clarity and analysis. In actual
life they never exist apart.
The structures of attunement and understanding will also guide us in the next section
when we turn to how Heidegger fulfills, again for philosophy, the criterion of continuity. Though
a number of elements of Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein, such as his
Vorhanden/Zuhanden distinction, could have been chosen to illustrate Heidegger’s concern with
concreteness, attunement and understanding will be joined into the unitary structure of thrownprojection, the most salient feature of Dasein that maintains its continuity, to which we now turn.
Thrown-Projection and Continuity
According to Bonhoeffer, Heidegger is successful at meeting the criterion of continuity, and
though Heidegger is not alone in meeting this criterion, the way in which he does so is unique
among the philosophical options Bonhoeffer has evaluated. As we saw in the last chapter, both
Hegel and Scheler were able to meet the criterion of continuity. They were only able to do so,
however, at the expense of concreteness. Heidegger, in contrast, has met the criterion of
concreteness. We should, therefore, expect Heidegger’s solution for continuity to be importantly
different from Hegel’s and Scheler’s. Kant was also concerned with the problem of continuity. It
seemed empirically obvious that there just was epistemic and anthropological continuity; yet
when we attempt to find and disclose the source of the continuity we cannot find it. Rather it
must simply be assumed as the transcendental ego. Kant’s inability to find the source of
continuity arises from his overly act-oriented philosophy. For Heidegger to meet the criterion of
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continuity, he must maintain the concreteness already established, be able to actually find the
source of continuity, and coordinate act and being.
Before elucidating the existential structure Bonhoeffer identifies as Heidegger’s solution
to the problem of continuity, 89 i.e. the structure of thrown-projection, we must first take a step
back and summarize the important points concerning the being of Dasein that Heidegger
provides prior to the structure of thrown-projection. This is necessary in order to better
understand thrown-projection because much of what Heidegger covers prior to thrown-projection
will return later; and much of what precedes thrown-projection also helps Heidegger to fulfill the
criterion of continuity, though Bonhoeffer does not explicitly appeal to them.
To the basic question “‘What’ is Dasein?”, so important to Bonhoeffer, Heidegger
initially answers “being-in-the-world.” 90 Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon that, for
the sake of exposition and explanation, may be divided into three component structures. In order
of Heidegger’s exposition, these component structures are ‘in-the-world’, the entity or ‘who’ of
being-in-the-world, and ‘being-in’.
The goal of Heidegger’s investigation into the structure of ‘in-the-world’ is to get to
worldhood as such, or what makes it possible for us to have a world at all. 91 To elucidate this
goal, Heidegger distinguishes between four meanings of “world.” First, there is the perhaps
common definition of world as the total collection of stuff or entities. Working with this
definition, if one asked “What is the world?” one could presumably answer with an exhaustive
89
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inventory of all the particular entities that exist. This understanding of world is furthest from
Heidegger’s interest. Second, ‘world’ may be a regional ontological term. It may mean the
‘space’ that makes it possible to identify particular entities as belonging to particular categories.
A scholar of religion may have a ‘religious’ world by this definition. To have such a world
means that the scholar participates in a ‘space’ of meaning that allows certain entities to show up
as ‘religious’. Third, ‘world’ may mean that ‘space’ in which we live. Here the world is not a
collection of things, nor is it a regional, ontological ‘space’ of meaning that allows certain
entities to show up as those entities. Rather this world is the everyday ontic ‘space’ of meaning
in which we engage in actual everyday activities. When Heidegger uses this definition of world,
he generally talks about one’s “environment” (Umwelt), various immediate and surrounding
contexts of meanings and entities with which we most often deal. Fourth and finally, is ‘world’
understood as worldhood (Weltlichkeit), the explication of which is Heidegger’s true goal in
analyzing the structure of ‘in-the-world’. It is the existential structure of Dasein that makes
possible all the previous meanings of world.
To get to worldhood, Heidegger goes through the types of environments with which we
are most concerned, i.e. Heidegger goes through the third understanding of ‘world’ to get to
worldhood. This involves the average everyday ways we interact with equipment (Zeug). I will
take a classroom and its equipment as a particular example. If we wanted to talk about and
examine the entities within a classroom, one approach would be to look at each entity separately
and examine its objective properties. We might look at a dry erase marker and examine its mass,
volume, color, and so forth. This would entail seeing the dry erase marker as, what Heidegger
calls, a present-at-hand (vorhanden) entity. According to Heidegger, this is not how we
generally understand equipment within an environment. Nor would such an approach help us to
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understand the meaning of the environment of the classroom. Generally, in our average everyday
dealings with entities, we encounter them as ready-to-hand (zuhanden). That is, we generally
encounter and understand entities in using them. I understand the dry erase marker as something
I can use. 92 Further, I understand it as useful to some purpose, as ‘something in-order-to’ (etwas
zu-um). 93 I find it useful for writing on a whiteboard. The dry erase marker is now tied to another
ready-to-hand entity, the whiteboard. This in turn is tied to the desks, which should be
appropriately positioned facing the whiteboard. And we can continue to expand these relations
to include the doors, clock, overhead projector, and so forth. We see, then, that the classroom is a
totality of equipment in which all the ready-to-hand entities refer to one another. The equipment
is joined together into a totality by a “towards-which.” 94 That is, the ready-to-hand entities in the
classroom environment have a shared master purpose to which they contribute. In the case of a
classroom, the equipment collectively aims towards learning and teaching. The environment and
that which is ‘in’ it, is then organized according to a common purpose. This common purpose
organizes the environment into a relational totality of significance. The reason I can use and
understand a dry erase marker is because I understand its particular ‘place’ in this relational
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totality. This is essentially what an environment is for Heidegger. It is a particular, ontic
collection of relations that are organized and guided by shared purposes. 95
Worldhood is essentially, then, the existential structure of Dasein that allows for any
particular environment whatsoever. The relation between worldhood and environment is
essentially the same as the relationship between understanding and possibility and between
attunement and tuning. So worldhood is not any particular relational totality of significance,
such as a classroom or workshop. Rather worldhood is the possibility of any relational totality as
such according to which we and the entities we encounter can make sense at all. Worldhood is
what allows for particular “in-order-to’s” and “towards-which’s” presented in the preceding
paragraph.
The ‘who’ of Dasein, the next major structure of being-in-the-world, is one of the more
difficult and complex aspects of Heidegger’s analysis. If one takes Being and Time as a whole,
then a complete answer to this question must involve authenticity or ownednesss
(Eigentlichkeit), and would carry us deep into Division Two of Being and Time. 96 Authenticity
is, however, subject to particularly strong theological critiques by Bonhoeffer and will therefore
be a central subject of the next chapter. For now, then, we will focus on Heidegger’s initial
answer that the ‘who’ of Dasein is primarily the Anyone (das Man). 97
For Heidegger, who Dasein is in its average everyday dealings in the world, in its
concrete existence, is not itself, but rather the Anyone. With entities in the world, Dasein does
95
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explicitly attempting to avoid.
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not usually stand there starring at them investigating their objective properties. Similarly with
Dasein itself and others, Dasein does not usually understand itself as an isolated ‘I’ or subject
and then adds on others that are outside of Dasein. As Heidegger says, “By ‘Others’ we do not
mean everyone else but me—those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those
from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is
too.” 98
This then also means that being-in-the-world is always already a shared world or “withworld [Mitwelt].” 99 Dasein’s world is not an invention or construction of a subject, but is always
tied up in a shared network of meanings, significances, and involvements. There are shared
meanings for what it means for Dasein to participate in or manifest roles such as being a mother
or instructor. We have a sense of what to do and not to do in fulfilling these roles. We have a
sense of the significance of these roles. The meaning of particular environments is determined by
others and shared. We know what a classroom is, and what to do and not do there; we know what
a movie theater is, and what to do and not do there. In participating in roles and the environments
they entail, we share in the meaning of equipment associated with those roles and environments.
In being in this shared world, then, Dasein generally acts and thinks as anyone would act and
think.
The next major structure of being-in-the-world, Being-in, has, in fact, already been
explained in some detail above. Two of the primary structures involved in Being-in are
attunement and understanding. 100 We find ourselves ‘in’ the world according to ways in which
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we are attuned to our surroundings and the understanding of our possible ways of being ‘in’ that
world. 101
That the above analyzed structures belong to the unitary structure of being-in-the-world
cannot be overemphasized. Each component presupposes, mutually entails, and influences the
others. As Heidegger states towards the end of Division I, “Being-in-the-world is a structure
which is primordially and constantly whole.” 102 And Heidegger densely formulates being-in-theworld as that “which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its own most
potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with
Others.” 103
Being-in-the-world as a unitary structure is a valuable resource for addressing the
criterion of continuity; however, it is not the element of Heidegger’s analysis that Bonhoeffer
primarily identifies as meeting this criterion. Bonhoeffer’s concern is primarily with temporal
continuity rather than structural unity. In fact, as we will see in the following chapter stringent
structural unity is a possible failing of Heidegger’s from Bonhoeffer’s theological perspective.
We have also already seen this failing in Hegel and Scheler. As Bonhoeffer understands Hegel
and Scheler, for example, they in a sense meet the criterion of continuity, but only by collapsing
human existence into a static unity. If Heidegger had stopped at being-in-the-world, there is a
chance that he too would have merely met with a similar critique from Bonhoeffer. Heidegger
does not stop at being-in-the-world, however. In fact, what gives being-in-the-world its unity is
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a temporal continuity that lies at the heart of Bonhoeffer’s positive adaptation of Heidegger’s
analysis of Dasein.
According to Heidegger, it is not simply that each component of being-in-the-world is
tied up with the others that makes it a unitary structure, but that being-in-the-world is based on
the deeper unitary structure of “care” (Sorge), which Heidegger defines as “ahead-of-itselfBeing-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world) [Sichvorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden)].” 104
Though this formulation of care may not at first seem to be an improvement on the unitary
structure of being-in-the-world, it is what Bonhoeffer identifies as Heidegger’s meeting the
criterion of continuity. 105 The way in which Bonhoeffer talks about this is more often in terms of
thrown-projection, however. Therefore, I will speak of Heidegger’s meeting this criterion
primarily in those terms.
The general structure that allows Heidegger to maintain Dasein’s continuity is, according
to Bonhoeffer, thrown-projection. 106 In Bonhoeffer’s words, Heidegger can bring together act
and being in Dasein and maintain Dasein’s continuity because “Dasein is constant decisionmaking and, in every instance, already being determined.” 107 Why Bonhoeffer chooses to focus
on this particular aspect of Dasein will become clearer in chapter five when we elucidate
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Bonhoeffer’s theological adaption of Heidegger; suffice it to say, for now, it will allow
Bonhoeffer to maintain the continuity between the apparently disparate understandings of human
existence as “being in Adam” and “being in Christ.” 108
In the above accounts of attunement and understanding, an initial venture into thrownprojection has been made. As we saw, attunement is one of the important ways in which our
thrownness is revealed to us. Essentially thrownness means that Dasein always already finds
itself as having been something, having chosen certain possibilities, and having found itself in a
world in a certain way. Dasein has a past. The past is not, however, a succession of bygone,
completed moments; rather we always carry the past with us. The fact that I am sitting here and
writing this particular work is predicated on being-already-in-the-world. I find myself already in
a world with a certain range of socio-cultural possibilities. I could not be a chivalrous knight,
though I can be an academic and a husband. I have chosen such possibilities, at every moment
find myself as having chosen them, and I must therefore live up to those choices according to the
range of possibilities into which I am thrown. I also find myself always with others and ‘things’
that themselves have a range meanings and relations with which I must deal. The meanings of
and the ways in which I may relate to other Daseins and entities is already determined by my
thrownness, by where I find myself in the world, and vice versa.
In finding myself in a world in a particular way, i.e. in being thrown, I find myself with a
range of possible ways of being that have been laid out by the Anyone over history; I find myself
with a future. However, just as with my past, the future is not a succession of moments waiting
to be met or fulfilled. I am also always carrying my future with me. What I do now, what I think
now, what meaning other Daseins and entities have for me now are also determined by the way
108
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in which I understand their involvement in the possibilities I am constantly projecting before
myself.
The most important point is the mutual influence thrownness and projection have on one
another. As the hyphenated thrown-projection suggests, it too is a unitary structure. To take an
existentiell example, if I find myself with a broken-down car, a particular tuning of anger,
frustration, and so forth may arise because I see the situation as threatening the projected
possibility of teaching class. Though, I could also have an overriding projection of understanding
myself as stoic in my resolve to not allow situations to disrupt my emotional equanimity. The
projected possibility influences what a particular situation and the entities involved in it mean to
me. Simultaneously, the fact that I have a car, have chosen an academic profession and so forth
influence what projections I can act on and understand myself and the world according to. Put in
more general terms, myself, others, and entities only appear to me now because I have a past and
a future. My past or particular determinations of it appear as significant to me at a particular
time and given the future projections that are salient at that time. And particular projections
become noticeable given the particular circumstances of the present and the particular
determinations of my thrownness that are now salient. These structures are not disparate, but
mutually entail and determine one another. 109
To shift back to Bonhoeffer’s language, the being of Dasein lies in its acts and its acts lie
in its being. “Heidegger has succeeded in forcing together act and being in the concept of
Dasein; both what Dasein itself decides, and the fact that it is itself determined, are brought into
one here.” 110 This avoids the Kantian problem of making Dasein “a discontinuous succession of
individual acts” because such acts both arise from and are taken back into the continuity of
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Dasein’s being. 111 It also avoids Scheler’s static understanding of human existence because
Dasein’s being is made dynamic by the ever-arising acts. Avoiding Hegel is somewhat more
problematic.
One might reasonably ask how this differs from Hegel’s solution of collapsing act and
being into one another thereby erasing the differences between them, rather than coordinating
them. Bonhoeffer admits that “this solution” is “reminiscent of Hegel”; however, it “is
fundamentally different from Hegel’s theory in that being is Dasein, ‘being in the world’,
existing in temporality.” 112 Unfortunately, Bonhoeffer does not provide a detailed explanation of
his own evaluation of the difference, perhaps deferring to Heidegger’s own evaluation of the
distinction between himself and Hegel at the end of Being and Time. As Bonhoeffer indicates,
and as Heidegger explains in Being and Time, there are two key differences, i.e. concreteness
and temporality.
According to Heidegger, an essential difference between himself and Hegel lies in their
starting points. 113 “Our existential analytic of Dasein, [in contrast to Hegel], starts with the
‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which
primordially makes such existence possible.” 114 By contrast, according to Heidegger, Hegel
begins by abstracting all meaningful content away from both spirit and time such that spirit “falls
into time.” 115 Essentially, Heidegger seems to be saying that because his method begins with
concrete existence, he is able to demonstrate that spirit does not fall into time, but that
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temporality is the common source of both spirit and our ordinary sense of time as sequential. So
the ultimate difference, according to both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, lies in temporality.
Temporality and Historicity
The most important concept of Being and Time, both for distinguishing Heidegger from Hegel
and for Bonhoeffer’s adaptive theological use of Heidegger, is the concept of temporality. As
Heidegger continues his distinction from Hegel: “‘Spirit’ does not fall into time, but it exists as
the primordial temporalizing of temporality.” 116 We may begin to clarify this distinction by
looking forward to Heidegger’s 1930/31 Winter semester course entitled “Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit” where Heidegger explicitly expands on Being and Time’s treatment of
Hegel.
To summarize in the form of theses, we can say: For Hegel, being (infinity) is also the
essence of time. For us, time is the original essence of being. These are not theses which
can be simply played against each other antithetically. Rather, the term essence [Wesen]
says something fundamentally different each time, precisely because being is understood
differently. 117
Hegel’s ‘reversal’ of Heidegger’s proposed relation of time and being, where for Hegel “being is
the essence of time” leads to Bonhoeffer’s critique that Hegel only solves the problem of act and
being by equating the two. Time, according to Heidegger’s reading of Hegel, is an appearance
of being. More particularly, time is a mode of differentiation that arises within the unity of
absolute being: “Or to speak in terms of time, we can say that [for Hegel] time is one appearance
of the simple essence of being qua infinity.” 118 Or , “Conceived logically and thus really ontologically, the essence of being is being-identical-with-itself in being-other. The egologically
conceived essence of being is the ‘inner difference’ as I = I, the relation to something which at
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the same time is not a relation.” 119 Here Heidegger, in different words, seems to be pointing to
Bonhoeffer’s problem, i.e. that with Hegel act and being simply become equivalent. Hegel’s
historical dynamism is, for both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, chimerical. What appear to be
dynamic acts in history are occurring within the static universal being.
One cannot, however according to Heidegger, simply reverse the Hegelian relation of
time and being and arrive at the correct position; rather, one must reformulate the concept of
essence (Wesen). According to Heidegger’s famous formulation, the essence of Dasein is
existence. 120 The essence of Dasein is its ‘to be’. Or using the above elucidated unitary structure
of thrown-projection, the essence of Dasein is to pick up possibilities given to it in its thrownness
and project itself forward according to those possibilities. The condition for the possibility of
thrown-projection is temporality. ‘Time’, or, more properly, temporality, is the essence of being.
It is important to pause and explain Heidegger’s concept of temporality. As others have
pointed out, temporality is the key to Bonhoeffer’s evaluation that Heidegger has solved the
problem of act and being. 121 It is that concept that allows Heidegger to succeed where others
have failed. And it will return in force in Bonhoeffer’s own positive theological account of
revelation or the person of Jesus Christ.122
To understand Heidegger’s temporality, it is best to start with what temporality is not,
namely time or time as we normally understand it. According to Heidegger, when we normally
reflect on time, particularly from a theoretical stance, we understand it as ‘now-time’. 123 We
understand time to be a linear series of ‘now’s that can be identified by a clock. There are future
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‘now’s waiting to be actualized; there are present ‘now’s that are actual; and there are past
‘now’s that are no longer.
Heidegger identifies a number of problems with this conception of time, or more properly
with simply assuming this conception of time. First, this reflective, theoretical conception of time
simply assumes, yet cannot account for, the continuity of time. 124 What is it that unifies these
different ‘now’s? According to Heidegger, we must go deeper in order to identify the structure
that can unify what might otherwise seem to be discrete moments.
A first step in seeing a solution to this problem is to see the second problem: We do not
in average everyday existence think of time in this reflective, theoretical way. This way of
viewing time is present-at-hand; 125 that is, to see time as an entity with objective properties not
unlike seeing the dry erase marker according to its weight, color, and so forth. A more
fundamental understanding of time is “world-time” (Weltzeit), or the time with which we are
concerned. 126 When we are going about our average everyday business we do not understand
time as a contentless succession of ‘now’s. Time is meaningful. 127 “Now is time to prepare a
lecture.” “Now is time to eat.” “Half an hour is not enough time to cover the material.” “Half an
hour is just enough time to eat.” Here we understand time according to the way we use it and the
entities and activities that fall within it. Here we move closer to temporality, though we are not
yet there. We still do not know what makes such concern for and understanding of such entities
and activities possible, and we do not have an account of the continuity of world-time.
The answer to these problems comes with seeing the temporal core of thrown-projection.
The temporal foundation of thrown-projection also answers the Hegelian worry that the unitary
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structure just equates act and being. The key to solving both problems lies in Heidegger’s above
quoted phrase “the temporalizing of temporality” (Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit), which for
Heidegger is historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). 128 Here, act and being, as thrown-projection, are not
coordinated merely because they mutually entail one another, but because they have a deeper
unity in temporality. Yet temporality is not a static unity. It is a process. By saying “Zeitigung
der Zeitlichkeit” or “Zeitlichkeit zeitigt” (temporality temporalizes) Heidegger means that
temporality produces, brings about, or brings to fulfillment its unified temporal structure. The
elements of this unified temporal structure, which we have encountered briefly before, are the
future (Zukunft), present (Gegenwart), and past, having been or beenness (Gewesenheit). 129
Heidegger calls these temporal elements “ecstases” (Ekstasen). 130 By calling these unified
elements of temporality ecstases, Heidegger is emphasizing the fact that temporality is extended
or stretched. 131 “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.” 132 One might
say that temporality is the pressing forward into the future while, simultaneously and based on
that pressing forward, the pulling up of the past. This process just is temporality and historicity;
not a singular entity that might risk Heidegger falling back to a static collapsing of act and being.
As Heidegger states, “Temporality is not […] an entity which first emerges from itself; its
essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstasies.” 133
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This temporalizing temporality is the condition for the possibility of thrown-projection. 134
Thrown-projection is the central existential structure of Dasein that allows for all the above
elucidated structures. Temporality is then the being of Dasein. This also then means that,
because temporality is the being of Dasein, Dasein is also stretched or extended into these
unified elements of temporality, 135 and, returning again to Bonhoeffer’s vocabulary, this
coordination of act and being as thrown-projection is also stretched or extended.
Dasein is the pulling of its past or beenness (Gewesenheit) with it while simultaneously
pushing itself into future (Zukunft) possibilities as it presently finds itself being-amongst entities
in the world. With Heidegger’s concept of historicity and the previous account of thrownprojection, we can fill in and further explain this formal temporal structure: The temporal
structure unfolds as Dasein presses forward into possibilities, both proximal and distant. In terms
of historicity, this constitutes one’s fate. 136 As I see the possibility for being a husband, a
hopefully long-term possibility, before me, various intermediate possibilities appear such as
anticipated anniversaries, having a job for the sake of meeting expectations of being a husband,
and so forth. I also pull up a past, one which has particular meaning based on my chosen
projections, such as having been married. I take over the inherited socio-cultural context of what
it means to be married and so forth from my heritage or tradition. 137 I simultaneous disclose
surrounding entities and other Dasein according to this future and past; so, for example, I see my
wife as my wife because of my projected possibility of being a husband and the pulled up past of
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having been married. So I am not only or primarily what I am now; my being is extended in
particular, ontic ways into these ecstases.
This concept of temporality gives Bonhoeffer the key to solving the problem of act and
being both in theological ontology (i.e. theology proper or an ontology of revelation) and
theological anthropology. That it does so will not become clear until chapter five, but Bonhoeffer
does provide an early, somewhat enigmatic hint in one of his praises of Heidegger’s success. In
each of the previous philosophical cases Bonhoeffer briefly tested them according to how their
systems could handle the concept of God. Bonhoeffer does the same with Heidegger. In asking
what has allowed Heidegger to come to a solution to the problem of act and being Bonhoeffer
answers “the first is that he [Heidegger] interprets being so much in terms of time that even
God’s eternity, if it could be at all philosophically conceived, would, in principle, have to be
thought of as having been drawn into time.” 138 The exact nature of this apparent praise is not
immediately clear. Perhaps looking to Heidegger will help. In making this statement Bonhoeffer
cites and draws on the following footnote from Being and Time:
The fact that the traditional conception of “eternity” as signifying the “standing now,”
(nunc stans), has been drawn from the ordinary way of understanding time and has been
defined with an orientation towards the idea of ‘constant’ presence-at-hand, does not
need to be discussed in detail. If God's eternity can be ‘construed’ philosophically, then it
may be understood only as a more primordial temporality which is ‘infinite’. Whether the
way afforded by the via negationis et eminentiae is a possible one, remains to be seen. 139
This seems to be a remnant of the opening pages of Heidegger’s The Concept of Time, initially a
lecture presented to the Marburg Theological Society in July, 1924. 140 In these opening pages
Heidegger concedes that the proper route for understanding time may be to move from (God’s)
eternity to time. However, there must be an initial access to this eternity. This access is faith. A
138
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philosopher, acting as philosopher, cannot have this access, only a theologian in faith can. “[T]he
theologian, then, is the legitimate expert on time.” 141 As for the philosopher, “If the philosopher
asks about time, then he has resolved to understand time in terms of time or in terms of the δεί
[ever, always, or perpetual], which looks like eternity but proves to be a mere derivative of being
temporal.” 142 Heidegger’s point seems to be that if philosophy tried to understand eternity, it
could only ever mistakenly understand it as the δεί, which is secondary to or arises from
Dasein’s temporal being. 143 Here Heidegger is asserting, specifically in relation to time and
temporality, the division between theology and philosophy. 144 Only theology through faith can
access eternity. If philosophy speaks of eternity, it is making a fundamental mistake. It is not, in
fact, speaking about eternity but rather of the δεί. It would seem that God’s eternity cannot be
properly philosophically construed.
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Heidegger on this issue seems somewhat different.
Bonhoeffer seems to be taking Heidegger’s statement at face value; that philosophy can construe
God’s eternity by drawing that eternity into time. Bonhoeffer’s likely misreading, which seems
understandable since he only had the above footnote to work with, points to a more complex
relation to Heidegger on issues of time, temporality, and God’s eternity.
We can gain some clarity on the complex similarities and differences on Heidegger and
Bonhoeffer here, if we ask if Bonhoeffer is genuinely complimenting Heidegger. After all,
Bonhoeffer lists this as an important element in Heidegger’s ability to coordinate act and being
in Dasein. That, according to Bonhoeffer, Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of Dasein is so
extreme as to draw God’s eternity into time is not obviously a compliment. According to Plant,
141
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this is not only not a compliment, but the heart of Bonhoeffer’s theological critiques of
Heidegger. 145 According to DeJonge and explicitly in contrast to Plant, this is a compliment and
at the heart of Heidegger’s and Bonhoeffer’s respective successes at the problem of act and
being. 146 I will have much more to say about this, particularly in chapter five, but for now we can
say that neither Plant nor DeJonge are wholly right or wrong. The nature of Bonhoeffer’s
position on God being drawn into time is a particularly dense instance of many of the distinctions
so far elucidated. One must keep in mind the distinction between the conceptual levels of the
problem of act and being, particularly the levels of anthropology and theology; the important
distinction between philosophy and theology; and the newly acquired Heideggerian distinction
between time and temporality. Plant is certainly right to say that Bonhoeffer must reject the
drawing of God’s being into time, or, to be more accurate, the drawing of God’s being into
Dasein’s temporality. 147 However, this does not mean, as DeJonge points out, that Bonhoeffer
would have to or actually does reinforce God’s eternity. 148 In his Lectures on Christology, for
example, Bonhoeffer says, “It is just as impossible to ask how God can enter into time—as if
such an isolated God could exist!” 149 That is, God must have some positive relation to time;
otherwise there is the risk of isolating God from the world. The problem is that drawing God’s
being into Dasein’s temporality risks making God one entity among others at the disposal of
Dasein’s autonomous understanding. From Bonhoeffer’s theological perspective, this is a
consequence of Heidegger working as a philosopher at the anthropological level. According to
the larger structure of Act and Being, this is best understood then as simultaneously a theological
critique and philosophical praise. As Bonhoeffer assumes and Heidegger admits, philosophy
145

Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” 320.
DeJonge, “God’s Being Is in Time,” 133–4.
147
Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” 320.
148
DeJonge, “God’s Being Is in Time,” 133–4.
149
DBWE 12: 313 (DBW 12: 294).
146

129

cannot access the solely theological domain of faith. Yet Heidegger has coordinated act and
being in human existence, particularly by understanding such existence as fundamentally
temporal. This is instructive for theology; theology can adapt this temporal understanding of
human existence to an understanding of revelation. Here Heidegger’s distinction between time
and temporality is important and lacking in both Plant’s and DeJonge’s assessments of this
issue. 150 From Heidegger, Bonhoeffer gets the conceptual tools with which to formulate God’s
relation to time. Though an important element to Bonhoeffer’s theological solution to the
problem of act and being, it cannot simply be that God enters time, however. Rather God must be
temporal in some way. With an eye to a fuller explanation in chapter five, Bonhoeffer’s position
may briefly be stated as follows: The being of the person of Jesus Christ is temporal. For
Bonhoeffer, then, human Dasein is not the font of temporality; rather, Jesus Christ, as something
like the Ur-Dasein, is. 151 As we will see in chapter five, this allows Bonhoeffer to make many of
the same moves Heidegger does for human existence in order to coordinate act and being for
revelation.
***
We have now seen Heidegger’s central successes at solving the problem of act and being for
philosophy at the anthropological level. In contrast to his philosophical predecessors, at least
according to Bonhoeffer, Heidegger realized that epistemological problems could only be
addressed after elucidating the being of that entity that can know, i.e. Dasein. However, it was
not simply enough to look at Dasein in the abstract; rather, one must investigate Dasein as it goes
about living in the world. One must look at Dasein concretely. Through this concrete
investigation, which moves from particular ontic content to the formal ontological make-up of
150
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Dasein, Heidegger arrives at Dasein as the unitary phenomenon of thrown-projection, or, in
Bonhoeffer’s encapsulation, the fact that Dasein is always already and simultaneously deciding
and being determined. According to Bonhoeffer’s assessment, this both satisfies the criterion of
continuity and the coordination of act and being in Dasein. Moving to temporality, we see that
this unity is not static. Rather the coordination is stretched along the elements or ecstases of
temporality. As Bonhoeffer clearly states a number of times, this ontological solution to the
problem of act and being must be in some way useful for theology as a means to explain Christ
and the church as temporally extended. 152
Despite this usefulness there is still a general problem that hinders an unaltered adoption
of Heidegger. The existential analysis of Dasein is philosophy. As such, according to
Bonhoeffer, it must still be trapped in the cor curvum in se, in the autonomous ‘I’ understanding
itself from itself. Bonhoeffer finds Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and its attendant
phenomena of Angst, death, and conscience, to be particularly egregious cases of this. In the next
chapter, we will see that while these might count as philosophical successes in relation to the
criteria of transcendence and boundary, they are particularly theologically offensive to
Bonhoeffer.
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Chapter Four: Heidegger’s Theological Failure
In the previous chapter we saw from Bonhoeffer’s perspective the various successes of
Heidegger’s philosophy as presented in Being and Time in relation to the problem of act and
being, particularly as it occurs at the anthropological level. Such successes should then reappear
in some guise in Bonhoeffer’s own theological solution to the problem. However, Bonhoeffer
does not find Heidegger’s solution to be immediately applicable to the final theological level of
the problem of act and being. Heidegger’s Being and Time is, for Bonhoeffer, a theological
failure.
For those familiar with the development of Heidegger’s self-understood relation to
theology, a subject dealt with in chapter six, it may seem odd, even erroneous, to attribute
anything like a theological failure to Heidegger’s project in Being and Time. Heidegger did not
understand himself to be doing theology, and Bonhoeffer recognized this. 1 It is important to
remember that Bonhoeffer’s theological reaction to Heidegger develops amidst growing
contemporaneous theological reactions to Heidegger, some of which, particularly evident in
Bultmann’s work, view Heidegger’s philosophy as a fecund starting point for theological work.
For Bonhoeffer to view Heidegger’s philosophy as a theological failure is to say that Heidegger’s
philosophy cannot itself form the basis of theology, and that for it to be useful for theology it
must be adapted according to theology’s own standards.
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The previous chapter explained and evaluated Heidegger’s philosophical successes
deemed appropriate for theological adaptation by Bonhoeffer; this chapter explains and evaluates
those elements of Heidegger’s Being and Time that Bonhoeffer finds not only unusable by
theology, but which pose direct threats to Bonhoeffer’s understanding of proper theology.
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is at the center of Bonhoeffer’s theological
critiques of Heidegger. 2 Bonhoeffer sees in Heidegger’s authenticity an argument for the
possibility of Dasein putting itself in a privileged form of existence. Bonhoeffer will reject
authenticity as a particularly strong form of the cor curvum in se. Authenticity will then be
replaced with an act-being coordinated account of revelation. Detailing Bonhoeffer’s rejection of
authenticity will allow for an account, in chapter five, of how revelation fulfills many of the
same roles for Bonhoeffer’s theology that authenticity does for Heidegger’s philosophy.
Bonhoeffer’s Theological Critique of Possibility
In his “Inaugural Lecture” based on Act and Being, Bonhoeffer says, “the concept of possibility
has no place in theology and thus no place in theological anthropology.” 3 In the last chapter I
pointed to Heidegger’s concept of possibility as a component in his philosophical success at the
problem of act and being, particularly in anthropology and with the criterion of continuity. Here
it would seem that the concept of possibility must be rejected in theology and, therefore, is not a
genuine philosophical success that can be translated into theology. This is yet another point at
which the distinction between Bonhoeffer’s assessments of philosophy and theology must be
disambiguated.
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To do so we must understand what Bonhoeffer means here by possibility and to do that
we must return to his fundamental theological concern. His fundamental concern, which we
have seen numerous times, is to overcome the cor curvum in se (the heart curved in on itself),
which is the ever present state of sin that results in humans always being self-directed and unable
to genuinely encounter others. Overcoming the cor curvum in se requires a proper
understanding of human existence.
In his “Inaugural Lecture” Bonhoeffer asserts that humans can either understand
themselves from their works or from their boundaries. 4 That is, we can either understand the
human from what it does or can do, or we can understand it from the boundaries of its existence.
This mirrors the distinction between being-oriented philosophies and act-oriented philosophies,
respectively. For example, Kant understands the human, according to Bonhoeffer, as oriented
towards the boundaries of the thing-in-itself and the transcendental ego. As Bonhoeffer reads
Kant, human existence is suspended between these two boundaries and must therefore be
understood according to them. Heidegger, by contrast, understands human existence primarily in
relation to our ability to be (Seinkӧnnen) and what we most characteristically do. 5 Heidegger, for
instance, singles out Dasein’s constant activities of understanding its world and interpreting
being as distinctive of Dasein.
Though these options for understanding human existence appear to be different, both, if
improperly oriented, rely on the same foundation, i.e. possibility. It may be fairly clear that
understanding human existence according to its work, or what it can and does do, is to
understand human existence according to possibility. Work or activity is, for Bonhoeffer, just
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the concretization or actualization of possibility. 6 Understanding the human from its boundaries
is also reliant on understanding the human based on possibility, both in philosophy and improper
theology, i.e. theology that does not have an act-being coordinated ontology of revelation. As
we saw with Bonhoeffer’s critiques of Kant, the human understanding itself from its own
boundaries means that such boundaries are drawn by human understanding itself. Such
boundaries become a work of the human being itself. The boundaries themselves are then only
instantiations of human possibility. 7 This then means, according to Bonhoeffer, that both
available options for humans to come to understand themselves are based on possibility.
Human self-understanding that works from possibility necessarily, for Bonhoeffer, leads
to the cor curvum in se. 8 For human existence to understand itself according to its possibilities
means for it to understand itself based on self-reflection. Human existence both asks and answers
the question concerning its meaning. In theology, understanding human existence means
understanding existence in sin and faith. With the ability to understand sinful and faithful
existence, there is the risk that human existence may be able to work itself from sin to faith, a
position that Lutheran Bonhoeffer rejects. If humans could work from sin to faith, revelation or
the person of Jesus Christ would be superfluous. In terms of the criteria for solving the problem
of act and being, theological transcendence would be closed off. Bonheoffer presses his
rejection of any role for possibility further. Not only is there no active possibility of moving from
sin to faith, there is no passive ability to receive revelation to move from sin to faith, which will
be important for Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of Heidegger’s concept of conscience. For Bonhoeffer
(and Barth) this would risk the conclusion that revelation must conform in some way to human
6
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existence that would thereby challenge the sovereignty and complete transcendence of
revelation.
It is clear that Bonhoeffer’s critique of possibility is explicitly theological. Turning to
actual examples of understanding human existence from possibility or boundaries, Bonhoeffer
opens with the following: “If as theologians we turn to hear what contemporary philosophy has
to say about the human […]” 9And concluding his survey of contemporary philosophy and as a
transition to contemporary theology, Bonhoeffer says, “Although theology accepts these results
of philosophical inquiry, it interprets them in its own fashion as the thinking of the cor curvum in
se.” 10 It is important to note the specifically theological framework of Bonhoeffer’s critiques.
Here Bonhoeffer’s concern is primarily soteriological. Bonhoeffer’s concern is not with
possibility as such, but rather with the possibility of humans coming to understand themselves
from themselves. Or put another way, Bonhoeffer wants to reject the ability for humans to place
themselves in the truth. 11
Bonhoeffer’s rejection of possibility in Heidegger’s philosophy does not then concern the
ability of humans to understand themselves according to average everyday possibilities.
Bonhoeffer does not reject Dasein’s ability to understand equipment such as hammers, social
roles such as mothers or instructors, character traits such a patience or punctuality, and so forth.
Bonhoeffer rejects the ultimate possibility attributed to Dasein according to Being and Time, i.e.
authenticity or ownedness. More particularly, Bonhoeffer rejects the central feature of
authenticity as a possibility that Dasein itself takes up or in which it places itself. Bonhoeffer
sees in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, and its attendant concepts of death and conscience, a
particularly virulent form of the cor curvum in se. Though, as we will see in chapter five,
9
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Bonhoeffer does re-theologize these concepts using them to explicate human existence in sin or
in Adam.
Authenticity and the Cor Curvum in se
As we will see Heidegger’s authenticity fails at the criterion of transcendence; though in a very
particular way that secondary literature mistakes for a failure at transcendence in general. 12 The
general contours of the problem are as follows: Authenticity is a distinctive possibility of Dasein.
Achieving authenticity gives Dasein unique access to the fundamental truths of its existence. 13
That is, authenticity entails a privileged or normatively superior relation to one’s existence. For
Bonhoeffer the theologian, however, revelation is the only event capable of granting Dasein that
privileged position. 14 As Bonhoeffer reads Heidegger, and there are good reasons to have this
reading, this means that Heidegger, whether intentionally or not, has made revelation a
possibility of Dasein. But this removes the transcendent nature of revelation that Bonhoeffer
wishes to maintain. It also means that Dasein need only look to its own possibilities, its own self,
to come to the truth. Dasein need only turn in on itself (cor curvum in se).
Authenticity fulfills various and central functions in Being and Time. 15 Again,
Heidegger’s primary intended goal is to get to the meaning of being. He does this by going
through Dasein, that entity that already cares about its own existence and being, and that already
has an understanding of being. Though Heidegger warns that he does not intend to give a
complete picture of Dasein, 16 he does need to get to the most salient and structurally fundamental
features of Dasein. Division I covered Dasein in its average everyday existence and
12
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inauthenticity. Heidegger still needs to disclose the possibility of Dasein as authentic. 17 In
authenticity, Dasein becomes a whole self. 18 In becoming authentic and whole, Dasein gains a
superior continuity of self by taking a stand and being constant (Selbstständigkeit) that is only
realized on the other side of anxiety, death, and conscience after which Dasein sees its fallenness
and guilt and becomes free for death in forward-running resoluteness. 19 Authentic Dasein then
has a privileged and complete, even if not a theoretically explicit, view of its existence. Central
to this understanding of existence, and Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger, is existence as
fundamentally temporal. 20 Getting to temporality is central to getting to the meaning of being, 21
the intended goal of Being and Time. Authenticity is then not ancillary to Being and Time’s
overall project and its central concepts, some of which Bonhoeffer sees as profitable to his own
theological project.
Despite the obvious importance of authenticity, Bonhoeffer is unambiguously critical of
it. For example, Bonhoeffer says, “Every concept of existence that is not formed by being
encountered or not being encountered by Christ is ‘inauthentic’ (including Heidegger’s
‘authentic’ existence).” 22 Bonhoeffer’s rejection of authenticity is not an insignificant matter
given its centrality for Heidegger’s method and philosophy as presented in Being and Time. It is,
therefore, important to detail and evaluate Bonhoeffer’s rejection of authenticity in order to
evaluate the ways in which Bonhoeffer will positively use Heidegger in his theology. By
rejecting authenticity, Bonhoeffer may be gutting Heidegger’s philosophy. As we will see in the
next chapter, however, Bonhoeffer retains many of the elements involved in authenticity
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attributing some to Christ as something like the Ur-Dasein and some to Dasein as Being in
Adam.
That Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is a focal point of Bonhoeffer’s theological
criticisms of Heidegger is not a controversial point. Most secondary literature that even touches
on Bonhoeffer’s relation to Heidegger say something to the effect that Bonhoeffer is critical of
Heidegger on this point. 23 And to my knowledge there is no instance in the secondary literature
of anyone contravening this assertion. However, the importance of Bonhoeffer’s critique of
authenticity, the importance of the concept in Being and Time, and the complexity of the concept
itself requires a more devoted analysis than has been given thus far.
To understand and appreciate Heidegger’s authenticity we must first explain another
important existential structure that coming to authenticity is meant to alter, i.e. fallenness
(Verfall). At its simplest fallenness is Dasein’s tendency to evade its self. 24 This tendency to
evade or not be its self is the way in which Dasein, according to Heidegger, generally exists in its
average everyday being-in-the-world: “The Self, however, is proximally and for the most part
inauthentic, the Anyone-self. Being-in-the-world is always fallen.” 25
If we return to a question from the previous chapter, “who is Dasein?” and the answer,
“Dasein is generally the Anyone” we get a clearer understanding of what it means for Dasein to
fall. In Dasein’s average everyday dealings in the world, Dasein generally does what anyone
does. That is, Dasein generally unreflectively accepts meanings that make up the world from
others around it. Dasein does not generally reflect on the fact that it is the one that is taking up
these meanings, and understanding and acting in the world according to them. So, for example,
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in taking up the role of instructor or parent, fallen Dasein may simply do, without reflection,
what one’s previous instructors or parents have done, or cobble together the latest trends in
parenting or teaching without a clear conception of making it one’s own. Such a Dasein may not
actually know why a certain teaching method is being used or why certain rules are enforced.
When asked, such a Dasein might simply respond with “Because that is how it is done” or the
like. The problem also runs deeper.
It is not simply that such a Dasein unreflectively does what anyone does in such roles,
such a Dasein probably does not even know why or even that it chose to take up such roles.
Because of this, such a fallen Dasein does not have a whole or coherent self. In falling, Dasein
becomes absorbed and dispersed in the world.
This “absorption in ...” has mostly the character of being-lost in the publicness of the
“Anyone.” Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an
authentic potentiality for being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness” into
the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is
guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. 26
The details of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are not immediately pertinent. 27 What is
important is that fallenness involves scattering oneself superficially among the various entities,
meanings, and possibilities one is given in the world. So it is not simply that fallen Dasein takes
up possibilities and meanings without knowing why or how, fallen Dasein scatters itself among
these various possibilities. It takes up the possibilities of being a parent, spouse, instructor,
punctual person, and so forth with no understanding of how they work together or whether there
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is a meta-possibility that structures them together to form a whole or coherent self. In falling
Dasein has become fragmentary. 28
These characteristics of fallenness mean that there is a real sense in which fallen Dasein
is not a self. Fallen Dasein is doing what anyone can or does do. The Anyone is acting and
thinking for Dasein. Here Dasein is not a genuine, authentic, or owned self. As fallen, Dasein is
then a disowned or inauthentic self. This is the condition that authenticity is meant to correct.
In his inaugural lecture Bonhoeffer provides the following, dense summary of his
understanding of authenticity and how it is achieved:
Where the person is summoned by conscience, he is able to extract himself from his
captivity to the world, albeit not in such a way that he might escape the forces of
temporality without responsibility, but such that he takes his guilt, [the nullity of his life]
upon himself and orients himself toward the most unconquerable of all forces—death. He
draws death into his life and lives a being toward death […] The person gains command of
the world by elevating himself into a tragically isolated individual. [The person remains
alone, understanding himself from himself; being in the world has no meaning for one’s
authentic self-understanding]. 29
There are some notable accuracies and inaccuracies in this summation of Heidegger’s
authenticity, which will become apparent as it and Bonhoeffer’s criticism are unpacked. 30
Bonhoeffer reads Heidegger’s authenticity as the condition for the possibility of becoming an
actual self, which necessarily involves making Dasein a coherent whole. 31 According to
Bonhoeffer, “In its [Dasein’s] captivity to the world, to the Anyone, to talk […] Dasein
28
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disintegrates.” 32 Reading Heidegger through the concept of possibility, to overcome this state
Dasein must realize its most characteristic or essential possibility, i.e. the possibility to own
itself. And this necessarily entails Dasein becoming whole: “Insofar as Dasein lays hold of the
possibility, the existence, most authentic to it, Dasein grasps its own wholeness.” 33 And though
one may have alternative emphases in interpreting Heidegger’s authenticity, there is no doubt
that Bonhoeffer’s reading highlights central characteristics of authenticity. In contrasting Dasein
as authentic or inauthentic, 34 Heidegger, for instance, characterizes the latter as dispersed or
disintegrated: “The Self of everyday Dasein is the Anyone-self [the inauthentic self that is captive
to the Anyone], which we distinguish from the authentic Self—that is, from the Self which has
been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. As an Anyone-self, the particular Dasein
has been dispersed into the ‘Anyone’, and must first find itself.” 35 Pulling its self out of this
fallenness or captivity to the Anyone is an essential possibility of Dasein: “And because Dasein
is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is
essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost
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itself and not yet won itself.” 36 And in winning its self, Dasein essentially becomes a unified
whole; Heidegger describes one of the tasks of Division II of Being and Time as follows 37:
One thing has become unmistakable: our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot
lay claim to primordiality. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic being
of Dasein, and of Dasein as less than a whole. If the Interpretation of Dasein's being is to
become primordial, as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then
it must first have brought to light existentially the being of Dasein in its possibilities of
authenticity and totality. 38
That is, methodologically we can only properly understand, ontologically, the wholeness of
Dasein through an investigation into authentic Dasein because only authentic Dasein has a grasp
on its wholeness and unity.
Achieving authenticity, for Heidegger, entails the existential encounters of anxiety, death,
and conscience, the latter two of which are important for Bonhoeffer’s theological criticisms of
Heidegger. Before presenting the basic picture of this movement from inauthenticity to
authenticity, it is important to keep two points in mind. First, as is usually the case with
Heidegger, he does not intend these terms in their usual everyday meanings. Heidegger’s unique
understanding of these terms will be explained in further detail in the following two sections; for
now I am concerned with merely presenting the basic picture of their role in moving Dasein from
inauthenticity to authenticity. Second, anxiety, death, and conscience are modifications of the
structures of thrownness or attunement, projection or understanding, and discourse respectively.
As we saw in the last chapter, these structures mutually entail one another; they are not
sequentially or chronologically related. 39 I, for example, project based on my thrownness and
simultaneously take up my thrownness in a particular way based on particular projections.
36
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Because they are particular manifestations of these structures, anxiety, death, and conscience are
similarly related. Though they are not sequential, Heidegger does prioritize projection or the
future. He says, for example, “In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future
first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatical unity of
primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise
through a cumulative sequence of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their
equiprimordiality.” 40 Death, as futural, then has some priority over anxiety, and anxiety is
defined as “anxiety in the face of death.” 41 Though they are not sequential, they must be
presented in some order. Because death has some priority over anxiety and Bonhoeffer is
unconcerned with Heidegger’s presentation of anxiety, death is presented first with anxiety
incorporated into the presentation when necessary for understanding death.
Keeping the above caveats in mind, the overall movement from inauthenticity to
authenticity looks something like the following: In coming to authenticity, Dasein projects itself
forward towards its death. Assuming that Dasein does not cover over or flee from this
realization, this reveals to Dasein the radical contingency of all its possibilities. 42 The
possibilities it has chosen to be a spouse, instructor, punctual person, and so forth must come to
an end. Even its ability to choose possibilities must come to an end. 43 This challenges the usual
or taken-for-granted meaning one has found in the world. The inability to find meaning in one’s
possibilities or one’s world as a whole is the attunement of anxiety. 44 Dasein becomes anxious
concerning its being-in-the-world. Its usual involvements with entities and others seem to lack
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significance. 45 Then Dasein encounters conscience, which reveals to Dasein its usual state of not
having a self, having fallen into the world, its guilt at having done so, and the need to take
responsibility for its self. 46
If these encounters go well, endure, and Dasein does indeed take responsibility for its
self, its being-in-the-world is further modified as forward-running resoluteness (anticipatory
resoluteness; vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). 47 Here resoluteness is a modification of thrownness
and forward-running is a modification of projection. When projection is modified as running
forward towards death, Dasein “is forced by that very running forward into the possibility of
taking over from itself its ownmost being, and doing so of its own accord.” 48 This then causes a
fundamental shift in Dasein’s understanding of the intermediate possibilities that lie prior to
death, such as being a spouse or punctual person:
When, by forward running, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from
one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one;
and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand
and choose among the factical possibilities lying prior to [vorgelagert] that possibility
which is not to be outstripped [i.e. death]. 49
“Forward-running to death is” also, however, “essentially anxiety.” 50 Again, with the
attunement of anxiety, Dasein is anxious about its self and its being-in-the-world. In such an
attunement “the totality of involvements […] is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into
itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance.” 51 Authentic Dasein’s
reaction to this is resoluteness. Resoluteness reveals to authentic Dasein its actual thrownness; it
unlocks the possibilities available to a particular Dasein in actual circumstances that arise from
45
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the Anyone and from its historical and cultural heritage. 52 And this forward-running resoluteness
places Dasein in the “truth of existence.” 53
Although Bonhoeffer will have more specific theological critiques of death and
conscience, we already have a strong critique of authenticity. In owning its self, Dasein comes
to a privileged or genuine understanding of its self, others, the world (and presumably God). This
in itself would not be a problem. Bonhoeffer himself, as we will see, formulates a privileged
condition in which humans may exist that grants such an existence genuine understandings of the
same. However, authenticity is a distinctive possibility that arises from Dasein itself. Anxiety,
conscience, and death are Dasein’s. Forward-running resoluteness is a modification of Dasein
that arises from Dasein. They are, therefore, not transcendent in the theological sense that
Bonhoeffer wants. At the close of Part A of Act and Being, the philosophical section,
Bonhoeffer has the following encompassing assessment of all philosophy, including
Heidegger’s: “The offense against Christian thinking in any autonomous self-understanding is
that it believes human beings to be capable of giving truth to themselves, of transporting
themselves into the truth by themselves, since the ‘ground’ of existence must somehow surely be
in the truth, in the likeness to God.” 54 Heidegger, as Bonhoeffer reads him, succumbs, like all
philosophy, to the intellectual form of the cor curvum in se, one which does not allow for
theological transcendence and one which Bonhoeffer often encapsulates in the critical phrase,
“the autonomous thinking I understanding itself from itself within a closed system.”
Heidegger has failed by not meeting the criterion of transcendence in a very particular
(theological) way. To get at the particular way in which Heidegger does fail here according to
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Bonhoeffer, we must first address how he does not. 55 Though Heidegger’s concept of Dasein
does succumb to the general critique of the cor curvum in se, it is not because Heidegger
understands Dasein to be an autonomous thinking I. 56 Heidegger is explicit that Dasein is not
equivalent to a subject or I. 57 Heidegger is concerned with the ontological or existential analysis
of Dasein. Concepts such as “subject” or “thinking I” carry ontic baggage and can only occur
based on a particular ontic understanding of Dasein. For instance, depending on the science in
which the concept occurs, anthropology or biology for example, there are ontic
predeterminations of what constitutes instances of “human being” that Heidegger intends to get
under. This is not to say that there is not or could not be a “thinking I” for Heidegger. He is
simply primarily concerned with what is more fundamental than the “thinking I” and what would
allow for the “thinking I” to arise. 58
To clarify how Heidegger does not succumb to the criticism that reason, the thinking I, or
the subject collapses everything into itself, we may dissect the critique’s central point: “the
autonomous thinking I understanding itself from itself within a closed system.” 59 Dasein is
clearly not autonomous. It is dependent on the Anyone, thrownness, the context into which it is
thrown, its totality of involvements, and so forth. It can neither be nor act without these. This,
then, makes it impossible for it to understand itself from itself. When I think of myself as an
instructor, I am not simply encountering my self. I am explicitly encountering myself engaging
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in activities and drawing upon meanings given to me by my historico-cultural context. When I
encounter an entity, I am not encountering something I have created, and therefore only myself.
Neither am I encountering an object whose being has independently existing predicates. I am
encountering a particular confluence or nexus of involvements that are neither wholly dependent
on me nor wholly independent of me because I in part contribute to them. Nor is the potentiality
for such encounters simply within me as a subject or “thinking I.”
A particular instantiation of this problem involves the “who” of Dasein and Dasein’s
relations to others. If Dasein were autonomous, collapsing the world into itself, we should expect
to see this in Dasein’s relations to others. Marsh, for example, argues that the important
difference between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer concerns their appraisals of proper relations of
Dasein with others. After having elucidated Heidegger’s fundamental structures of Being-with
and Dasein-with, Marsh thinks that “despite whatever intentions [Heidegger] might have to
depict togetherness as aboriginal to Dasein, his description has the consequent effect of
consolidating the other with the I. Although Heidegger argues that Dasein-with is a characteristic
of Dasein’s other through the being-with of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, nonetheless, the world
is always a referential totality for the sake of the I that is Dasein.” 60 At least at one point this is
also Bonhoeffer’s assessment of Heidegger: “Because human beings are alone, the world is
‘their’ world, and other human beings have sunk into the world of things (cf. Heidegger’s
‘Mitsein’, ‘being-with’).” 61 Ultimately Heidegger must fail for Bonhoeffer because such relations
are not mediated through Christ. But it is incorrect to assert that Dasein possesses the world and
others within it precisely because Heidegger has coordinated act and being. It would be much
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more accurate to say that, for the most part, the world, the Anyone, and others possess Dasein. 62
Not only do entities in the world get their involvements and meanings from the Anyone and
others, such that they are not passive recipients of my intentional acts; I too get the being from
which I understand myself and my possibilities from the Anyone and others. 63 And this is
particularly true when Dasein exists as an inauthentic Anyone-self. 64 So Dasein as an inauthentic
Anyone-self cannot be the focus of this critique.
The heart of the criticism is authenticity; however, many of the characteristics of
inauthentic Dasein effective at preventing the criticism are still operative for authentic Dasein.
According to Marsh, “what it means to be authentic is this winnowing down of the self that
dwells alongside and with others to its innermost individuality” resulting in “the disconnection of
any genuine bond between I and other.” 65 This is not correct, but understandably so. The mistake
is equating the process of coming to authenticity with authenticity itself. On the other side of the
process, there is no free-floating self that has been released from the common understandings
and possibilities of the Anyone as if authentic Dasein can now create itself ex nihilo. 66 Authentic
Dasein returns to the Anyone, to its thrownness, and takes up or chooses the possibilities and
understandings that it inherits, though in a qualitatively different manner: “The resoluteness in
which Dasein comes back to itself, dis-closes current factical possibilities of authentic existing,
and discloses them from the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.” 67 Even in
authentic existence, Dasein is not an “I” mastering and possessing the world and others.
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Authentic Dasein is still dependent on these communal structures. And there is some indication
that Bonhoeffer saw this: Dasein “enters into its most authentic possibility […] not by
withdrawing from this world but by accepting its fallenness in the world as its guilt.” 68
Additionally, authenticity creates the conditions for proper relations to other: “Resoluteness
brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-amongst what is ready-to-hand, and pushes
it into solicitous Being with Others.” 69 So, it is neither the “before” of inauthentic existence nor
the “after” of authentic existence with which Bonhoeffer should have a problem.
From Bonhoeffer’s theological perspective and given an accurate reading of Heidegger,
there are two legitimate critiques. The first concerns the means by which Dasein transitions from
inauthenticity to authenticity. The second concerns the closed nature of Dasein’s existential
structures. Together these both make Heidegger unsuitable for Bonhoeffer’s conception of
proper theology. The first critique, concerning the process of coming to authenticity, involves
encountering death, anxiety, and conscience, which will be the detailed focus of the following
two sections; I will therefore present the second critique first. This critique is essentially that the
closed nature of Dasein’s existential structures means, for Bonhoeffer, that “no room has been
left for the concept of revelation.” 70
While Heidegger is able to account for ‘this-worldly’ transcendence, or being
encountered and affected by others, Heidegger cannot account for the transcendence of
revelation. 71 There, in fact, seems to be a few options concerning how Heidegger’s analysis of
Dasein might relate to revelation. First, Heidegger could be understood to practice a basic
methodological atheism where theological matters are more or less bracketed. There are many
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points where Heidegger explicitly separates phenomenology or philosophy from theology, with
particular concern that confusing the two is detrimental to both. 72 Second, it could be that
Heidegger’s analysis goes beyond this methodological atheism to a straightforward atheism.
Heidegger’s own biography up to the writing of Being and Time and his philosophical reliance
on theological sources make this option implausible. Bonhoeffer does describe Heidegger’s
philosophy as “a consciously atheistic philosophy of finitude.” 73 However, Bonhoeffer seems
less explicitly concerned with Heidegger’s own stance on revelation and more concerned with
how Heidegger’s philosophy might form the basis of an inappropriate ontology of revelation.
There is some cause for thinking that Heidegger has at least implicitly left room for
revelation. He does leave room for other major theological concepts. Heidegger is quite explicit
on this point in his “Phenomenology and Theology” (1927), particularly concerning sin as an
existentiell modification of Being-guilty (Schuldigsein):
Hence we can say that precisely because all basic theological concepts, considered in
their full regional context, include a content that is indeed existentially powerless, i. e.,
ontically sublated, they are ontologically determined by a content that is pre-Christian
and that can thus be grasped purely rationally […] then the content of the concept [of sin]
itself, and not just any philosophical preference of the theologian, calls for a return to the
concept of guilt. But guilt is an original ontological determination of the existence of
Dasein. 74
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Nearly everything that Bonhoeffer must reject is compressed in this statement. Consider the
‘causal’ chain of the particular example of guilt here: Dasein has a particular ontological nature.
Part of this nature is the structure of guilt. As ontological, guilt may happen to be given the ontic
content of sin, a philosophical preference of the theologian. Most importantly, this content is
existentially powerless. Heidegger has constructed comfortable homes in the being of Dasein for
some of the most important theological concepts.
The worry here is that Heidegger has made an existential home for revelation in the
transition to authenticity. If so, revelation has been swallowed, not by act, but by being, making
it one possible existentiell modification among others and leaving it impotent vis-à-vis the
existential structures within Dasein from which it arises and according to which it must conform.
It is here that Bonhoeffer must draw the line, particularly given his Barthian sensibilities.
The reason for this is that the essence of revelation lies in its event-character. For the
existential-ontological analysis, revelation can be thought within the static possibilities of
Dasein; but then it no longer has the essential character of an event, one that comes from
God’s freedom […] But if revelation is essentially an event of God’s free activity, then it
supersedes and challenges also the existential-ontological possibilities of Dasein […] In
the existentiell event of revelation, the existential structure of Dasein is touched and
changed. 75
By making room for revelation in the being of Dasein, Heidegger is essentially not talking about
revelation. For Bonhoeffer, revelation must be understood as God’s free event that supersedes
any human possibility.
More generally, making room for revelation in Dasein also means that, again, Dasein has
the possibility of placing itself in the truth. Revelation is importantly, for Bonhoeffer, that
transcendent event, the only event, that places Dasein in the truth. Now that revelation is a
possibility of Dasein, Dasein yet again commandeers the ability to place itself in the truth.
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Dasein needs only turn ‘inward’ (cor curvum in se) to its own possibilities in order to come to
the truth of its existence.
In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer says that Heidegger has successfully coordinated act and
being. Also, in his “Inaugural Lecture” Bonhoeffer says, “Scheler conceives the possibilities of
the human being statically, hence in continuity but not in existentiality [i.e. openness to
transcendence]. Heidegger succeeds in combining the two.” 76 Bonhoeffer can say both this and
also that Heidegger has theologically failed at the criterion of transcendence without
contradiction if we again keep in mind the different standards to which Bonhoeffer holds
philosophy and theology. Heidegger has not collapsed the world into the I or subject as idealism
does according to Bonhoeffer. With this Heidegger has accounted for transcendence as best as
can be expect of philosophy by theology. Yet, because Heidegger’s philosophy is philosophy, it
is incapable of leaving Dasein open to transcendent revelation.
The Boundary of Death
Bonhoeffer’s more general critique of Heidegger’s authenticity is that in coming to this
privileged position Dasein need only turn to itself thereby removing or incorporating, depending
on one’s theological use of Heidegger, transcendent revelation. Much of the content of this
critique is contained in the more localized critiques of how Dasein comes to authenticity,
particularly through death and conscience.
As we have seen from the last two chapters, designating a proper boundary is essential to
a true solution to the problem of act and being. Kant’s boundaries of the thing-in-itself and the
transcendental subject, for example, are epistemologically ideal if only they could be maintained.
In keeping with the general nature of the problem of act and being, we should also expect some
form of boundary at the anthropological level. As a champion of a solution to the problem of act
76
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and being at the anthropological level, we should expect Heidegger to provide such a boundary.
And so he does with his concept of ‘death’, which Heidegger explicitly calls Dasein’s boundarysituation (Grenzsituation). 77
Bonhoeffer unequivocally rejects Heidegger’s concept of ‘death’ on strictly theological
grounds. “On this point, cf. Heidegger’s analysis of ‘being towards death’ as the ‘ownmost
potentiality for being’ that makes possible ‘the whole of Dasein’. Heidegger’s concept of death is
metaphysical and utterly insincere, for he includes death in the dialectical process of the spirit
(‘Dasein’) finding itself.” 78 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Bonhoeffer properly
understands Heidegger on death; though, in light of Bonhoeffer’s other theological commitments
he would still have to reject Heidegger’s ‘death’ even if accurately understood.
Yet, it is important to accurately understand and appreciate Heidegger’s ‘death’ because
it is essential to Being and Time’s overall structure both in itself and as understood as a
philosophically adequate solution to the anthropological problem of act and being, and we cannot
otherwise accurately understand and correct Bonhoeffer’s evaluation of ‘death’.
For Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein, death is methodologically important. The
goal, again, is to get a fundamental grasp of Dasein’s being. This entails coming to understand
Dasein as a whole. A central existential structure of Dasein is possibility. Dasein is essentially
possibility. This entails that Dasein is always “not-yet”; something is always “still
outstanding.” 79 But if Dasein is always and essentially incomplete possibilities, then how can we
understand Dasein as a whole? 80 Heidegger’s answer is that if we come to understand the
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existential structure of death, we can understand Dasein as something that is whole. This will
entail death being a certain way or manner of having incomplete possibilities. 81
To understand, however, how death is an answer to the problem of Dasein’s
completeness, we have to understand what is not an answer or what Heidegger does not mean by
‘death’. Heidegger explicitly distinguishes ‘death’ from “perishing” (Verenden) and “demise”
(Ableben). Perishing is biological death. 82 Perishing is then an event at the end of a biological
life. Demise is a way of perishing specific to Dasein. Where perishing and ‘death’ meet there is
demise, which is strictly reserved for Dasein. This is what Heidegger means when he says that
demise is intermediate between perishing and ‘death’ and that “Dasein […] can demise only as
long as it is dying.” 83 A bacteria may physically or biologically perish. A bacteria, however,
does not have a world. 84 Dasein does have a world. It seeks to understand its being: how it is as
thrown into a world, with the necessary requirement to project itself and understand itself
according to its possibilities. ‘Death’ is the ontological possibility of no longer being able to do
this. When Dasein physically dies it experiences demise as the end of its world and the end of its
being-there. 85 So ‘death’ is not unrelated to ordinary understandings that Heidegger would call
‘demise’ or ‘perishing’, but it is not strictly equivalent to them either. ‘Death’, rather than being
an actual event, which would make it ontical or existentiell, is an ontological or existential
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possibility of Dasein. As Heidegger says, “when Dasein dies […] it does not have to do so with
an experience of its factical demising, or in such an experience.” 86
Bonhoeffer’s critiques of Heidegger’s death seem to involve conflating death with
demise. Given the complexity of Heidegger’s analysis of death, the ambiguity of Bonhoeffer’s
language in evaluating death, and the fact that Bonhoeffer does not explicitly acknowledge the
distinction of death from demise, we cannot say with certainty if Bonhoeffer has an adequate
understanding of Heidegger’s death. In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer first describes Heidegger’s
death as follows: “As temporal Dasein within historicity, it must order itself upon its own end so
as to attain its original wholeness. And this end is death. In the most proper sense, Dasein is
‘being toward death’.” 87 First, when Bonhoeffer says that “this end is death,” it is not clear what
meaning of end he has in mind. Heidegger, in another instance of his method of formal
indication, goes through a few common meanings of “end,” such as “stopping” or being
“finished,” and rejects them as possible meanings of death-as-end. 88 Elsewhere Bonhoeffer
seems to equate wholeness with completion. 89 This would seem to suggest that by “end”
Bonhoeffer has one of the rejected meanings in mind. And if by death-as-end he has something
like “stopping” or “finishing” in mind, then it seems that he may be conflating death with
demise. As a final piece of evidence, Bonhoeffer locates Heidegger’s analysis of both authentic
and inauthentic existence firmly in existence in sin or Adam. In describing what sounds like an
allusion to Heidegger’s process of coming to authenticity, Bonhoeffer says, “In conscience death
steps within the horizon of the I, but only as an entity, as an event that conscience can
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conquer.” 90 It seems quite likely then that Bonhoeffer reads Heidegger’s death as an event, i.e. as
demise rather than death. 91 This likely misunderstanding of death will lead Bonhoeffer to a few
misplaced critiques. First, we must properly understand Heidegger’s death.
Death is not an event like demise, but is rather a way of being. Death is a possibility and
uniquely so. “Death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.” 92 As Polt aptly
points out, Heidegger’s choice of “death” (Tod) is misleading, offering “mortality” as a viable
substitute. 93 “Mortality” correctly highlights death, as Heidegger means it, as a continual
condition. It is not an event that will happen. Rather it is a way in which Dasein is finite and
therefore that conditions its existence. To highlight this Heidegger also uses the term “dying” at
one point saying, and echoing Luther, “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to
die.” 94 In this sense, death then means the constant condition under which all of Dasein’s projects
are undertaken. Whether Dasein truly knows it in an existential sense, it is mortal and finite; all
its projects, and more fundamentally even the ability to undertake projects, are constantly under
threat.
As a possibility and a way for Dasein to be, death has a few distinctive characteristics
that make it unique among Dasein’s possibilities. It is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. It is nonrelational. It is certain and indefinite. And it is unsurpassable (not to be outstripped;
unüberholbare). 95
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By death as Dasein’s ownmost possibility, Heidegger essentially means that death always
belongs to a particular Dasein. No one can die for another Dasein. Here understanding the
difference between death and demise is important. Someone else can demise for me. Forms of
heroism and sacrifice are predicated on this possibility. But no one can take over my mortality,
the fundamental condition that I am finite, for me. This also makes death distinct from other
possible ways of being. Being a spouse or instructor are also ways for Dasein to be; however,
they are ways that may be taken over by others.
Death as uniquely mine or ownmost distinguishes it from other possibilities of Dasein in
another important respect, which makes it certain. This is not empirical or epistemic certainty. 96
Again this would be to mistake demise, the event, with death, the possibility. No other
possibility is a possibility in which Dasein must exist. It is not necessary that any particular
Dasein be a spouse or instructor. It is, however, necessary that Dasein be mortal. 97
Though death is certain it is also indefinite. Here the “when” of death is indeterminate. 98
Here it is difficult to elucidate what Heidegger means without making it sound like a future event
like demise. By contrast, Heidegger asserts that death is often covered up by demise. Death,
being confused with demise, is then seen as a future event. As a future event that will happen,
“but not right away,” the “when” of death is then made definite. 99 Rather death, according to
Heidegger, “is possible at any [every/each] moment” (er jeden Augenblick mӧglich ist) and
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because of this is indefinite. 100 What Heidegger seems to be saying, particularly if “jeden” is
meant as “each” or “every,” is that death is a possibility in which Dasein always is, and therefore
it does not occur at or in any particular moment of sequential or chronological time.
As a possibility that is ownmost and certain, death is also unsurpassable or not to be
outstripped. All other possibilities are susceptible to breakdown in the face of Dasein’s finitude.
The conditions that allow different possibilities to be taken up, such as being an instructor, may
fail. Dasein, as we will see with anxiety, may no longer be able to identify itself with a
possibility. There are a number of conditions in which any particular possibility may no longer
be a possible way for Dasein to be. This is not the case for death. No other way of being can
remove death or mortality as an essential way for Dasein to exist.
Finally, death is non-relational. 101 When facing up to death, Dasein’s relations with others
are cut off. “When it [Dasein] stands before itself in this way [i.e. facing up to death], all its
relations to any other Dasein have been undone.” 102 Death (and anxiety), when experienced, are
extreme individualizing moments when relations to others seem to have no significance.
Anxiety attends Dasein’s understanding of death. When Dasein encounters death, feels
the full weight of the above characteristics, yet does not flee in the face of it, 103 Dasein

100

Ibid.
Much of Heidegger’s analysis of death is reminiscent of some of Luther’s statements concerning death. For
example, “The summons of death comes to us all, and no one can die for another. Every one must fight his own
battle with death by himself, alone. We can shout into another’s ears, but every one must himself be prepared for
the time of death, for I will not be with you then, nor you with me.” “The First Sermon, March 9, 1522, Invocavit
Sunday” in LW 51: 392. In all candor, this is one of many points where Luther is not always consistent. For
example, in his “Sermon on Preparing to Die,” he states that “in the hour of death no Christian should doubt that he
is not alone.” For the eyes of God, Christ, the angels, the saints, and all Christians are on him; Martin Luther,
“Sermon on Preparing to Die,” in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, ed. Timothy E. Lull (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1989), 643.
102
SZ 250.
103
It seem that the most common way of fleeing death, for Heidegger, is to misunderstand death as demise and
understand demise, following the Anyone, as an event that will happen “but not right away.”
101

159

simultaneously encounters “anxiety in the face of death.” 104 As death was a unique possibility of
Dasein, anxiety is a unique attunement of Dasein. Death reveals the radical contingency of all of
Dasein’s possibilities. Dasein is then thrown back on the way it is in the world. And given the
radical contingency of Dasein’s possibilities, Dasein cannot identify with such possibilities:
“Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself […] in terms of the
‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted.” 105 If Dasein cannot identify with
possibilities such as being a spouse or instructor, then the involvements such possibilities were
mutually dependent on collapse. Dasein’s world then collapses and “has the character of
completely lacking significance.” 106 As the collapsing of the world, “anxiety,” like death,
“individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world.” 107
Though they seem dire, these encounters are in fact, liberating for Heidegger. They
potentially free Dasein of its fallenness and lostness in the Anyone-self, and they thereby
potentially lead to authentic existence.
We may now summarize our characterization of authentic being-towards-death as we
have projected it existentially: Running forward reveals to Dasein its lostness in the
Anyone-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily
unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
freedom towards death-a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the
“Anyone,” and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious. 108
But as Heidegger quickly notes following the above quotation, the job is not complete. He must
still account for how Dasein can move forward in an authentic and existentiell way. To do so he
gives an account of conscience, the subject of the next section. First, we must account for
Bonhoeffer’s critiques of death and, by extension, anxiety.
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Bonhoeffer appears to have four critical comments concerning death. First, death (along
with anxiety) individualizes Dasein and therefore isolates it. 109 Second and like the failure of
Kant’s boundaries, death cannot be a true boundary because in authentic existence death is
incorporated into Dasein’s self-understanding. 110 Third, Bonhoeffer accepts Heidegger’s
observation of Dasein’s radical finitude, but believes that Heidegger has conflated finitude with
completion. 111 Fourth, that death leads to completion makes it systematic and metaphysical. 112
Concerning the first criticism, Bonhoeffer is right. Heidegger unambiguously asserts that
death and anxiety are extreme individualizing moments. Unfortunately as we saw earlier,
Bonhoeffer carries this through to authentic existence. This is patently false at least in so far as
Heidegger throughout Being and Time asserts that authentic existence is what allows for genuine
relations with others and the world. The only viable means of saving Bonhoeffer here is to adopt
his theological position. 113 For Bonhoeffer, both Heidegger’s inauthentic and authentic
existences are existences in sin. For Bonhoeffer, the only difference between the two is that
authentic existence involves a higher level of self-justification in the face of sin. A prominent
theme throughout Bonhoeffer’s corpus is that existence in sin is incapable of having proper
relations with others. It is possible to theoretically account for our ontological dependence on
and therefore openness to others; however, existence in sin cannot in reality or, as Heidegger
would put it, existentielly, have proper relations with others. This then means that even in
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authentic existence one cannot have proper relations with others and is therefore in some sense
isolated, for Bonhoeffer.
The second critique, that death is not a true boundary because it is incorporated into
Dasein, is true by Bonhoeffer’s definition of boundary. It is a boundary imposed by Dasein’s
very being. It is a condition that must be faced up to and according to which other possibilities
must be undertaken in order for Dasein to be authentic.
The third critique, again, is that death, as that which reveals Dasein’s radical finitude,
leads to Dasein’s completion. But this seems to be predicated on death understood as merely a
futural event, as demise; when, in fact, Heidegger means that constant condition of being limited
or finite. There are only so many possibilities available to Dasein. There are fewer that Dasein
may take up. And even fewer still may be authentically taken up: “Freedom, however, is, in the
choice of one possibility—that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s not
being able to choose them.” 114 Dasein just is limited, bounded, or finite. So Bonhoeffer’s second
critique still holds, but seems to be predicated on an inaccurate understanding of completion and
the conflation of finitude with completion. Dasein can never be complete, for Heidegger, in any
straightforward meaning of the word. As long as Dasein is, it is “not-yet.” 115
Fourth, Bonhoeffer critiques Heidegger’s death for being metaphysical. Though
Bonhoeffer does not explicitly define what he means by “metaphysical” he seems to mean the
construction of any closed system that does not allow for an encounter with the transcendent. 116
So we essentially return to the above critique that authenticity is predicated on the closed
existential structures of Dasein. Death, as a possibility ‘internal’ to Dasein, and as a necessary
means to attaining authenticity, means that Dasein does not turn to or is affected by anything
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outside of itself in achieving genuine authenticity or selfhood. From Bonhoeffer’s theological
position this is certainly a legitimate critique.
Bonhoeffer has made some fundamental mistakes in his understanding of Heidegger’s
concept of death, most arising from the common mistake even among Heidegger interpreters of
mistaking demise for death; however, even with a proper understanding of death, Bonhoeffer
would have to reject being-towards-death as a means to achieving authentic existence given his
theological commitments. This means that Heidegger’s concept of death cannot aid in
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Dasein in faith or, in Bonhoeffer’s terms, being in Christ. This
does not, however, mean that Heidegger’s death could not and does not play some role in
Bonhoeffer’s theology overall.
When we turn in the next chapter to Bonhoeffer’s constructive theological solution to the
problem of act and being we may find that Bonhoeffer’s Christian understanding of death has
more in common with Heidegger’s than Bonhoeffer realized, the likely cause of which was their
shared reliance on the Christian tradition and Luther in particular. Plant, for example, says, “He
[Heidegger] plays an important cameo role in a contrast Bonhoeffer draws between beingtowards-death and being in Christ as being towards the future. Being-towards-death is still to
exist in sin. Being in Christ alone opens up the future since ‘the human being “is” in the future of
Christ—that is, never in being without act and never in act without being.” 117 Here too Plant is
complexly right and wrong concerning Bonhoeffer’s critique and alteration of Heidegger’s
concept of death. Again, the fuller picture of Bonhoeffer’s theological adaptation of Heidegger
will be further developed in the next chapter. For now we can agree with Plant that Bonhoeffer
firmly places Heidegger’s being-towards-death in the authentic Christian’s ‘past’ existence as
being in Adam or sin. However, like Heidegger’s ‘past’, this past being in Adam is not done and
117

Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” 321.

163

gone; rather, it is constantly made present in light of the future. Christian Dasein must be
constantly in the process of dying to sin or being in Adam. 118 So, Heidegger will be important for
understanding being in Adam, which is an important theological task in its own right. And we
have here a taste of how Heidegger’s temporality helps in understanding being in Christ, an
essential theological task.
Conscience, Guilt, and Self-Justification
In Heidegger’s concept of conscience, Bonhoeffer finds the justification for his overall critique
of authentic existence, i.e. that it is still caught in the cor curvum in se or sin. As Bonhoeffer
reads Heidegger, conscience is the “last gasp” of the self trying to justify itself in the face of
sin. 119
Conscience plays a crucial methodological function in Being and Time. While Heidegger
believes he has shown the ontological or existential possibility of coming to authenticity with
being-towards-death, he does not believe he has demonstrated the existentiell possibility of
coming to authenticity. 120 That is, Heidegger must show how it is possible for authentic existence
to have existentiell or ‘real world’ content. Conscience is that existential possibility that reveals
to Dasein that it is inauthentic and guilty, what its existentiell possibilities are, and allows Dasein
to authentically choose a particular existentiell way to exist.
Conscience, for Heidegger, manifests or is a call or appeal (Ruf). As fallen, Dasein is an
Anyone-self. It is caught up in the Anyone and the way in which the Anyone publicly
understands the world and Dasein. Dasein must be called out of its fallenness and away from its
Anyone-self in order to become authentic. 121 The call of conscience is then an appeal to Dasein
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as an Anyone-self. 122 Dasein is what is called in conscience. 123 More importantly, Dasein is also
the caller. 124 The call of conscience comes from Dasein as it has been individualized by
anxiety. 125 As individualized by death and anxiety, Dasein is able to call to itself concerning its
fallenness in the Anyone.
As a call, conscience must tell Dasein something. This something is not straightforward,
however. The call of conscience is characterized by silence or reticence (Verschwiegenheit). 126
There is a sense in which the call of conscience does not tell Dasein anything. It does not
manifest as specific language directing Dasein to do or not to do a specific action or engage in a
specific possibility. This, for Heidegger, would be to fall back into the idle talk of the Anyone
because it would treat Dasein’s existence as a manipulable, calculable thing. 127
Yet Dasein as an Anyone-self must be shown something, and this something is its guilt.
Exercising his method of formal indication, Heidegger runs through various common
understandings of ‘guilt’ in order to come to an ontological understanding that forms the basis of
these common understandings. Such common, ontic understandings include “owing something,”
“being responsible for,” and “making oneself responsible.” 128 These are not ontological
understandings, however. They concern specific things, actions, or requirements that are or are
not lacking. There must be an ontological basis in Dasein’s being for these. Ontological guilt
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relates to “not.” 129 Dasein’s being in being-guilty is then being-the-basis of a nullity or notness
(Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit). 130
This “notness” is easiest to understand according to the way it determines the various
structures of Dasein, for ontological guilt pervades its being. Dasein is guilty, or the basis of
notness, both in its thrownness and its projection. As thrown, Dasein always already finds itself
in a world in a particular way with certain possibilities open and closed to it. This thrownness is
not under Dasein’s control. “Thus ‘being-a-basis’ means never to have power over one’s
ownmost being from the ground up. This ‘not’ belongs to the existential meaning of
‘thrownness’.” 131 Polt usefully calls this aspect of guilt “indebtedness.” 132 Dasein cannot change
what it has been. It is indebted to its beenness, which it must take over. It is important to note
how extreme this position is. It is not simply a matter of being born into a world with its
particularities that I did not choose. Dasein is always making this indebtedness present. In more
ontic terms, I am always and constantly creating a past that I cannot change and must live with.
Guilt also infuses the structure of projection. Dasein “always stands in one possibility or another:
it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection.” 133
Polt calls this “responsibility.” 134 In choosing possibilities I am always also not choosing others. I
am responsible for such choices, and the ones not chosen may still make a claim on me.
Here we see how radical Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s finitude is. There is an
extreme curtailing of Dasein’s “power.” 135 And this lack of power is at the very heart of Dasein’s
being. It cannot be remedied. One might think that Bonhoeffer would appreciate this extreme
129
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limiting of Dasein. Yet, as we will see, in Dasein’s reaction to this in coming to authenticity,
Bonhoeffer sees self-justification and merely a different form of sin.
Though Dasein cannot remedy guilt, it can take it on in a particular way. Dasein’s
authentic reaction is resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). As a fallen, inauthentic Anyone-self,
Dasein has chosen possibilities, but not explicitly. 136 Authentic Dasein must change this
somehow. “This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. But ‘making up’ for not
choosing signifies choosing to make a choice—deciding for a potentiality-for-being, and making
this decision from one’s own Self. In choosing to make a choice, Dasein makes possible, first
and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being.” 137 This choosing to choose is resoluteness.
Dasein is confronted with its guilt and its not having authentically chosen itself. Dasein also
realizes that it must choose in spite of its guilt.
Dasein as resolute, then, chooses from the possibilities available to it from, what
Heidegger calls, its Situation. Resoluteness reveals, in a new way, where Dasein is and the
possibilities that are factically available to it. “Resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is
always the resoluteness of some factical Dasein at a particular time […] The resolution is
precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time.” 138
Previously, as an inauthentic Anyone-self, Dasein was only open to general possibilities as
publically interpreted by the Anyone. Dasein did not explicitly choose possibilities based on the
actual factical situation in which the particular Dasein exists. With the Situation revealed by
resoluteness and conscience, Dasein is now able to do so.
Heidegger completes his account of coming to authenticity by joining forward-running to
death with resoluteness. For Dasein to be resolute, it must see that it is guilt and that this guilt is
136
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constant. To see that it is constant requires that Dasein see that it is guilty to the end. In
projecting its guilt to the end, Dasein is simultaneously projecting or running forward to its death
(which is still understood not as an event but as something like facing up to mortality). 139 As
such, “the phenomenon of resoluteness has [according to Heidegger] brought us before the
primordial truth of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical
potentiality-for-being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Beingrevealed.” 140
With the last quotation and what has preceded concerning Bonhoeffer’s theological
requirements, one might already anticipate Bonhoeffer’s critiques, but to properly understand
Bonhoeffer’s critiques of Heidegger’s conscience, we must first understand the theological
commitments concerning conscience that Bonhoeffer brings to his reading of Heidegger. For
Bonhoeffer, following his reading of Luther, there are two types of conscience. 141 As we will get
to in further detail in the next chapter, for Bonhoeffer there are two different existences for
Dasein. Dasein can be in Adam (sin) or in Christ (faith). Dasein in Adam has one form of
conscience, and Dasein in Christ has two forms of conscience. 142 Bonhoeffer clearly understands
Heidegger’s conception of conscience to be a sinful or in-Adam conscience. Here is how
Bonhoeffer describes conscience in Adam:
139
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Conscience, in which desperation and solitude become-conscious-of-themselves, seeks
thereby to overcome them. Solitude is not grasped in its authentic sense. There arises
merely a general consciousness of being-left-alone, and this is what conscience is to
eliminate by restoring human beings once again to themselves. In conscience, the powers
of this world, law and death, fall upon human beings and make them anxious; here,
anxiety in the face of oneself erupts from life, because it neither knows the future nor
holds it in its power. Yet there is in this anxiety an inability to break free of oneself, a
final perseverance of the I in itself. In conscience death steps within the horizon of the I,
but only as an entity, as an event that conscience can conquer. Human beings think
themselves immortal and remain alone. 143
There are, of course, some inaccuracies here, some of which I have pointed out. Death is not
intended as an event for Heidegger, and it is crucial that Dasein does not see itself as immortal.
Yet, it seems rather clear that Bonhoeffer has Heidegger in mind.
Bonhoeffer’s problem is twofold. First, his general problem, and one that he has with
many contemporary theologies such as Karl Holl’s, is, as a technical term, the problem of the
point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt). 144 The point of contact is the theological position that there
must be a capacity or faculty within the human being pre-formed to receive revelation. 145 To hold
such a position would, for Bonhoeffer (and Barth), 146 threaten God’s sovereignty and freedom. It
would mean that God would have to conform to that capacity or possibility in human existence
when granting revelation. Additionally, it would threaten to make Christ and the church as the
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proper mediators of revelation irrelevant. 147 Bonhoeffer sees this risk in most contemporary
discussions of conscience. 148
Second and more specific to Heidegger, is the problem that the conscience and what it
discloses is not caused by God or Christ. Conscience makes Dasein “accuser, accused, and
judge,” or in Heidegger’s terms Dasein is both the caller and the called. 149 Here Dasein needs
only look to its own possibilities to come to a privileged existential position. Dasein justifies
itself from ‘within’ its own existence. It is cor curvum in se.
For Bonhoeffer, then, the authentic existence that results from these encounters with
anxiety, death, and conscience is only a higher level of sinful existence, a more nuanced form of
self-justification. Authentic Dasein has come to realize that many aspects of its existence are
‘sinful’ or fallen; however, rather than these aspects being modified or altered from outside,
authentic Dasein takes it upon itself to come to a new mode of existence. What is needed, for
Bonhoeffer, is for Christ to intercede from outside at the moment of self-justification to destroy
this conscience and Dasein’s last attempt at self-justification.
There are two characteristics of conscience, which are unfortunately underdeveloped, that
one might point to as rejoinders to Bonhoeffer’s criticisms. First, while describing the way in
which the conscience is a call from Dasein itself, Heidegger adds, “Indeed the call is precisely
something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed,
nor have we ever done so.” 150 To this Heidegger adds, second, that “The call comes from me and
yet from beyond [über] me.” 151 Though Heidegger rejects interpreting the lack of voluntarism in
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the conscience and its ‘transcendent’ qualities as relating to God, 152 these qualities might appear
to counter or mitigate Bonhoeffer’s criticisms, the central point of which is that Dasein is still
trapped in itself. Though Heidegger does not explicitly expand on or clarify these two points, it
seems that conscience is ‘outside of’ and not voluntarily chosen by Dasein as it is modified as an
Anyone-self. 153 That is, Dasein actually existing in the world as an Anyone-self does not choose
to have a conscience, and it appears to come from outside of Dasein because the conscience does
not operate in a way that is recognizable by Dasein as an Anyone-self. For example, a key
characteristic of the Anyone and Dasein as an Anyone-self is idle talk. By contrast, the
authenticity revealing conscience operates with a very different from of discourse, i.e. silence
and reticence, which the Anyone-self does not recognize as a form of discourse. By “beyond”
and “involuntary” Heidegger likely does not intend conscience to come from outside of Dasein’s
being.
Though Heidegger is able to maintain a this-worldly transcendence in which the world,
entities, and others are not collapsed into the subject, he does fail at Bonhoeffer’s desired
theological transcendence. Authenticity is a privileged mode of existence that Dasein brings
itself to through anxiety, death, and conscience. This, for Bonhoeffer, is merely another form of
an intellectual cor curvum in se and self-justification that threatens the necessity of revelation.
Pryzwara: An Excursus?
There is one last critique that must be dealt with. Bonhoeffer concludes his explicit account of
Heidegger in Part A of Act and Being with: “It follows that Heidegger’s concept of being,
despite its enormous expansion through the discovery of the existential sphere, remains
152
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unsuitable for theology.” 154 This is a seemingly straightforward rejection of Heidegger often
referenced in secondary scholarship. Ernst Feil says, “Thus Heidegger’s concept of existence,
derived from the human and not from revelation, was, for Bonhoeffer, theologically unusable.” 155
Boomgaarden also quotes Bonhoeffer’s above statement interpreting it as another instance of
Bonhoeffer’s critique that Heidegger fails to maintain openness to transcendence. 156 This is, of
course, Bonhoeffer’s strongest critique of Heidegger, but, as I will argue, I do not think that is
what is happening here. Finally, Zimmerman, possibly with this quotation in mind, says
“Bonhoeffer deems Heidegger's ontology ultimately unsuitable for a genuinely theological
conception of knowledge.” 157 When we turn to Bonhoeffer’s theological epistemology in the
next chapter we will see that this is true only based on a very narrow conception of suitability.
What is needed to properly interpret Bonhoeffer’s above statement is to reconcile it with his
many statements that Heidegger is useful for theology.
I believe a more reasonable interpretation of this critique, one that does not make
Bonhoeffer disingenuous or forgetful, comes from noting the difference between Dasein and the
“concept of being” (Seinsbegriff) and seeing this statement in light of its immediate context.
It is important that Bonhoeffer does not say that Heidegger’s concept of Dasein is
unsuitable for theology. Dasein and being are not equivalent. The following would be the general
consequence if Bonhoeffer considered Heidegger’s concept of being suitable for theology, and
why, therefore, he must reject being but not necessarily Dasein. Again, the overall goal of Being
154
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and Time is to understand the meaning of being. In Being and Time, Heidegger does not actually
achieve this goal. By the end of Being and Time the reader is frustratingly told that so far we are
only “on the way” to getting an answer to the meaning of being. 158 We, therefore, know very
little about being after reading Being and Time (though we know much about Dasein). What we
do know is that Heidegger believes that the way to get to the meaning of being is through that
entity that already has a pre-ontological or unthematic understanding of being, i.e. Dasein. What
is suitable to theology, for Bonhoeffer in Act and Being, is what can help theology come to an
act-being coordinated ontology of revelation. This would mean that if Heidegger’s concept of
being were suitable for theology, it would in some way be able to account for revelation, perhaps
even be equivalent to it. 159 But this would mean that Dasein already has an understanding of
revelation prior to revelation, grace, or entering faith. 160 This is a position that Bonhoeffer
rejects. What is particularly important is that Bonhoeffer can say this while still accepting
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as useful for theology, which is the target of all of Bonhoeffer’s
praises.
If we look closely at where the above statement occurs in Act and Being we see that it
occurs just prior to Bonhoeffer’s critique of a position much like the one just outlined. This
critique comes immediately before Bonhoeffer’s rejection of Erich Pryzwara, an early 20th
century Catholic theologian. According to the general purpose of and what has preceded in Part
A, Pryzwara should not be in this section. To this point, Part A has been devoted to philosophical
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attempts to solve the problem of act and being. Pryzwara would be a better fit for Part B, which
deals with theological attempts to solve the problem. So why is Pryzwara here? Most secondary
literature treats Bonhoeffer on Pryzwara as just another rejection of a relatively isolated attempt
to solve the problem of act and being.
It makes more sense to see Bonhoeffer’s rejection of Pryzwara as an extension of
Bonhoeffer’s treatment of Heidegger and as an instantiation of how Heidegger’s concept of
being can go theologically amiss if inappropriately applied to theology. Pryzwara had also
entered the theological fray of reactions to Heidegger. 161 Like Bonhoeffer, Pryzwara was also
concerned with the apparent closed and immanent nature of existence described in Being and
Time. 162 However, and also like Bonhoeffer, he saw possible positive theological uses for
Heidegger’s philosophy. He saw the possibility of returning to Scholasticism and reinvigorating
the doctrine of the analogia entis (analogy of being) using Heidegger’s concept of being and
Dasein’s relation to it. 163 There is in Dasein, as Pryzwara interprets Heidegger, a difference
between existence and essence. By contrast, God’s being is characterized by the strict identity of
existence and essence. The relation of Dasein’s existence and essence is in the likeness of the
relation of God’s existence and essence. 164 Through this likeness Dasein has the possibility of
accessing God’s being. That is, Dasein has, even if fallen or imperfect, a pre-understanding of
God’s being. But as we have seen working to God or revelation from a human possibility is
strictly rejected by Bonhoeffer. As Bonhoeffer says in his rejection of Przywara,
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The eternal ‘is’ remains a speculative notion which is continuously ‘in-over’ [in-über]
becoming, and which even admits of being broadened into an a priori system of the
natural insight of reason, but which is inadequate for a theological ontology. God is not
primarily the sheer ‘is’. Rather God ‘is’ the righteous one; God ‘is’ the holy one; God ‘is’
love. 165
Here, I believe, we see Bonhoeffer rejecting one possible theological use of Heidegger’s
philosophy, one in which Heidegger’s Seinsbegriff is likened to God’s being.
Immediately following his critique of Pryzwara, Bonhoeffer asks, “Does this prove that
every ontological approach is of no use for theology?” to which he answers, “It proves this with
regard to an ontological approach just as little as it does with relation to a transcendental
approach.” 166 And shortly thereafter in concluding Part A, Bonhoeffer says, “In what follows,
nevertheless, genuine transcendental philosophy [Kant] and genuine ontology [Heidegger] […]
are said to make a contribution to the understanding of the problem of act and being within the
concept of revelation.” 167 And it is to this contribution that we turn in the next chapter.
***
With these previous two chapters, we should now have an understanding of Bonhoeffer’s view
of Heidegger’s successes and failures in relation to the problem of act and being. This provides
us with a road map for the way in which Bonhoeffer creatively appropriates Heidegger to solve
the problem of act and being for theology. A summation of such successes and failures will help
anticipate the moves Bonhoeffer makes in his theological solution, to be explained in the
following chapter.
Heidegger’s greatest successes occur at the anthropological level with his analysis of
Dasein. His method of analysis begins by looking at the way Dasein actually lives or exists.
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Heidegger begins with how we pre-theoretically interact with each other and things in the world.
He begins with usual everyday understandings of words and concepts. This is a distinctive
success in relation to Bonhoeffer’s criterion of concreteness. Though it is not as immediately
obvious at this stage of Bonhoeffer’s development, he will turn to the concrete way in which
Christians exist in the church.
Much of the rationale for Heidegger’s turn to the concrete is predicated on overcoming
modern philosophy’s epistemological prejudices. To understand how we know, we must first
understand how we exist. With Bonhoeffer’s turn to concrete existence in the church, he will
develop what he calls “ecclesial knowing” that arises from this concrete existence.
Concerning Dasein itself, Heidegger has successfully maintained the continuity of its
existence, particularly by understanding it as thrown-projection and as fundamentally temporal.
Both are at the heart of Heidegger’s coordination of act and being. Bonhoeffer will therefore
apply both to an ontology of revelation. This is made easier by Bonhoeffer’s commitment to see
revelation, as he understands Luther to have, as the person of Jesus Christ. The person of Jesus
Christ, particularly as understood as the church, becomes something of an Ur-Dasein. Jesus
Christ and the church are, like Heidegger’s Dasein, explained by Bonhoeffer in fundamentally
temporal terms.
In virtue of participating or not participating in this Ur-Dasein, human Dasein exists, for
Bonhoeffer, as either in Christ or in Adam, respectively. This is Bonhoeffer’s answer to
theological anthropology. Given Bonhoeffer’s understanding of philosophy, Heidegger will also
play a positive, if complex, role here as well. We have already seen hints of how Bonhoeffer
understands Heidegger to have explicated being in Adam. Yet, given Dasein-in-Christ’s
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dependence on its existence in the church, and Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger to explain the
church, Heidegger also has his influence here as well.
Of course, Heidegger’s philosophy, as it is, cannot be the foundation of theology.
Heidegger fails at theological transcendence. Here Kant is much more important. Kant’s
intentions were right. He wanted to maintain the boundary between reason and the transcendent
thing-in-itself, for example. Only the direction of this intention was misplaced for Bonhoeffer.
Rather than our existence being directed at transcendence, at least initially, it is necessary for
transcendence to be directed at us. Here Bonhoeffer understands the transcendent person of Jesus
Christ to be pro me (for me) or directed towards me.
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Chapter Five: Bonhoeffer’s Theological Solution: Christ as Ur-Dasein
We now turn to the primary goal that the preceding chapters have been leading to, the
explication of Bonhoeffer’s theological solutions to the problem of act and being with an
emphasis on those elements informed by Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Heidegger’s solution.
The most difficult task of the present chapter is disambiguating where Heidegger is and is not an
influential source. There are times when this influence is clear. There are points when
Bonhoeffer the theologian explicitly wishes to distance himself from Heidegger the philosopher.
Most difficult of all are those points where Heidegger may be only an apparent, but not an actual,
influence. This seems to most often occur when the two have a shared source, Luther being the
most prominent. Heidegger’s relevance to Bonhoeffer’s theology, in the aforementioned ways,
is what will guide the following presentation of Bonhoeffer’s theology. It is, therefore, not an
exhaustive account of Bonhoeffer’s theology as presented in Act and Being.
Though not exhaustive, it does get to the heart of both Heidegger’s influence and
Bonhoeffer’s theological development. As we will see, Heidegger’s Daseinanalytik is
instrumental in Bonhoeffer’s formulation of Jesus Christ as person. This forms the heart of
Heidegger’s influence, and as Larry Rasmussen correctly observes, “the heart of [Bonhoeffer’s]
theology was Christology.” 1 Therefore, Heidegger’s influence is not inconsequential.
Bonhoeffer’s act-being coordinated theological ontology of revelation comes at the end
of Part B, “The Problem of Act and Being in the Interpretation of Revelation and the Church as
the Solution to the Problem.” The first two sections of Part B, “The Interpretation of Revelation
1

Larry Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality and Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press,
2005), 15; see also DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, esp chapter 8.
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in Terms of the Concept of Act” and “The Interpretation of Revelation in Terms of Being,”
replay the same basic critiques Bonhoeffer had in Part A of act-oriented and being-oriented
philosophies. Because the basic form of the critiques are the same and other excellent works
have been devoted to analyzing such theological critiques, I will only briefly summarize them
here. 2
Though Bonhoeffer deals with a number of theological attempts at a solution that he
categorizes as either act- or being-oriented, Barth and Holl are his most prominent and
representative cases. Barth’s primary concern is to maintain God’s freedom in relation to human
reason by avoiding any attempt to make God and revelation accessible to reason. He does so by
understanding revelation as a pure act of God understood as a subject, much like Kant’s
transcendental subject. This makes revelation a free, contingent, and atemporal act of God. The
most prominent problem Barth has is with maintaining continuity at the various levels of the
problem of act and being. For theological ontology, revelation as contingent and atemporal, only
occurs in discrete, atemporal ‘moments’; there is no necessary connection between one event of
revelation and the next. The continuity of Christian existence is then threatened. Barth and
Bonhoeffer assume that one is only a Christian in revelation. If this is so, then for Barth, one is a
Christian only during these atemporal moments of revelation. At best, then, one may simply
flicker in and out of Christian existence. If revelation and Christian existences are atemporal, and
being temporal is a fundamental way in which we understand the world, then there is also no real
or substantive Christian knowledge. At best, again, a Christian only has knowledge in those
moments of revelation, not before or after.
While Holl is the most prominent representative figure of an overly being-oriented
theology, he, in fact, represents one of three general options for an overly being-oriented
2

See DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, esp. chapters 3–5.
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understanding of revelation. One might understand revelation as doctrine, 3 psychic experience
such as Holl’s conscience, or institution. 4 All three options make revelation into something that
exists (Seiend). As something that exists, revelation would be available to human understanding.
As such, revelation is unable to truly and radically affect human existence. Revelation would not
be transcendent.
In order to avoid the problems of act-oriented and being-oriented accounts of revelation,
Bonhoeffer argues that revelation should be understood as person rather than as subject or entity
(Seiend): “The being of revelation must, therefore, have a kind of being that satisfies the two
indicated claims [transcendence and continuity]. We understand the person and the community
to be such a kind of being.” 5 To understand Bonhoeffer’s concept of person, however, we must
understand Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, to which we now turn.
Theological Ontology: Christ as Ur-Dasein
A proper theological ontology should coordinate act and being in revelation. Revelation, for
Bonhoeffer, is equivalent to the person of Jesus Christ. And “Christ is the corporate person
[Gesamtperson] of the Christian community of faith [i.e. the church].” 6 I will explain these steps
in more detail shortly, but what is important to note here is that Bonhoeffer understands, “the
church as the unity of act and being.” 7 Understanding how a Christian is in the church then leads
to an act-being coordinated theological anthropology. And understanding the knowledge that
arises from the church provides an act-being coordinated theological epistemology. The church

3

A notable example would be the (pseudo-)Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone that Bonhoeffer calls
“cheap grace” in Discipleship: “Cheap grace means grace as doctrine, as principle, as system. It means forgiveness
of sins as a general truth”; DBWE 4: 43 (DBW 4: 29).
4
DBWE 2: 103 (DBW 2: 100). Here Bonhoeffer provides the examples of the Catholic church and the orthodox
Protestant idea of the verbal inspiration of the Bible; DBWE 2: 104 (DBW 2: 101).
5
DBWE 2: 114 (DBW 2: 111).
6
DBWE 2: 111 (DBW 2: 108).
7
DBWE 2: 109 (DBW 2: 105).
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as the present body of Christ is then Bonhoeffer’s concrete source and solution for the problem
of act and being at all three levels.
To understand how the church is the concrete solution to the problem of act and being for
Bonhoeffer, it is important to understand his more formal solution in the person of Jesus Christ
and Heidegger’s role in it. For that we turn to Bonhoeffer’s 1933 course “Lectures on
Christology.”
That Heidegger influences Bonhoeffer’s “Lectures on Christology” is not as certain as
his influence on Act and Being, primarily because Heidegger’s name never occurs in the lectures.
In addition to the methodological and conceptual resonances the lectures have with Heidegger
and Act and Being to be elucidated shortly, there are other circumstantial reasons to believe
Heidegger is still influential here. Some of this evidence leads Plant to cautiously assert that here
Heidegger is still influential; 8 though I hope to show that one need not be quite as cautious.
First, that Heidegger’s name is not used in the lectures is not an immediate refutation of his
influence. As Plant notes, Bonhoeffer was not always fastidious in his citing of secondary
sources that may or at times obviously have had an impact on his thought. 9 Second, there does
not seem to have been any appreciable change in Bonhoeffer’s thinking between Act and Being
and the lectures that would lead to significant changes in his relation to Heidegger. Third, there
are many explicit references to and uses of Heidegger in Bonhoeffer’s work between Act and
Being and the lectures. 10
8

Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” 323; see also DeJonge, “God’s Being Is in
Time,” 134n20.
9
Plant, “‘In the Sphere of the Familiar:’ Heidegger and Bonhoeffer,” 316 and 323.
10
For explicit references to Heidegger in the interim see DBWE 10: 472 (DBW 10: 445); DBWE 11: 81 (DBW 17:
102) and 244-5 (DBW 11: 214-15); and DBWE 12: 193 and 245 (DBW 12: 155 and 215). The most significant of
these is the “Thesis Fragment about M. Heidegger and E. Grisebach” which may have been connected to his 1931-2
Winter semester course “The Idea of Philosophy and Protestant Theology in the Twentieth Century”; DBWE 11:
244-5 (DBW 11: 214-15). And DBWE 12: 193 (DBW 12: 155) shows that Bonhoeffer still sees Heidegger as
representing a contemporary, dominant philosophical movement. There are also interim instances where Heidegger
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Bonhoeffer’s methodological consideration about how one properly goes about doing
Christology is the lecture’s first notable step, and one which seems to have notable resonances
with, if not a direct result of, Heidegger. Christology is, for Bonhoeffer, fundamentally about a
person, the person of Jesus Christ. This leads Bonhoeffer to reject “how” and “that” questions in
relation to Christology in favor of “who” questions. It is inappropriate to ask “how” questions:
For example, how is Christ fully divine and human without the two mixing? For Bonhoeffer,
such “how” questions attempt to understand Christ according to an already understood
classification of relationships. This would be to treat the subject matter not as a person but as a
thing (Seiend), and to place it at the disposal of human reason, i.e. it would violate the criterion
of transcendence. 11 This means that neither the natural nor the human sciences are capable of
guiding Christology since they presuppose classifications. This is in keeping with Bonhoeffer’s
adaption of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. As we saw in chapter three, Heidegger also rejected
analyzing Dasein as just another entity and the use of various positive sciences in doing so. 12
Along with rejecting “how” questions, Bonhoeffer also rejects “that” questions. Once the
Christian is provided the appropriate answers to Christological questions, it is not appropriate,
is not explicitly mentioned, but where he still seems to be informing Bonhoeffer’s various assertions. For instances
where Heidegger’s notion of history seems to inform Bonhoeffer’s, see DBWE 10: 458 (DBW 10: 43); and DBWE
11: 201, 211-12, and 233 (DBW 11: 166, 178, and 202). For an instance where Bonhoeffer makes theological use of
Heidegger’s position that theoretical knowledge arises from praxis, see DBWE 11: 283n[104] (DBW 11: 253n104).
For instances where Bonhoeffer theologically adapts Heidegger’s emphasis and unique understanding of the future,
particularly for the purposes of preaching, see DBWE 11: 240n[322] and 410-15 (DBW 11: 387-94). For an
instance where Bonhoeffer makes use of Heidegger’s thrown-projection, though Bonhoeffer does not use those
words, see DBWE 11: 253 (DBW 11: 222). For an instance of Bonhoeffer’s use of the concept of “always already”
in relation to the church, see DBWE 11: 310 (DBW 11: 280). And for the relation of creatureliness to ontological
structures, see DBWE 12: 219 (DBW 12: 184).
11
DBWE 12: 301 (DBW 12: 281).
12
SZ 45-50. See also Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 39–42, where Heidegger rejects the
methods of generalization and formalization in favor of his formal indication, which anticipates this methodological
starting point in Being and Time. It is also important to note the confessional and theological background that is
likely predisposing Bonhoeffer to appropriate this methodology. Christ as person is a Lutheran assumption, one
which Bonhoeffer accepts as the essential starting point of theology (see DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological
Formation, 68–82.) This leads Luther, as Bonhoeffer reads him, to reject what Bonhoeffer understands to be “how”
questions, which is perhaps best illustrated in Luther’s conflict with Ulrich Zwingli over the “is” (See, for example,
“That These Words of Christ, ‘This is my Body,’ etc., Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics” in LW 37.)
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from Bonhoeffer’s faithful stance, to ask “that” questions, i.e. whether such answers are true. 13
For Bonhoeffer, this is to assume that human reason can get behind or before the person of Jesus
Christ, which is again to violate the criterion of transcendence. Here Heidegger seems to have
little if any influence. This seems rather to be a comparatively straightforward theological
assumption. 14
With the rejection of “how” and “that” questions, “what we have is the question of who,
the question of being [Sein], of the essence and nature of Christ. So the Christological question is
in its essence an ontological question. Its purpose is to bring out the ontological structure of the
who.” 15 Here the resonances with Heidegger are quite apparent, nor can I think of any other
influence that would guide Bonhoeffer to conclude that asking “who” means to ask about the
ontological structures of the person of Jesus Christ. 16 This is after all the guiding methodology
of Being and Time. And as we will see the structures that form the answers to the “who” question
are explicitly distinguished, by Bonhoeffer, from “historical [historische], factual, and ontic”
answers. 17 So Bonhoeffer asks about Christ in much the same way as Heidegger asks about
Dasein.

13

DBWE 12: 304 (DBW 12: 284).
However, this would seem to be a position that Heidegger would appreciate. To ask whether “that” is true,
particularly in relation to theological and faithful matters, would assume that a stance outside the factical or
existentiell existence in which they occur could be taken to judge their truth value. This seems, in part, to be his
point when in “Phenomenology and Theology” he says, “For the ‘Christian’ faith, that being which is primarily
revealed to faith, and only to it, and which, as revelation, first gives rise to faith, is Christ, the crucified God. The
relationship of faith to the cross, determined in this way by Christ, is a Christian one. The crucifixion, however, and
all that belongs to it is a historical event, and indeed this event gives testimony to itself as such in its specifically
historical character only for faith in the scriptures. One ‘knows’ about this fact only in believing.” Heidegger,
“Phenomenology and Theology,” 44.
15
DBWE 12: 304 (DBW 12: 285); emphasis in the original.
16
Ernst-Albert Scharffenorth points to Emil Brunner’s The Mediator as the source of Bonhoeffer’s distinction
between “who” and “how” questions. There are undoubtedly strong resonances with Brunner’s The Mediator
particularly concerning critiques of objective historical questions concerning Jesus; however, the details of
Bonhoeffer’s “who” question are closer to Heidegger. See Ernst-Albert Scharffenorth, “Editor’s Afterword to the
German Edition” in DBWE 12: 489; cf. Emil Brunner, The Mediator: A Study of the Central Doctrine of the
Christian Faith, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), 232–3.
17
DBWE 12: 314 (DBW 12: 295).
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There is, however, an important shift in orientation without which Bonhoeffer’s theology
would succumb to the same problems to which philosophy and inappropriate theologies have
succumb, i.e. the reduction of revelation to human understanding. If Bonhoeffer were solely
focused on the human ability to ask “who” and receive an answer, then this again would raise the
specter of human possibility or potentiality according to which humans can understand revelation
or the person of Jesus Christ apart from a prior intervention by revelation. To avoid this,
Bonhoeffer flips the order of questioning. So the first question is not the human asking Christ
“who are you?” Rather, the first question is Christ asking the human, “Who are you, you who
can only ask about me because you have been justified and received grace through me?” 18 Only
having been addressed by Christ can one properly ask and receive the answer to basic
Christological questions. 19
Two important points come from this basic reorientation of the question. First, for
Heidegger, the preeminent being that understands, asks, and answers, is Dasein, the human
logos; for Bonhoeffer, the preeminent being is Christ, the Logos. Here, we see the first and most
important reorientation of some of Heidegger’s basic insights away from human Dasein to Christ
as the Ur-Dasein. Second, Bonhoeffer is then after the ontological structures of the person of
Jesus Christ that lie behind Christ asking, answering, and understanding human Dasein. 20
The general ontological structure that composes the person of Jesus Christ, for
Bonhoeffer, is his being-there-for-you (Dir-Dasein). Here Bonhoeffer is combining the genuine
transcendental and ontological approaches to the problem of act and being. Bonhoeffer finds in
Kant and Heidegger the conceptual means of explaining, as Bonhoeffer sees it, two core
18

DBWE 12: 305 (DBW 12: 286).
Feil makes a similar point; Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 19. Again, this is a position Heidegger
would seem to agree with; see note 14 above.
20
That Christ as Ur-Dasein is what first and fundamentally understands human Dasein will form the basis of an
important alteration of Heidegger in service of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology in the next section.
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elements of Luther’s Christology: (1) Christ’s presence in and as the church-community, and (2)
Christ as pro-me. 21 In keeping with his interpretation of the history of theology in Act and Being,
Bonhoeffer sees the history of Christology as various schools emphasizing either Christ’s
substance, being, or Dasein, or emphasizing Christ’s works, effects, or acts. 22 Christ should
rather be understood as the coordination of both, of act and being as Dir-Dasein: “And yet what
is decisive about the pro-me structure is that, with it, both the being and act of Christ are
maintained. Being-there-for-you [Dir-Da-sein] comes together with being-there-for-you [Dir-dasein]. The presence of Christ as the pro-me is his real being-for-me.” 23
Christ is simultaneously the corporate person of the church-community and the acts that
arise from the church-community. The church-community itself forms the being of Christ; while
Word and sacrament form his most important acts. Acts of the true Word and sacrament can
only occur within the church-community. Act requires being. But the church-community is only
in so far as it is the place where Word and sacrament occur. Being requires act. 24
Christ’s ontological structure of Dir-Dasein also means, for Bonhoeffer, that he mediates
and forms the center of reality. 25 There are three important domains of reality with Christ as
center and mediator: Christ is (1) being-there for humankind (Dasein für den Menschen); (2)
being-there for history (Geschichte); and (3) being-there for nature. This means that Christ is the
center of our existence, history, and nature respectively. 26 The first will be important later for
theological anthropology, and the third is not extensively dealt with or of immediate concern.
The second, Christ as Dasein for history, is immediately relevant. But to understand this
21

DBWE 12: 314 (DBW 12: 295-6).
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DBWE 12: 323 (DBW 12: 305-6).
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Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, viii.
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proposition and how Heidegger does and does not aid in its development, we need to take a step
back and look at Bonhoeffer’s development on this point.
Much of Bonhoeffer’s theological development was guided by a concern to coordinate
the then dominant, yet oppositional, theological movements of liberal theology and Barthian
dialectical theology. One can see this concern as early as 1925 in Bonhoeffer’s “Paper on the
Historical and Pneumatological Interpretation of Scripture.” 27 A primary theme in the conflict
between these movements concerned revelation’s and Christ’s relation to history and time.
Liberal theology saw Jesus as an historical person, an occurrence in time and history, and
therefore open to critical-historical study. 28 In the attempt to maintain revelation’s uniqueness
and sovereignty, Barthian dialectical theology begins by asserting a strict division between
Christ and history. 29
Here we return to the disagreement between Plant and DeJonge presented in chapter
three. As early as 1925, Bonhoeffer wants to have God in time and history. 30 Ubiquitous
statements in the lectures make this clear. For example, “It is just as impossible to ask how God
can enter into time—as if such an isolated God could exist!” 31 Yet, it cannot be that Christ is
drawn into time. This would obviously make Christ one entity among others whose being is
determined by human Dasein’s temporal nature. Having Christ drawn into time would violate
Bonhoeffer’s criterion of transcendence. Bonhoeffer prefers to say that God or Jesus Christ
enters or exists in time and history.

27

DBWE 9: 285-98 (DBW 9: 305-23).
Adolf von Harnack, “Open Letter to Professor Karl Barth,” in Adolf von Harnack: Liberal Theology at Its Height,
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Yet, there are still potential problems even when one understands God’s entrance into
time and history as a free act. God’s entering time risks either it being a disruptive entrance or
making Christ objectively available not unlike the consequences of Christ being drawn into time.
His pre-Act and Being solution, which is more act-oriented, favors the first option. For example,
in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer says that “Revelation enters time not just apparently but
actually, and precisely by so doing it bursts the form of time.” 32 And a few pages later, “Since
death as the wages of sin (Rom. 6:23) first constitutes history, so life that abides in love breaks
the continuity of the historical process.” 33 This is certainly not the pure actualism of Barthian
theology where revelation is completely atemporal. Yet, here Bonhoeffer still has difficulty
maintaining historical and temporal continuity. By Act and Being and “Lectures on Christology”
this disruptive language is dropped.
Though Christ’s entrance into time and history cannot simply be a disruptive event, it
also cannot be a by-gone objective historical event, as many liberal theologians have it. That is,
one cannot have an overly being-oriented understanding of Christ that might make him merely a
doctrine, psychic experience such as the conscience, or institution. 34 This would make Christ an
object rather than a person. As an object in history, it either continues to have an influence in
history and therefore can be understood according to human categories such as causality, or
Christ becomes an inspiring image, presumably among others, that one can recall. 35 Again, this
violates the criterion of transcendence and revelation’s ability to radically affect human
existence.
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So again, Bonhoeffer’s solution must maintain continuity and transcendence, which is
predicated on understanding the being of revelation “neither as what exists [Seiendes], as
something objective, nor as nonexisting [Nichtseiendes], as something nonobjective.” 36 The third
alternative is to understand Christ as person, 37 and person for Bonhoeffer has many of the basic
structures of Heidegger’s Dasein, at this point the most important of which is Dasein’s
temporality and historicity translated into Luther-inspired language of Christ as Dasein for
history. This is then parsed out according to the concepts of the Humiliated One, the Exalted or
Risen One, the historisch Jesus Christ that is accessible by objective historical analysis, and the
geschichtlich Jesus Christ that is only accessible by faith. 38
If Bonhoeffer intends “Dasein” in some Heideggerian sense, then we should see Christ as
the foundation of the meaning and being of history, as human Dasein is for Heidegger. 39 This is
obviously the case, for example, when Bonhoeffer says, “History finds its meaning in the
humiliation of Christ,” and “Christ is here seen to be the limit and the center of history’s
being.” 40 Here the Risen or Exalted Christ is that from which history and time arise. 41
If Bonhoeffer is adapting Heidegger’s Dasein to theological purposes, we should see
further details of that appropriation. After all, that Christ is the origin of all reality including
history is a basic position easily available to Christian theology from its own sources, such as the

36
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opening to the Gospel of John. For Heidegger, the being and meaning of an entity are
importantly determined by the entity’s position in Dasein’s temporality. I understand a dry erase
marker according to its place in the past I also carry along with me and the future projections I
press forward into, which would be different for an economist or an instructor. If Bonhoeffer is
adapting Dasein’s temporality and historicity to the person of Christ, then we should see
something at least roughly equivalent. Though this is much more evident in Bonhoeffer’s
theological anthropology and epistemology, there are signs of it here as well. History and time
live between the promise and fulfillment. 42 The promise (of the Messiah and of becoming God’s
people) is past, but not in an objective, by-gone sense; rather, “this has become a living promise
everywhere.” 43 The promise is always made present. And “history lives toward the fulfillment of
this promise alone.” 44 History is always pressing forward into the projected possibility of the
fulfillment of the promise.
This is particularly evident in Bonhoeffer’s understanding of how we gain historical
access to the person of Jesus Christ. The relation a particular entity has to this history determines
its meaning and being. This is importantly true of the historical person of Jesus Christ. The
objective historical (historisch) person of Jesus is the God-human, the Humiliated and Exalted
One. 45 However, we cannot know this based on objective history; this “historisch access” cannot
“oblige us to believe.” 46 If one could, then the person of Jesus Christ would be one objective
entity among others available to human Dasein’s understanding. Access can only be gained
through the geschichtlich Jesus. That is, we can only access this truth by participating in the
existential history (Geschichte) of Jesus. But “access through the geschichtlich Jesus is only
42
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possible through the Risen One, through the Word by which Christ resurrected bears witness to
himself.” 47 So the person of Christ or revelation is there in time and history, but his meaning and
being is determined by his own, and not human Dasein’s, temporal and historical nature.
As we will see in more detail as we move through the church to theological anthropology,
humans can access his meaning and being only based on how Christ already understands humans
and the kind of participation one has in that history. Bonhoeffer’s statement in Act and Being
that Heidegger “interprets being so much in terms of time that even God’s eternity, if it could be
at all philosophically conceived, would, in principle, have to be thought of as having been drawn
into time” is a partial or philosophical compliment. 48 In keeping with Bonhoeffer’s reorientation
of the best philosophy for theological purposes, he applies the best understandings of human
Dasein, applies them to Christ, and makes Christ the origin of those elements. Christ’s being
already is temporal. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that Christ acts to place human Dasein
into Christ’s temporality, associated with Dasein in Christ, or to leave human Dasein in the sinful
temporality, associated with Dasein in Adam. If human Dasein participates in Christ’s
temporality, then the Christian sees the geschichtlich Jesus in the historisch Jesus and the union
of the Humiliated and Exalted One. If human Dasein participates in ‘Adam’s’ temporality, then
human Dasein only sees the historisch Jesus.49
The church has this same temporal and historical structure. 50 It should. The person of
Jesus Christ, for Bonhoeffer, exists concretely as the church-community, which is a corporate
person (Gesamtperson). This will also form the necessary step for Bonhoeffer to answer the
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problem of act and being at the anthropological level since the Christian concretely participates
in the church and the Christian’s being is determined by such participation.
The church is defined as the place where the proclamation of Christ, as preaching or the
Word and sacrament, are ‘present’ (Gegenwart). As with Heidegger, however, this present is not
something that arrived from the future and will soon become past. In the section “The Kind of
Being of Revelation in the Church,” Bonhoeffer immediately defines the church using the
structure of thrown-projection and the language of temporality explained in chapter three.
Because this temporal explanation of the proclamation has not had much impact in secondary
literature it deserves to be quoted in full:
What is past, as ‘having happened’, is essentially caught up ‘in its context’, unless the
proclamation ‘coming to’ us (‘in the future’) raises it up into the present. In the concept
of contingency, as the occurrence that comes to us from outside, the present is determined
by the future […] It may be said of Christian revelation that the proclamation of cross and
resurrection, determined by eschatology and predestination, and the occurrence effective
within that proclamation, lift even the past into the present, or paradoxically, into
something ‘in the future’. It follows from this that the Christian revelation must not be
interpreted as ‘having happened’, but that for those human beings living in the church, in
each present, this once-and-for-all occurrence is qualified as future. 51
Bonhoeffer, in a footnote, says, “This might be a starting-point for a distinctively Christian
philosophy of time in contrast to the concept of time as something reckoned by motion.” 52
The opening lines of the above quotation are particularly important for locating
Bonhoeffer between or beyond liberal and dialectical theology, for his coordination of act and
being in the church, and for demonstrating his reliance on temporality. Apart from participation
in the church, the past appears as “having happened” and determined by “its context.” The past
appears to be something objectively available. But, contrary to this liberal theological position, it
“must not be interpreted as ‘having happened’.” For a Christian in the church, the only place
51
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where theology may be properly practiced, the act of the proclamation comes to the Christian
from the future. 53 It is a contingent act, as Barth would have it, but it is temporal; it is made
present from the future. This futural proclamation simultaneously lifts the past into the present,
“or paradoxically, into something ‘in the future’.” The proclamation is temporally extended.
Because the church just is the place where Christ performs this temporally extended
proclamation, the church too is temporal.
Again, one might be tempted to simply assert that Bonhoeffer is strictly appealing to the
Christian tradition, particularly its eschatological themes. If so, one might expect it in Santorum
Communio prior to encountering Heidegger; however, this temporal understanding is not present
there. Nor is this temporal understanding of the church and revelation an option in any of
Bonhoeffer’s other influential sources such as Barth or Holl. Bonhoeffer’s language does,
however, bear a striking resemblance to Heidegger’s: “Just as the Present arises in the unity of
the temporalizing of temporality out of the future and having been, the horizon of a Present
temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and of having been.” 54 Or,
emphasizing the future as Bonhoeffer does, “Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes
itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all
awakens the Present.” 55
Bonhoeffer closes this section, “The Kind of Being of Revelation in the Church,” with a
summation of the successes at the problem of act and being for an ontology of revelation, or
53
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theology proper. 56 Transcendence is maintained by making Christ and the church-community
neither a being or entity (Seiend) nor a pure acting subject, but rather a person who initiates the
act (the Kantian, Lutheran Dir of the Dir-Dasein in the “Lectures on Christology), drawing
human Dasein into its being, understood as the church-community (the Heideggerian, Lutheran
Dasein of the Dir-Dasein). 57 Making the appropriate Lutheran alteration to Kant, the boundary
that maintains the transcendence of Christ is established by the being of revelation or Christ
itself, and can only be crossed by Christ’s free act. As we will see in the next section, for
Bonhoeffer, one cannot even know that such a boundary exists between human Dasein and
Christ until Christ has crossed the boundary for you. Following Heidegger, the continuity of
revelation is maintained by making it temporally extended; the temporal extension that maintains
continuity is then not simply a matter of eternity or being in time, but being the very basis for
(Christian) time. And this revelation exists concretely as the church, which is, as will be
developed further in subsequent sections, the world ‘in’ which Christians exist and from which
theological knowledge arises, much like Heidegger’s initial appeal to first turn to actual lived
experience.
Theological Anthropology: Human Dasein in Christ as the Church
Bonhoeffer’s solution to the problem of act and being for theological anthropology is particularly
complicated, comprising a portion of Part B, “The Kind of Being of Human Beings in the
Church,” and all of Part C, “The Problem of Act and Being in the Concrete Teaching concerning
Human Beings ‘in Adam’ and ‘in Christ.’” Bonhoeffer’s anthropology is so complicated because
he must distinguish between sinful (in Adam) and faithful (in Christ) existences. His distinction,
however, is not merely between different modes or modifications of human Dasein; that is, being
56
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in Adam and in Christ are not, for Bonhoeffer, founded on shared existential structures. They are
different kinds of being (Seinsarten). 58 This makes maintaining continuity at the anthropological
level that much more difficult. Not only must Bonhoeffer maintain the ‘internal’ continuity of
Christian existence, but he must maintain that existence’s continuity with sinful existence while
at the same time maintaining a strong distinction between the two. Though much of the details of
Bonhoeffer’s anthropology, particularly for ‘in Christ’, are developed in opposition to
Heidegger, Heidegger is important for existence in Adam and for maintaining continuity across
these two kinds of existences.
In keeping with the nested layers of the problem of act and being, human Dasein’s being
(the anthropological level) is determined by its relation to revelation, the person of Jesus Christ,
or the church (theology proper). Existence (Existenz) is defined according to whether or not it is
encountered by Christ. 59 Pati, being acted upon, is what determines human Dasein. This then
begins Bonhoeffer’s general coordination of act and being at the anthropological level based on
his theological ontology of revelation. Adapting his understanding of Heidegger from Part A, 60
Bonhoeffer, in part, understands the person of Jesus Christ as a decision to act or not act upon
human Dasein in order to place it in the being of the church, particularly through the Word
(preaching) and sacrament. 61 This act presupposes already being determined as being in the
church. One must already be in the church to be acted upon. 62
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From this determination by Christ, human Dasein then has its corresponding and
coordinated act and being. The Christian already is in the church. From this arises the Christian’s
act of faith; “Faith invariably discovers itself already in the church.” 63 Yet, being in the church
already presupposes the act of faith. 64 Bonhoeffer summarizes this coordination of act and being
between the theological and anthropological levels as follows: “I am borne (pati), therefore I am
(esse), therefore I believe (agere). Here the circle closes. Here even the agere is pati.” 65
It is important to bear in mind that this coordination is equally true of non-Christian
existence. Not being acted upon means not being a Christian and therefore not believing. This, in
part, informs Bonhoeffer’s position that sinful, in-Adam existence and faithful, in-Christ
existence are distinct kinds of being rather than merely different modifications of existential
structures common to both.
Since here the transcendental and ontological approaches come together in the
sociological category, the existence of human beings is understood to be by nature as
much in decision as ‘already in Christ (or in Adam)’. Even though faith is act, as an
expression of being in the church of Christ it encompasses the totality of Dasein in Christ,
just as unfaith, as an expression of being in Adam, encompasses the totality of the old
Dasein. Faith knows that it comes upon its decision as one already made. Just as unfaith
is no individual psychic act, but rather a mode of being [Seinsweise] in the old humanity,
so on the same basis faith is to be seen as a mode of being [Seinsweise] in the church of
Christ, as it is seen as an act. 66
Here we see unfaith as a mode of being related to the kind of being of in-Adam existence. This is
separate from the faith as a mode of being equally intimately tied to in-Christ existence.
Bonhoeffer must make a comparatively (vis-à-vis Heidegger and Bultmann) strong
distinction between these two kinds of existences given some of his other presuppositions. If
there were not this strong distinction, then it would mean, as it does for Bultmann and
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Heidegger, that the existential structures of Dasein are unaffected by revelation. 67 This would
make such existential structures the mediators of revelation, much like Holl’s conscience. This
would, among other things, challenge the necessary, for Bonhoeffer, understanding of revelation
as a transcendent event. Rather, for Bonhoeffer, “in the existentiell event of revelation, the
existential structure of Dasein is touched and changed. There is no second mediator, not even the
existential structure of Dasein. For revelation, the ontic-existentiell and ontological-existential
structures coincide.” 68 There are then important, basic ontological differences between being in
Adam and being in Christ, to which we now turn.
For Bonhoeffer, being in Adam is the more ontologically pointed and biblically based
term for being a sinner (esse peccator). 69 Bonhoeffer’s intent is to locate sin at both the
existential and existentiell levels. To do so he creates the technical distinction between Dasein
and Wiesein (how-being). Though Wiesein is not directly taken from Heidegger, it is structurally
similar to Heidegger’s ontic/existentiell level. “In theological terms, it would mean that the
sinner remains creature, that ‘Da’-sein as creature lies at the foundation of how [‘Wie’] one
ontically is as a sinner.” 70 Exactly why Bonhoeffer develops this new term, Wiesein, is unclear.
It may be that Bonhoeffer wants to maintain Heidegger’s distinction between ontic/existentiell
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and ontological/existential, but provide himself a terminological route for presenting these two
levels as reciprocally influential.
What we do get from the above quotation is Bonhoeffer’s position that sin involves the
entire human being as both Dasein and Wiesein. This begins his coordination of act and being in
being in Adam. First, Bonhoeffer must reject understanding sin as merely free, contingent acts.
“If sin were no more than a free act of the particular moment, a retreat to sinless being would in
principle be possible.” 71 Thinking of sin as an act that one may or may not freely commit would
not be consistent with Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran concern to understand sin as something
inescapable by human means. It would also threaten the continuity of sinful existence. One
would only be a sinner once in awhile in committing such acts.
Sin also cannot be understood as an entity. Seeing sin as a pretemporal act of rebellion,
psychologizing it, or naturalizing original sin all count, for Bonhoeffer, as seeing sin as an entity.
Understanding sin as strictly located in one, more, or even in the entirety of the existential
structures would also seem to be an instance of this limited view of sin. As an entity, it is
possible to take an objective, disinterested view of it. Sin can be in the power of human
understanding, and therefore does not affect human existence. 72
Sin must be located both in the human’s being (Dasein) and the human’s acts (Wiesein).
More particularly, and following Bonhoeffer’s common maneuvers, sin as an act must
simultaneously arise from a sinful being and be that which places one in that sinful being. For inAdam existence, then, sin is determinative of its Dasein, Wiesein, and the relation between the
two. Sin is the violation of one’s Dasein by one’s Wiesein. 73 Human Dasein is and should be
understood as a creature coram Deo (before God). However, sinful acts (Wiesein), which repeat
71
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Adam’s original sin, violate Dasein; Dasein in Adam becomes both creature and creator. 74 It sees
itself as determinative of reality. But this particular Wiesein already arises from sinful Dasein in
Adam. Here both the continuity and transcendence, i.e. that one is actually affected by sin, is
maintained. One is always already in a condition of sin; yet one is also always culpable for that
condition because one’s own acts have created that condition.
This may work well for the individual, but Bonhoeffer’s goals are more ambitious; his
concern is not merely to coordinated sinful act and sinful being for the individual, but for
humanity as a whole as well. Bonhoeffer’s answer is to, yet again, turn to his concept of person;
more particularly to see Adam as both individual and community, as ‘I’ and humanity. Every
individual is both an individual and “the one person of humanity, Adam.” 75 When an individual
commits an act of sin, it is Adam’s first free and contingent act of sin occurring again and again.
Yet, because it is always humanity as Adam committing this act, there is a continuous being
underlying the act. Bonhoeffer seems to be equating Adam as humanity with Dasein, those
structures universally constitutive of human existence; while Wiesein is equated with how the
individual as Adam concretely acts from those universal structures: “In the knowledge of my
being-a-sinner as an individual, I see my Dasein is in the power of my Wiesein; I cannot know it
in its creaturely being [i.e. as a being dependent on God]. In the knowledge of my being-a-sinner
as humanity, I see my sinful Dasein as the basis of my Wiesein.” 76 Each act is always Adam’s
first act of sin creating the being of Adam, placing the individual in the being in Adam. Yet, the
being of Adam is constantly there underlying each act.
Bonhoeffer then outlines the basic features of being in Adam. Such features are guilt,
death, conscience, anxiety, and temptation (Anfechtung). Here, Bonhoeffer seems, in part, to be
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providing a Lutheran re-reading of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, which firmly places both
authentic and inauthentic existences in being in Adam. 77 In what seems like an obvious reference
to Heidegger, Bonhoeffer begins, “The everydayness of human beings in Adam is guilt.” 78 This
is not Heidegger’s notion of guilt, but rather the constant decision for solitude, a flight both from
Christ and the proper social relations that arise from a relation to Christ. When Dasein in Adam
becomes aware of this solitude and guilt, the conscience arises. 79
The conscience is that final phenomena that results in either explicit self-justification, a
higher order of the cor curvum in se, or in the transition to being in Christ. In conscience, guilt
and death are revealed causing anxiety, when the world presses in on human beings and becomes
too ‘narrow’. 80 Here sinful self-justifying conscience reincorporates such phenomena into itself. 81
It makes death a future event rather than a constant condition. Here, again, Bonhoeffer
inaccurately ascribes the former view of death to Heidegger, 82 when, in fact, an accurate
understanding of Heidegger may have helped Bonhoeffer explain his view of death. 83 Such a
conscience may also take its guilt upon itself leading to self-condemnation and active
repentance; the intention, according to Bonhoeffer, is to exonerate oneself apart from Christ. 84
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This form of conscience is still then a fleeing from Christ into the self. It is the final attempt of
the cor curvum in se to maintain itself.
In contrast, at this point when the conscience arises, Christ may choose to assail the
person through Anfechtungen (trials, temptations, or assaults). This reveals to Dasein in Adam its
guilt, but from outside. It also reveals death, not as an event, but that one is already dead.
Because this process is initiated by Christ from outside, one is freed from the cor curvum in se
and able to be directed at Christ (actus directus). 85 In being so directed, human Dasein finds that
it is already being in Christ, in the church; here act and being presuppose one another again and
are coordinated.
With the transition from being in Adam to being in Christ, the old human being has died
and a new one arisen. 86 How this occurs involves a change in the human being as both Dasein
and Wiesein. How one concretely is (Wiesein) no longer involves the act of turning inwards
(cor curvum in se), of seeing oneself as both creature and creator; now one’s being (Dasein) is
determined by the act of contemplating Christ (Wiesein). 87 How one actually is (Wiesein), then,
does not involve a violation of one’s Dasein.
In keeping with Bonhoeffer’s reorientation of Heidegger and Kant, it is important,
however, that the Christian is not the initiator of this transition. The Christian is only able to be
directed at Christ because of Christ’s initial act placing the Christian in Christ’s being; the
Christian becomes an ‘object’ of Christ’s contemplation in the church. 88 That the Christian
becomes an ‘object’ of Christ’s contemplation is important. Human beings do not lose their
sinful existence in entering the church and Christ. They are always simul justus et peccator
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(simultaneously justified and sinner); however, the Christian is seen as justified by Christ. This is
not dissimilar from, and could have some roots in, Heidegger’s explication of the relationship
between Dasein and entities such as equipment. The being of a hammer or dry erase marker is
seen in a particular way in part according to its place in Dasein’s projects and temporality. The
being of human beings is either in Adam or in Christ depending on how Christ sees the human as
participating in his, especially the church’s, temporality.
With this new kind of being, being in Christ, comes a new temporality, a “temporality of
faith,” which one must avoid freezing. 89 (The implication, I think, is that one should favor
Heideggerian temporality over Scheler’s static account. 90) Referencing the temporality of the
church explained above, Bonhoeffer says that “being in Christ, as historical, is also defined by
past and future.” 91 Since theological anthropology is dependent on theological ontology, this
naturally follows. Bonhoeffer provides two sections to account for the temporality of theological
anthropology’s being in Christ: “The Definition of Being in Christ through the Past: The
Conscience” and “The Definition of Being in Christ through the Future: The Child.”
Here in his temporal account of theological anthropology, Bonhoeffer is, as always,
guided by his concern to coordinated act and being. Additionally and in particular, he is guided
by his concern to explain and bring together two Lutheran concepts: The Christian as a new
creation and as simul justus et peccator (simultaneously justified and sinner). Earlier in Part B,
Bonhoeffer criticized both Barth and Bultmann for their inability to combine the two. 92 Barth can
maintain the new creation or the “new existence,” but at the expense of continuity of the “total
I”; Barth cannot account for the Christian as simul justus et peccator. Bultmann can maintain the
89

DBWE 2: 153 (DBW 2: 153).
For evidence that Heidegger also saw a unique temporality for faith, see Heidegger, The Phenomenology of
Religious Life, 73.
91
DBWE 2: 155 (DBW 2: 154).
92
DBWE 2: 98-101 (DBW 2: 94-7).
90

201

continuity of the “total I,” but only at the expense of the new existence. How can Bonhoeffer
describe the Christian both as simul justus et peccator and as a new creation? The Christian must
be a new creation in so far as Bonhoeffer sharply distinguishes between being in Adam and
being in Christ. Yet, the Christian must also be simul justus et peccator in so far as there is
continuity between being in Adam and being in Christ.
The answer is a complex culmination of much of Bonhoeffer’s work. A brief summation
of what has preceded might then be in order. First, these questions and answers are a matter of
theological anthropology, but as we have seen anthropology depends on theology proper or
theological ontology. That is, human existence, for Bonhoeffer, must be understood concretely
as existence in Adam or existence in Christ, both of which are determined by one’s relation to
Christ or revelation. So the answers that follow presuppose that the Christian already finds
herself the recipient of Christ’s act and simultaneously participating in Christ’s being. Second,
this point is also important because all other attempts to understand human beings, both
philosophical (Kant and Heidegger) and theological (Barth and Bultmann) have begun from the
human, which traps such attempts into assuming, whether explicitly or implicitly, that it is a
human act or possibility that maintains continuity. For Bonhoeffer, it is not the human being that
maintains continuity; Christ does. The more appropriate question would then be: How does
Christ maintain the continuity of the new creation and the simul?
The best way to understand how Bonhoeffer maintains the continuity of being in Adam
and being in Christ is to see the way in which Heidegger and Kant function in Bonhoeffer’s
Lutheran understanding of confession or penance. Confession is that concrete act, which must
occur in the church (being), where the Christian conscience looks at and repents for the
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Christian’s “past in Adam.” 93 In this act of confession, the human being in Adam dies to the new
existence in faith. 94 This is not a human act, however; “they do not give themselves death but, in
faith, see themselves given into death by Christ.” 95 If it were the case that humans were the
primary actors in confession, then it would be just an instance of the self-justifying conscience of
being in Adam. Here, Bonhoeffer utilizes the theological alteration of Kantian transcendentalism
where Christ, rather than human reason or understanding, is the primary actor.
For Bonhoeffer, confession is also the daily making present and dying to one’s past in
Adam. Here Bonhoeffer is utilizing the theological appropriation of Heidegger’s temporality
and thrown-projection. This is how Bonhoeffer is able to maintain the continuity of being in
Adam and being in Christ, or the simul. Conscience, which is operative in confession, is that
which reveals sin. Technically, however, “the human being in Christ is no longer governed by
sin, [therefore] conscience is something defined by the past in Adam.” 96 So, confession is
concerned with one’s past sin, one’s past being in Adam. Here the Christian, as being in Christ,
is participating in the temporality of the church explained above. As such, ‘past’ does not mean
done with or by-gone, but that which is constantly made present. In the act of confession, which
again must occur in the being of the church, the Christian’s past in Adam is made present in light
of a future directed at Christ: “Those over whom the future of Christ has triumphed in faith must
daily die the death of that past anew with open eyes […] Thus being in Christ—which when
defined by the past is the reflection, taking place in faith, of repenting and dying—is taken up
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and determined by the future; and this future is holiness and life.” 97 Because the Christian is
presently seeing the past in Adam in light of the future in Christ, sin is not seen as sin by either
Christ or the Christian; the Christian sees “sin within the forgiveness through Christ.” 98
While the simul is provided by the past made present, the new creation is provided by the
future made present. “In faith the future is present; but inasmuch as faith suspends itself before
the future […], the human being ‘is’ in the future of Christ.” 99 While confession was the
operative ‘sacrament’ of being in Christ from the perspective of the past, baptism is, for
Bonhoeffer, the relevant sacrament of being in Christ from the perspective of the future. 100
“Baptism is the call [act of the church] to the human being into childhood, a call that can be
understood only eschatologically,” that is from the future. 101 This admittedly seems an odd
choice; baptism seems to lie in the Christian’s objective past. Part of the answer to this comes
with its connection to confession, which addresses another problem below, but for now it is
important to baptism’s relation to the church. Baptism is the sacrament that places one in the
church. It is the church’s, and therefore Christ’s, act that places the Christian into Christ’s
temporality. That temporality is primarily futural: “Home is the community of Christ [the
church], always ‘future’, present ‘in faith’ because we are children of the future.” 102 The true
meaning of baptism then lies in the future. Again, this future is not something one can mark off
on a calendar. It is projection forward, directing oneself, to Christ; it is a future in the present:
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“This is the new creation of the new human being of the future, which is an event already
occurring in faith, and there perfected for view.” 103
There still seems to be a lingering problem. How is the continuity of the new creation
with the simul justus et peccator maintained? The temporal coordination of past, present, and
future seems to occur in both, but by different means particularly in so far as one is associated
with confession and the other baptism. Bonhoeffer does not seem to directly address this.
Perhaps because of his confessional commitments he thought the explanation I will offer was
more or less obvious. The key, I believe, is recognizing the relationship that confession and
baptism have to one another according to Luther. For Luther, confession is not an independent
sacrament in itself, but the renewal of baptism; it is the continual, daily reliving of baptism. 104
With this ‘one’ sacrament these two central concepts of theological anthropology are joined.
As I understand it, the general temporal picture looks something like the following for
Bonhoeffer. First and foremost, Christ and the church are oriented towards the future. They press
forward, understand the present and past, according to the promised, complete correction of the
corrupted creation caused by Adam. The Christian, as necessarily determined by and
participating in Christ’s temporality, does so as well. This future is anticipated in the present. 105
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And this future is predicated on the past corruption of Adam. Because the future is anticipated in
the present and predicated on the past, the past in Adam is pulled to up to the present. Every sin
‘now’ is Adam’s original sin. For theological anthropology, because the Christian lives at the
temporal juncture of these ecstases, they are determined by both. The Christian always already
finds itself thrown into an in-Adam past. Insofar as a Christian actually is a Christian, they have
undergone baptism where Christ has placed the individual into his corporate person, the church,
such that the individual shares in the corporate future. The individual and the community have
died to their past being in Adam through Christ’s future granted by baptism. Yet this is not fully
consummated. It is necessary to continually kill the in-Adam past, to reaffirm, through
confession, what occurred through baptism.
Theological Epistemology: Ecclesial Knowing
Again, given the nested nature of the conceptual levels of theological ontology, anthropology,
and epistemology, we should expect Bonhoeffer to deal with the problem of act and being at the
epistemological level and that Heidegger should play some positive role there as well. Both
expectations are met, and as one might expect by now, Bonhoeffer creates some rather complex
conceptual divisions to address the problem for theological epistemology.
For Bonhoeffer, there are three forms of knowing, the last of which is further split into
two additional divisions: There are unbelieving, existentiell, and ecclesial forms of knowing. 106
The German editors make an important mistake here that is compounded by the English
translation and that requires explicit correction. 107 In the German edition, Bonhoeffer says
“Dieses Wissen hat theologisch eine dreifache Gestalt, als ungläubiges, als existentielles und als
are again made the primary actors; for example, see DBWE 1: 222 (DBW 1: 151); DBWE 15: 302 (DBW 15: 299);
and DBWE 6: 57 (DBW 6: 42-3). This also risks mistaking temporality and objective time. One could potentially
objectively measure time according to a human estimation of the progress made towards a future state of perfection.
106
DBWE 2: 124-5 (DBW 2: 122).
107
I thank Michael DeJonge for pointing out to me much of what follows concerning the four types of knowing.
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kirchliches Wissen, deren Explikation erst später vorgenommen werden kann.” 108 The German
edition notes that “ungläubig” should be “gläubig.” 109 Following this suggestion, the English
edition translates this as “Theologically this knowing has three forms: as believing, as
existentiell, and as ecclesial.” 110 Part of the justification for this ‘correction’ is Bonhoeffer’s
relisting of these forms a page later. In the English edition, “We must first distinguish among
three distinct ways of knowing and the concepts that correspond to three sociologically different
functions of the church: the believing [glaubende], the preaching [predigende], and the
theological [theologische] ways of knowing, of which the first may be called the existential [sic]
[existentielle] and the other two ‘ecclesial [kirchliche] knowing’.” 111 If one pays close attention
to Bonhoeffer’s distinctions, one sees that there are four, not three, forms of knowing, and that
there is indeed a “parallelism” between the two lists. 112 First, there is “unbelieving” knowledge.
This makes sense because being in Adam must have some epistemic relation to theological
matters. Being in Adam does not believe. Second, there is “believing” knowledge, which “may
be called existentiell” (not existential as the translation has it). 113 Then there is “ecclesial”
knowing, which is then further divided into preaching and theology.
The primary ‘object’ of knowledge Bonhoeffer is concerned with is fairly specific: “The
object of faith is the person of Christ preached in the community of faith.” 114 From this primary
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DBW 2: 122.
DBW 2: 122n58.
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DBWE 2: 126 (DBW 2: 123); emphasis in the original.
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DBWE 2: 124-5n[67]. Tietz gets the four part division of Bonhoeffer’s types of knowing correct, and her account
of Bonhoeffer’s theological epistemology is, in general and by my estimation, the best; Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers
Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft, 273.
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In fact, the English edition often mistranslates existentiell as existential.
114
DBWE 2: 126 (DBW 2: 123). Heidegger makes a comparable statement in Heidegger, “Phenomenology and
Theology,” 44: “For the ‘Christian’ faith, that being which is primarily revealed to faith, and only to it, and which,
as revelation, first gives rise to faith, is Christ, the crucified God. The relationship of faith to the cross, determined
in this way by Christ, is a Christian one. The crucifixion, however, and all that belongs to it is a historical event, and
109

207

object of knowledge then arise other objects unique to faith: “Thus in faith is disclosed a new
sphere of knowledge and objects.” 115 Again, Bonhoeffer positions himself between or beyond
two alternative epistemologies that do not, as he sees it, appropriately understand the unique
nature of the person of Christ as the central object of faith. If revelation, as Barth has it, is nonobjective, a non-entity (Nichtseiend), then it is impossible for faith to be directed towards
revelation. With nothing else to be directed at, one can only reflect on one’s own faith. 116 With
this, one is again trapped in the cor curvum in se. Yet, revelation also cannot be an entity, an
object in the usual sense. It cannot simply be a doctrine, an institution, or the objective historical
human Jesus of Nazareth. Again, human reason and understanding could then understand
revelation on its own terms. Potentially, one would not even need faith to access revelation.
Again, revelation must be understood as person. The person is “the point of unity of the
transcendental and the ontological approaches to knowledge.” 117 The person, particularly as
Christ for Bonhoeffer, is knowable or haveable, but not in the usual sense of an object that is
simply there to be known. 118 The person is knowable only in the person’s self-giving act. 119 This
maintains the epistemological transcendence of the person because the person acts from outside.
Because it is a free act from outside, it is the person that sets the epistemological limit from
outside. This self-giving act creates a corresponding alteration in the being of human Dasein.
Dasein is in faith or Christ, from which the act of believing arises. 120

indeed this event gives testimony to itself as such in its specifically historical character only for faith in the
scriptures. One ‘knows’ about this fact only in believing.”
115
DBWE 2: 127 (DBW 2: 125). Heidegger makes similar statements in “Phenomenology and Theology,” 44–5.
116
DBWE 2: 125 (DBW 2: 122).
117
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 125).
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DBWE 2: 127 (DBW 2: 124-5).
119
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 125).
120
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 126).
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As one may already guess simply from Bonhoeffer’s terminology, Heidegger plays an
important role here as well, one which follows the important insight Bonhoeffer appropriates
from Heidegger that epistemology is dependent on anthropology. This means that being in
Adam and being in Christ must have distinct ways of knowing arising from their distinct
existences. From being in sin or Adam arises the existentiell way of knowing as unbelieving in
relation to Christian matters. From being in faith or Christ arises the existentiell way of knowing
as believing in relation to Christian matters. 121 Here we see Bonhoeffer both using and altering
Heidegger for his own theological purposes. For Heidegger, what Bonhoeffer labels being in
Adam and being in Christ would be existentiell modifications of more fundamental existential
structures; however, these are separate kinds of existences and are, therefore, better understood,
for Bonhoeffer, as existential. All knowing that arises from these distinct kinds of existence are
then existentiell, as Bonhoeffer consistently makes this distinction in this section. 122
In Christian believing, one “know[s] oneself overcome and pardoned by the person of
Christ in the preached word.” 123 From this comes knowledge of other faithful matters, such as the
beliefs that Christ is present in the sacrament or that confession is efficacious in justifying the
Christian. Here, believing or faith as the act of knowing is the simple actus directus (direct
act). 124 The Christian simply believes. 125 There is no reflection on one’s faith, no reflection on the
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This is an important position underlying Discipleship as well; for example see DBWE 4: 51 (DBW 4: 38); see
also Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 20–1.
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That the English translation often translates “existentiell” as “existential” in this and other sections makes this
distinction more difficult to detect. This also means that when DeJonge labels faith, for Bonhoeffer, as “implicit,
existential knowledge” he is half right. All knowledge, for Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, is existentiell. All knowledge
is predicated on the particular way human Dasein is in the world. Believing is an “implicit” or pre-theoretical way of
knowing, while theology is an “explicit” or theoretical way of knowing. See DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological
Formation, 79–81; DeJonge, “God’s Being Is in Time,” 130.
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DBWE 2: 126 (DBW 2: 123).
124
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 126).
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Though there are some detailed points of disagreement between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer on this point, there is
notable agreement. For example, when Heidegger says, “Thus faith understands itself only in believing. In any case,
the believer does not come to know anything about his specific existence, for instance, by way of a theoretical
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entities of faith, such as baptism or communion. Here the Kantian “in reference to the
transcendent” and the Heideggerian ready-to-hand (zuhanden) knowledge are joined. In the
faithful act of knowing in reference to Christ, Christ becomes Christ. 126 Or, according to the
terminology of the “Lectures on Christology,” the historisch Jesus becomes the geschichtlich
Jesus by which the Christian can know Christ as both the Humiliated and Exalted One. 127 The
Christian then knows implicitly, unreflectively the meaning of Christ and the ecclesial
accoutrements that come along with such knowledge. 128 As Tietz correctly notes, though without
explicitly referencing Heidegger, the implicit “everydayness” of this type of knowledge allows
the Christian to be directed to Christ without having to be always consciously focused on
Christ. 129
Understanding believing-knowledge in this way helps to maintain the transcendental
uniqueness of revelation, as that which cannot be fully grasped by human understanding. The
intentionality of believing is, according to Bonhoeffer, by definition directed solely at Christ or
revelation; as soon as it reflects on itself it is no longer faith. 130 Faith and its ‘object’, Christ as
that which stands against (Gegen-stand) the ‘I’ , cannot be pulled into human reason and
understanding. 131
At this point, it is important to deal with a criticism Tietz has of Bonhoeffer’s position on
theological epistemology. As she notes, Bonhoeffer rejects the theological proposition that “like

confirmation of his inner experiences. Rather, he can only ‘believe’ this possibility of existence as one which the
Dasein concerned does not independently master.” Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” 44.
126
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 126).
127
DBWE 12: 330-1 (DBW 12: 314).
128
This is, of course, all predicated on being placed in a new ‘world’, the church, by Christ. Though Bonhoeffer
does not explicate or analyze Heidegger’s concept of “world” in any detail, the relation of the church to being in
Christ to believing is structurally similar to Heidegger’s relation of world to the being of Dasein to knowledge and
follows Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger to explain epistemology’s dependence on anthropology.
129
Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft, 281.
130
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 126).
131
DBWE 2: 126 (DBW 2: 123-4).
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can only by known by like.” 132 There are two general options for understanding this proposition.
The first option is that there remains some post-lapsarian likeness between human beings and
God’s being sufficient for allowing humans to know God. The second option is that an essential
component of God’s granting a Christian grace or faith is God’s imparting Christ or the Holy
Spirit to the Christian and that it is really Christ or the Holy Spirit within the Christian that
knows God for the Christian. 133 The former is clearly rejected by Bonhoeffer. 134 It is not
immediately clear whether Bonhoeffer is successful in rejecting the latter. His preferred position
is that “unlike is known by unlike”: “Because it is ‘in Christ’, Dasein is ‘in reference to’ Christ.
But because here untruth is placed into truth, unlike is known by unlike […] unlike gives itself to
be known by unlike: Christ, the crucified and risen one, gives Christ’s own self to be known by
human beings, who live to themselves. It is in being known by God that human beings know
God.” 135 As Tietz points out, however, there are times when Bonhoeffer falls back on Barthian
language that seems to presuppose that “like is only known by like.” For example, Bonhoeffer
says that “God gives the divine self in Christ to the community of faith and to every individual as
member of this community of faith. This happens in such a way that the acting subject in the
community of faith, proclaiming and believing, is Christ.” 136 It is difficult to reconcile such
statements with Bonhoeffer’s rejection of the Barthian position, but it is worth taking a closer
look at what Bonhoeffer seems to intend in his alternative position and that position’s
Heideggerian elements.
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As Bonhoeffer understands the Barthian position, it is predicated on a strict division
between unlike subjects. 137 Through his adaptation of Heideggerian Dasein, Bonhoeffer,
however, wants to undercut the question of how unlike subjects can know each other. 138 Rather,
the point for Bonhoeffer is that the person of Christ encounters the Christian in the church
thereby placing the Christian in a world, in the Heideggerian sense, in which the Christian does
know the person of Christ. It may still be that Bonhoeffer must rely on Barthian language.
Bonhoeffer does want to avoid the other extreme alternative Barth is countering, i.e. that there is
some possibility in human existence that allows for human knowledge of God apart from God’s
intervention. So it is likely that Barth’s formulation must remain in some guise; however,
Bonhoeffer’s deeper point is that, as Tietz references, 139 that God first intervenes in human
existence—unlike humans are known first by unlike God—which thereby affects the human’s
total existence. This creates human existence anew within the church. Within this new ecclesial
world, the human ‘subject’ is given the ability to know God.
One presupposition that leads to Barth’s failure here, according to Bonhoeffer, is the
presupposition that the act of faith must be atemporal. 140 Yet, faith is “a temporal act” for
Bonhoeffer, and as such must have some relation to the continuity of faithful existence. 141 Faith
is primarily futurally directed, specifically at the futural fulfillment of the Christian promise;
however, as we have seen at the other conceptual levels, there must be an intimate connection of
futural projection to the present. 142
137
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Here preaching, as the first form of ecclesial knowing, enters. The ‘object’ of faith is,
again, “Christ preached in the community of faith.” 143 Faith is created by Christ acting through
the sermon or word (and sacrament). 144 As a way of knowing, preaching’s object is “the word of
proclamation to the community of faith” made “hic et nunc” (here and now). 145 The purpose of
preaching is then to create future-oriented believing now, in the present, and here in the church.
The direction or intentionality of preaching-knowledge is reflexive (actus reflexus).
Because preaching requires reflection on the content of the proclamation made to the church, it
risks making revelation into an object or entity under the control of human understanding; in
other words, it is under the constant threat of succumbing to the cor curvum in se. What saves
preaching for Bonhoeffer is its communal nature, its dependence on the being of the church. The
preacher acts from the office of preaching, an office arising from the church that is the present
body of Christ. 146 Therefore, the preacher, for Bonhoeffer, is not acting as an individual, but
rather Christ and the community are acting through the preacher. 147 In act-being terms, the being
of the individual as preacher is created by, lies within, Christ as the church. All acts arising from
that being are then similarly created from Christ as the church.
Preachers must obviously reflect on the content of that which they preach. The preacher
must guide the present message of the sermon according to the “memory of the church.” 148
Theology is the church’s memory. From this memory, theology forms dogmas with the aim of

knowing of preaching is no longer the already spoken [past] word but the one to be spoken just now [present] to this
community of faith” (DBWE 2: 133); and “Its [theology’s] object is all the happenings held in remembrance in the
Christian community of faith” (DBWE 2: 130).
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DBWE 2: 126 (DBW 2: 123).
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213

guiding preaching. 149 Preaching, therefore, presupposes theology and its dogmas. In fact, “For
preaching it follows that preachers must be theologians.” 150 “Theology is, therefore, the science
[Wissenschaft] that has its own presuppositions as its subject matter, that is to say, it stands
between past preaching and future preaching.” 151 That is, theology makes present, in the form of
dogmas, the past happenings of the church, which present preaching may then take up and
believers may use as a guide with an eye to the future.
As opposed to the previous forms of knowledge, theology is an explicit, reflexive, and
propositional or assertive way of knowing. Theology arises from the life lived in the church. It
has a particular object or positum of study, “the spoken word of Christ in the church.” 152 From
this spoken word, which is the origin and continuation of the church, arises other entities for
theological reflection. Such entities include “all the happenings held in remembrance in the
Christian community of faith; in the Bible; in preaching and sacrament, prayer, confession; in the
word of the person of Christ, which is preserved as an entity in the historical [geschichtlichen]
church.” 153 These entities are already pre-theoretically understood in the existentiell believing
way of knowing. Theology’s task is then to reflect on such already known entities, systematize
them, and present it to preaching. This is possible because, as Tietz correctly observes, God has
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freely bound God’s self to such ecclesial entities upon which theology reflects, even if God is not
strictly equivalent to such entities. 154
Bonhoeffer and Heidegger are in some substantial agreement here. Existentiell believing,
the pre-theoretical or implicit way of knowing, is predicated on the existential being in faith. 155
Theology systematizes and makes explicit that knowledge already known by believing. 156 They
agree on the importance of theology’s relation to faith and Luther as an (the) important figure in
the correct understanding of that relation. With perhaps a nod to dialectical theology, most likely
Bultmann in particular, and its mounting critiques of liberal theology, Heidegger says,
“[Theology] is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther’s insight that the ‘foundation’
on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary.” 157
They do differ, however, on the nature of that relationship. Just prior to the above
quotation, Heidegger says, “Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man’s being
towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it.” 158 For
Bonhoeffer, however and somewhat paradoxically, theology does not remain within faith. The
being of faith only is in the direct act of looking at Christ. “Whether faith is faith can neither be
ascertained nor believed; but the faith that believes is faith.” 159 Though “theology is a function of
the church,” 160 it is an instance of actus reflexus. Theology is then not faith, and when theology
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looks at faith, it does not see faith as such: “The question about the possibility of faith can only
be answered through its reality. But since this reality is not amenable to the manner of exhibition
of what exists [Seiend], any reflection proves to be destructive.” 161 The same is true of revelation
itself; theology turns it into an entity. 162
What saves theology, for Bonhoeffer, and separates it from all other positive sciences is
its humility and obedience. 163 Proper, obedient theology can “be practiced only where the living
person of Christ is itself present and can destroy this entity [created by theology] or acknowledge
it.” 164 The living person of Christ is the church or community of faith. More particularly,
preaching, which takes up theology, judges theology’s dogma in the community of faith. 165
Theology must always be practiced with an eye to the fact that its true meaning is given in the
church, which may accept or reject it. 166
The general epistemological picture looks something like the following: The church as a
collective person is in faith. From faith arises various, newly available entities that both the
church and the individual participating in the church may faithfully know. This includes the
church’s heritage, its past. Theology’s primary task is to care for and order this heritage. 167
Importantly, theology and its product, dogma, do not create faith. 168 However, this systematized
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remembrance is a necessary aid in preaching, when Christ as word is presented here and now to
the church community, which does create faith. 169 Christ and the church then carry the word
given in preaching forward in believing. 170 As Tietz nicely encapsulates these types of
theological epistemology, “Theology thus says, ‘God forgives sins’; preaching says, ‘you are
forgiven’; belief says, ‘I am forgiven’.” 171
***
Though the preceding was by no means exhaustive of Bonhoeffer’s theology, even as presented
in Act and Being, it should be clear that Heidegger plays a pivotal role it its development. That
there are nested levels of investigation is structurally and conceptually central for both Heidegger
and Bonhoeffer. For Heidegger, the proper founding of knowledge and the sciences is predicated
on a proper understanding of Dasein. Taking this a theological step further, for Bonhoeffer,
while understanding ecclesial knowledge in its various forms is predicated on knowing faithful
existence, understanding that existence is further predicated on understanding Christ or
revelation.
Temporality, as that element that maintains continuity, is particularly vital to
Bonhoeffer’s project. Without it, Bonhoeffer might be a more or less orthodox Barthian.
Temporality has a fundamental role to play for theological ontology, anthropology, and
epistemology. It is certainly true that what use Bonhoeffer makes of Heidegger is first
theologically tested. That is, had Heidegger’s basic temporal framework not arisen, at least in
part, from Heidegger’s own theological background and had Bonhoeffer not at least implicitly
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recognized it as worth re-theologizing, then Heidegger’s temporality would likely not have had
the impact it did on Bonhoeffer’s own work. Yet, temporality did have this impact and to the
degree that understanding Heidegger’s temporality is necessary for understanding the
development of Bonhoeffer’s early theology.
A next logical question would be to ask, “Is it right for Bonhoeffer to use Heidegger in
this way?” Nearly all that has preceded has been predicated on how Bonhoeffer understands the
way in which theology may profitably use philosophy. It is equally legitimate to ask whether
Heidegger would approve. Asking this question would place Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of
Heidegger in relation to Heidegger’s own understanding of the relation of theology to philosophy
and the history of theological reactions to Heidegger. This is the topic of the next and
concluding chapter.
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Chapter Six: Bonhoeffer and Heideggerian Theology
The primary goal of the preceding chapters was to illuminate the pivotal role Heidegger played
in Bonhoeffer’s early theological development. Secondarily, though still importantly, my goal
has been to demonstrate that Bonhoeffer is a good theological interpreter of the early Heidegger.
As a conclusion, I would like to bring this secondary concern to the fore and explicitly ask
whether such use of Heidegger is appropriate by Heidegger’s own standards. In general, I argue
that Bonhoeffer’s theological adaptation of Heidegger is appropriate by Heidegger’s own
standards.
When one thinks of an early Heideggerian theologian, Bultmann is most likely seen as
the paradigm example. Bonhoeffer, however, is quite critical of Bultmann in Act and Being. 1 If
Bultmann is the paradigm case of a theological appropriation of Heidegger’s early philosophy
and Bonhoeffer is critical of Bultmann, then it may seem likely that Bonhoeffer’s own use of
Heidegger misses the mark in some way. This is predicated, however, on the position that
Bultmann is more or less the only or best way in which to make theological use of Heidegger.
Challenging this position is then an intermediary goal on the way to demonstrating that
Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger is appropriate.
In order to assess both Bultmann and Bonhoeffer on their use of Heidegger, we need
standards by which to evaluate them. Because we are dealing with early Heidegger around the
time of his writing and publishing Being and Time, the primary source for these standards will be
1

For a good summation of Bultmann’s place in Bonhoeffer’s corpus see Peter Frick, “Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich
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Peter Frick (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 223–37.
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Heidegger’s “Phenomenology and Theology,” which is, at the time, the most sustained and
systematic account of how his phenomenology may relate to theology. Though this is his most
sustained and systematic account of the relation between phenomenology and theology, it
contains an inherent ambiguity. Heidegger asserts that theology is guided both by
phenomenology and faith. As we will see, it is difficult to maintain an equitable guiding
relationship between phenomenology and faith. This then leads to theology being primarily
guided either by phenomenology or faith. This then leads to two viable routes for theology to
take vis-à-vis philosophy. One may either take a positive-appropriative route whereby
phenomenology is the primary guide for theology. Or one may take a positive-adaptive route
whereby faith is primary and requires theology to alter philosophical positions in light of faith. 2
In the second section we will see how Bultmann legitimately takes the first positiveappropriative route. That is, Bultmann finds in Heidegger’s phenomenology an accurate formal
account of human existence from which theology must work. However, Bultmann pushes
beyond the boundaries that Heidegger sets even for this more optimistic approach to theology’s
use of phenomenology. Heidegger strictly forbids phenomenology any access to revelation
severely curtailing phenomenology’s applicability to faithful existence. Bultmann, seeking to
make phenomenology generally applicable to theology in all its domains, argues that
phenomenology does have formal access to revelation.
Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger, as we will see in the third section, is a viable and
legitimate alternative to Bultmann. Bonhoeffer shares many of the same general assumptions
concerning the disciplinary and scientific nature of theology as it relates to philosophy. But
rather than take the first positive-appropriative route, Bonhoeffer takes the positive-adaptive
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There is a more straightforwardly negative route whereby philosophy and theology are more or less strictly isolated
from one another. In the context of the current discussion, this is exemplified by Barth’s espoused view.

220

route left open by Heidegger, and Bonhoeffer does so with the intention of avoiding Bultmann’s
mistakes.
Phenomenology and Theology: Two Routes
The most extended and detailed account by early Heidegger of theology’s possible relationship
to his brand of phenomenology is given in his “Phenomenology and Theology.” 3 A number of
excellent interpretations and elucidations of this work exist. 4 One problem with interpreting this
work is its apparent internal conflict. Interpretations, when they explicitly tackle this internal
conflict, tend to favor one side or the other.
There are comments by Heidegger, difficult to interpret away, that there is a strict
division and opposition between phenomenology and faith, from which theology arises.
Heidegger, for example, describes philosophy, equivalent to phenomenology here, and faith as
“mortal enemies,” such that “philosophy does not even begin to want in any way to do battle
with [faith].”5 This leads Judith Wolfe, for instance, to argue that in writing and presenting this
work, Heidegger in fact already thought that there could be no real profitable relationship
between phenomenology and theology. 6 The implication seems to be that one should ignore the
points where Heidegger does present ways in which theology may profit from phenomenology.
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There are a number of contextual problems with this interpretation. First, Heidegger later
thought “Phenomenology and Theology” important enough, as a genuine sign of his thought at a
particular time, to include it in his Pathmarks. Second, though there is certainly a growing
unease with the prospect of the possibility of positive relations between theology and
phenomenology, 7 there is also a history of more optimistic statements concerning their relation. 8
Third, much of “Phenomenology and Theology” is predicated on Being and Time.
“Phenomenology and Theology” is dependent on the distinction between the ontological science
of phenomenology and the ontic sciences, theology among them. Heidegger also draws on the
specific example of sin’s relation to guilt present in Being and Time.
More importantly and directly related to the content of “Phenomenology and Theology,”
Heidegger goes to great lengths to delineate the boundaries between phenomenology and
theology with an eye to those points where theology might profitably engage phenomenology.
These more optimistic elements should, then, be taken seriously. “Phenomenology and
Theology” should be read as a transitional work. Here Heidegger appears to be working under
the already well thought out positive relationship between the two with an eye to his growing
belief that the two should be strictly divided. As such, the positive approach is a viable
Heideggerian option, one present from 1920 to at least 1927. Therefore, these criteria will be the
more immediate concern for evaluating Bultmann and Bonhoeffer.
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Heidegger’s more conciliatory approach begins by asserting that the relation between
theology and philosophy is dictated by the respective scientific character of each; initially, at
least, the relation is not determined by the division between faith and reason. 9 Theology is a
positive, ontic science. 10 Like other ontic sciences such as biology or economics, it is tasked with
explicitly investigating a particular subject matter or region of being. Biology is tasked with the
explicit investigation of living things; economics is tasked with investigating economic
phenomena. Christian theology’s task must be to investigate something distinctively Christian.
However, that something is not straightforwardly God: “Etymologically regarded, theo-logy
means: science of God. But God is in no way the object of investigation in theology, as, for
example, animals are the theme of zoology. Theology is not speculative knowledge of God.” 11 It
may appear that Heidegger is making the strong and counterintuitive claim that God is not a
subject of theology. Not so. Heidegger is claiming that God is not an object of investigation in
the usual sense; one cannot use speculative knowledge or independent human reason to come to
know abstract or metaphysical truths about God. Rather, one must go through Christianity.
Given the claim that speculative knowledge of God is not the aim of theology, it is worth
pausing here in order to spell out Heidegger’s theological assumptions and dispel potential
misunderstandings. It is certainly not the case that Heidegger forbids theology to ask and answer
the question of God. 12 To do so, however, one must go through “Christ, the crucified God.” 13
This does cut off “autonomous philosophizing” or reason from access to God. And here it is
important to note that Heidegger is likely working with Luther’s conception of a “theology of the
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cross” as opposed to a “theology of glory.” 14 Heidegger might be faulted for not making this
explicit; though he may have presumed some shared assumptions on this from his audiences at
Tübingen’s Lutheran Theological Faculty and the Protestant-dominated Marburg. Certainly not
every theologian would find this position appealing, but according to this particular theological
position, it seems appropriate.
It might seem then that Christianity is the subject of theology. Heidegger rejects this as a
straightforward option as well. Christianity, as an historical phenomenon, is open to investigation
by other sciences, but to investigate Christianity as an objective historical phenomenon is not to
practice theology. 15 Here, Heidegger is likely critiquing Harnack, Troeltsch, and liberal theology
in general. 16 Theology is a science that occurs within Christianity. More specifically, “Theology
is a conceptual knowing of that which first of all allows Christianity to become an originarily
historical event,” i.e. “Christianness [or faith] pure and simple.” 17 Theology is the science of
faith and that which is revealed in faith.
Another characteristic of ontic sciences is that the subject matter of their investigation is
already pre-theoretically, pre-ontologically, or implicitly understood. We already have a pretheoretical understanding of living phenomena and of economic phenomena. 18 The task of
biology and economics is to reflect on that understanding, clarify, and systematize it. Theology,
as the science of faith, must reflect on faith and that which is revealed in it to clarify and make
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explicit what is already believed in faith. 19 This is the beginning move that will distinguish
theology from other ontic sciences.
Theology is then the science of faith in four ways. 20 First, again, theology is the science
of faith and that which is revealed in faith. It is important, however, not to reduce or equate faith
to a set of propositions or facts. Because faith is not a set of propositions or facts, theology is
also not merely a science of such propositions or facts. Faith is a way of living; it is “the very
comportment of believing.” 21 Theology is, second, the science of this way of living. Third,
theology is the science that arises from faith. “It is the science that faith of itself motivates and
justifies.” 22 Finally, theology, as the science of faith and arising from faith, cultivates faith.
Heidegger quickly, however, qualifies the assertion that theology cultivates faith; he elaborates
on this task assigning it a purely negative function:
[T]heological transparency and conceptual interpretation of faith cannot found and secure
faith in its legitimacy, nor can it in any way make it easier to accept faith and remain
constant in faith. Theology can only render faith more difficult, that is, render it more
certain that faithfulness cannot be gained through the science of theology, but solely
through faith. Hence theology can permit the serious character of faithfulness as a
“graciously bestowed” mode of existence to become a matter of conscience. 23
Because theology is so dependent on faith, the former is obviously importantly
determined by the latter. It is necessary, then, to give an account of faith as a way of life, one
which is wholly unique. Faith is a mode of existence. 24 It is one particular way of filling out the
universal existential structures of Dasein.
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Though faith itself is a mode of Dasein’s existence, it does not originate from Dasein.
Faith “arises not from Dasein or spontaneously through Dasein.” 25 That which does create faith
is precisely that which is believed by faith, “revelation” or “Christ, the crucified God.” 26 By
saying that revelation comes neither through nor from Dasein, Heidegger rejects revelation as a
possibility, in his technical sense, of Dasein. This means that revelation itself cannot be a subject
of phenomenological investigation.
Faith is, more particularly for Heidegger, rebirth. Heidegger’s description of faith as
rebirth deserves a full quotation:
[F]aith is rebirth. Though faith does not bring itself about, and though what is revealed in
faith can never be founded by way of a rational knowing as exercised by autonomously
functioning reason, nevertheless the sense of the Christian occurrence as rebirth is that
Dasein’s prefaithful, i.e. unbelieving, existence is sublated therein. Sublated does not
mean done away with, but raised up, kept, and preserved in the new creation. One’s preChristian existence is indeed existentielly, ontically, overcome in faith. But this
existentiell overcoming of one’s pre-Christian existence (which belongs to faith as
rebirth) means precisely that one’s overcome pre-Christian Dasein is existentially,
ontologically included within faithful existence. To overcome does not mean to dispose
of, but to have at one’s disposition in a new way. 27
There is much happening here. This is Heidegger’s answer to how one coordinates Christian
existence understood both as simul justus et peccator and as new creation. 28 The new creation
occurs at the existentiell level. Previously the Christian lived in a particular pre-faithful or
unbelieving way. With revelation, this pre-faithful, existentiell way of living is destroyed and
replaced by a faithful, Christian way of living. Yet, the existential structures remain the same;
one lives a justified life that is still determined by Dasein’s ‘sinful’ existential structures.
The more immediately relevant result of the above understanding of faith is its
consequence for the interaction of theology and phenomenology. Theology is a particular ontic
25
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science with a particular positum, or region of being to be studied. All ontic sciences are
beholden to phenomenology as the ontological science. Again, all ontic sciences are concerned
with the study of particular regions of being. This is predicated on a pre-theoretical or prescientific understanding of that region. These regional understandings of being are predicated on
our general pre-theoretical understanding of being in general. That is, we all have an
understanding of what it means for things to be. It is phenomenology’s task to disclose and
explicate how it is that we can understanding being in general. From this task arises the other
essential “task of directing all other nontheological, positive sciences with respect to their
ontological foundations.” 29 Obviously, Heidegger understands theology to be special among the
ontic sciences; yet, because theology understands itself as a science, phenomenology may still
(co-)direct theology. More particularly, faith, as an existentiell modification of Dasein’s
existential structures, is informed, at least in part, by those structures. These structures are
phenomenology’s domain of investigation. Understanding these structures must therefore be
instructive for theology. Faith itself does not need phenomenology, but insofar as theology
understands itself to be the science of faith, insofar as theology wants to make existence in faith
conceptually clear, theology needs phenomenology.
What distinguishes theology from other ontic sciences is its unique subject matter.
Theology is dependent on faith both for its motivation and as its primary subject of investigation.
Faith and its contents come from that which first gives rise to faith, i.e. revelation or Christ. This
again comes neither through nor from Dasein. Faith and its contents are not accessible by
Dasein’s own means. With other ontic sciences, so the implication seems to be, Dasein does or
can of itself gain pre-theoretical access to those regions of being that the various other ontic
sciences study. This is not so for theology. “[W]hat is revealed in faith can never be founded by
29
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way of a rational knowing as exercised by autonomously functioning reason.” 30 Only faith and
theology have access to faith and its contents. And because an ontic science must remain true to
its subject of study, theology must be (co-)directed by faith.
Theology then has two masters. Theology is beholden to faith for its content and to
phenomenology for its scientific nature. 31 If theology wishes to be conceptually clear concerning
its explication of faithful existence, it must turn to phenomenology for the basic formal account
of Dasein. But the content about which theology must get clear is only available in faith.
Heidegger uses the relation of sin and being-guilty to illustrate his point. 32 Being-guilty,
as we saw, is a fundamental existential structure of Dasein. Sin is the existentiell modification or
understanding of being-guilty only available to faith. If theology wishes to be conceptually clear
and correct concerning faith’s understanding of sin, then it should turn to phenomenology for
guidance or co-direction, particularly through what phenomenology has revealed concerning
being-guilty. However, sin itself is only available in faith; “only the believer can factically exist
as a sinner.” 33 So theology must also turn to faith for a correct understanding of sin, one
existentiell understanding of being-guilty.
Theology has two opposing masters creating a tension for theology. Phenomenology
cannot be in or access faith and still be phenomenology. Or, what amounts to the same, one who
is in faith cannot perform phenomenology and still be in faith. The two are mutually exclusive
positions, yet theology must be guided by both simultaneously.
30
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Before going into the details of the tension theology faces when trying to appeal
simultaneously to faith and phenomenology, it is useful to explain what the tension is not. For
Heidegger, theology’s task cannot be the explicit investigation of Dasein’s existential structures.
This is due to theology’s ontic and existentiell nature. To be concerned with particular entities is
to not be concerned with being in general. And to be concerned with a particular existentiell way
of living, faith for instance, is to not be concerned with Dasein’s formal existential structures.
There seems to be two related problems with this position that the existential structures of Dasein
are “never a theme of theology.” 34 First, Heidegger explicitly says that the investigation into
Dasein’s existential structures is and goes through the existentiell. 35 One can never find ‘blank’
existential structures. They are always manifested in particular existentiell ways. One must go
through actual ways of existing to get to what makes existence in any way possible. Why can’t
theology go through faith to do the same? Second and in particular, Heidegger himself is
indebted in no small part to theological and religious accounts of existence. His
phenomenological analysis of Paul’s epistles to the Thessalonians and his analyses of Book X of
Augustine’s Confessions anticipate many of the existential structures central to Being and
Time. 36 In a 1921 letter to Karl Lӧwith, he identifies himself as a “Christian theologian.” 37 And
he acknowledges Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard as important sources. 38 Heidegger seems
to have gone through faith despite phenomenology’s inability to access faith.
The question, again, is, why can’t theology go through faith to access the existential
level, yet Heidegger can utilize theological sources in his phenomenology? What seems to be
Heidegger’s answer may be unsatisfactory, but it is important to acknowledge it in order to
34
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properly locate the actual tension. Understanding the answer involves appreciating the centrality
of Heidegger’s method of formal indication. Formal indication is, again, the method that
Heidegger thinks essential for moving from the existentiell to the existential. It involves the
bracketing of the particular content contained in any particular way of existing in order to get to
the structures that make every way of existing possible. When Heidegger utilizes faithful
accounts of existence, he does so through the method of formal indication. This removes the
particular faithful content that makes that existence in fact faithful. Theology, if it were to do the
same, would also have to bracket faithful content. However, faith is what it is because of this
content. And theology, as essentially and intimately connected to faith, is the practice of
reflecting on that content. If theology were to bracket faithful content through formal indication
it would, by Heidegger’s definition, cease to be theology. Part of Heidegger’s intent, which in
general is fairly consistent throughout his corpus, is to maintain the integrity of both
phenomenology and theology.
The tension is strictly located in theology. For Heidegger, faith has no need of
phenomenology, and technically, Heidegger should have been able to reach the existential level
without the use of religious accounts of existence. Theology, however, requires both. 39 Because
of the mutually exclusive nature of faith and phenomenology an actual equitable co-direction of
theology by both seems difficult, if not impossible. So which should theology favor,
phenomenology or faith?
It certainly seems that most of Heidegger’s argumentative weight is placed on
phenomenology or philosophy being the queen of the sciences. All other sciences should be
directed to their proper subjects by phenomenology. Phenomenology holds the key to
39
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understanding that entity, Dasein, that engages in scientific inquiry. And for theology,
phenomenology investigates the basic structures of Dasein. When theology investigates, from a
position of faith, pre-Christian or sinful existence it should utilize the structures disclosed by
phenomenology to guarantee conceptual clarity. Even when investigating faithful Christian
existence it would seem that theology must utilize phenomenology’s findings for the sake of
conceptual clarity for “[a]ll theological concepts necessarily contain that understanding of being
that is constitutive of human Dasein as such, insofar as it exists at all.” 40 It would seem then that
phenomenology is the structural master of both sinful and faithful existences. This is the
conceptual support lying behind what I have termed the positive-appropriative route.
But this option is in tension with other of Heidegger’s statements that theology, to remain
theology, must be beholden primarily to faith. First, there is the argumentative weight that
Heidegger places on all the various ways in which theology is the science of faith. Because of
their unique character, revelation, faith, and its contents are not universally accessible.
Phenomenology cannot then direct theology as it directs the other ontic sciences; “theology is a
fully autonomous ontic science.” 41 This then means that “the primary direction (derivation), the
source of [theology’s] Christian content, is given only in faith.” 42 Because faith is primary for
theology and phenomenology cannot access the content of faith, it is not essential to
phenomenology to direct theology. When phenomenology does aid in directing theology, it is at
theology’s behest: “The demand, however, that [philosophy] must be so employed is not made
by philosophy as such but rather by theology, insofar as it understands itself to be a science.” 43 If
it is theology that requests philosophy’s help, and theology is primarily beholden to faith, then
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the help that is accepted must be mediated by faith. Faith also seems to demand this. Faith sees
itself as a privileged way of existing, one which has unique access to the truth of both preChristian and Christian existences, meaning whatever truth philosophy may offer about either
ways of existing must be judged by faith as acceptable or not. Faith then seems to be the final
arbiter of truth both of itself and of ‘sinful’ existence, to which theology, by Heidegger’s
definition, must conform.
So though theology must be directed both by phenomenology and faith, it cannot be
equitably co-directed by both. Both phenomenology and faith, which are again mutually
exclusive positions, can make a claim to being the primary guide for theology. If one favors
phenomenology, then one is apt to take the positive-appropriate route for theology’s use of
philosophy. If one favors faith, then one is apt to take the positive-adaptive route.
This tension should not simply be brushed aside. One may be tempted to brush the
tension aside as just a tension in Heidegger’s biography and one that Heidegger soon moves
beyond. One may be tempted to dismiss it as simply contradictory and incoherent. Or one may
see “Phenomenology and Theology” as just another, and maybe not all that unique, answer to the
question, “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens?” All three under-appreciate Heidegger’s
attempt to coordinate theology’s use of phenomenology and faith.
Taking both theology, or at least important historical instances of it, and philosophy, as
Heidegger sees it, seriously means that there can be neither a straightforward “yes” nor “no” to
the question of whether philosophy and theology can have profitable relations. As Heidegger
says, “it is precisely this opposition [between faith and philosophy] that must bear the possibility
of a community of the sciences of theology and philosophy, if indeed they are to communicate in
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a genuine way, free from illusions and weak attempts at mediation.” 44 The opposition between
faith and philosophy, the presupposition that would lead one to assert that there can be no
profitable use of philosophy by theology, is in fact what must ground profitable engagement
between theology and philosophy.
As Heidegger understands faith and phenomenology, they share an important concern.
Both are importantly concerned with fundamental questions concerning human existence.
Phenomenology investigates Dasein’s general relation to being that makes any particular way of
existing possible at all. Faith involves an implicit or pre-theoretical understanding of human
existence coram Deo, or before God. More particularly, according to Heidegger,
phenomenology and faith are concerned less with particular content of human existence and
more concerned with the enactment, the how, of human existence. 45 Theology as the science
arising from faith and concerned with faith then shares these same concerns with human
existence. Additionally, as a science, theology seeks conceptual clarity concerning human
existence bringing theology yet closer to philosophy.
Yet, this dialogue between theology and philosophy is predicated on a difference or, to
use Heidegger’s stronger word, an opposition. Faith is not philosophy. Philosophy operates
under the assumption of an existentiell possibility of a “free appropriation of one’s whole
Dasein,” a position seen by faith as sinful. 46 Faith begins from the existentiell assumption of the
coram Deo. It is this difference that allows for any dialogue at all. So there must be a dialogue
between theology and philosophy, at least at this stage in Heidegger’s work; yet this dialogue
must always also be a tense one.
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Both Bultmann and Bonhoeffer share many of Heidegger’s positions delineated above.
They both take seriously the tension between faith and philosophy from which theology must
work. Yet, they represent two different routes one may take in relation to this tension. Bultmann
represents the positive-appropriative route; Bonhoeffer represents the positive-adaptive route.
They are, therefore, good test cases for how theology may positively engage Heidegger’s early
philosophy according to Heidegger’s own standards.
Bultmann and the Appropriative Route
Bultmann is generally considered an exemplar of a theological appropriation of Heidegger’s
early philosophy. In hindsight, Bultmann remarks, for example, that “[T]he work of existential
philosophy, which I came to know through my discussions with Martin Heidegger, has become
of decisive significance for me. I found in it the conceptuality in which it is possible to speak
adequately of human existence and therefore also of the existence of the believer.” 47 Here we see
not only that Heidegger was of “decisive significance” for Bultmann, but more specifically, that
Bultmann found that he could use Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein to work out an analysis of the
existence of the believer, i.e. faithful existence. Bultmann appropriates philosophy for the
theological task of explicating faith.
Such implicit and explicit reliance on Heidegger, coupled with their close personal
relationship, lends support to the position taken by such scholars as John MacQuarrie and Gareth
Jones that, with some relatively minor discrepancies, Bultmann’s theological use of Heidegger
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remains true to Heidegger. 48 It is undoubtedly true that Bultmann had a good grasp of
Heidegger’s early philosophy, attempts to remain true to Heidegger, and does often succeed. 49
It is important to give Bultmann his due by attempting to appreciate the context within
which he worked and the problems he was attempting to solve. Bultmann was confessionally
Lutheran. Within the Lutheran tradition, there is a prevalent, though not exclusive, trend to
allow philosophy access to basic truths concerning human existence in sin. 50 In his own way,
Heidegger shares this assumption. Phenomenology can access the existential structures that
theology overlays with its understanding of the being of humans as sinful. This presupposition
requires that Bultmann take a more conciliatory position to philosophy’s theological usefulness.
Bultmann’s use of Heidegger comes as dialectical theology is growing as an academic
alternative to liberal theology. Dialectical theology, of which Bultmann was a self-avowed
member, was faced with the project of not simply destroying the liberal theological tradition, but
with offering a positive program of its own. Having developed under similar conditions,
Heidegger’s phenomenology shared some of the same presuppositions as dialectical theology, at
least in general outline. For example, writing to Karl Lӧwith in 1925, Heidegger says, “What still
shows some ‘life’ is the Barth-Gogarten movement, which is represented in a prudent and
independent way by Bultmann—and since I am always subject to being counted among
theologians, I permit myself also to accompany this movement, although during a recent debate I
48
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expressed my skepticism in a sufficiently clear manner.” 51 Such similarities include a distrust of
traditional metaphysics, critiques of contemporary methods of historical research, and the
attempt to return and retrieve some unsullied origin. These basic similarities allowed Bultmann
to see Heidegger as a source for his own constructive dialectical theology. 52
As various dialectical theologians began developing positive programs, various problems
with conflicting resolutions appeared within dialectical theology itself. Such problems include
whether and how there might be a legitimate ‘natural theology’, whether and where there might
be a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) in human existence for revelation, and how the
continuity of pre-Christian and Christian identity might be maintained. Again, Bultmann found
in Heidegger specific resources with which to come to his own position on such problems.
It is also important to note that Bultmann’s theological position underwent significant
changes. In the late teens and early twenties, for example, Bultmann squarely located himself in
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the developing Barthian dialectical theology. 53 It appears, however, that as his knowledge of and
interaction with Heidegger grew, he went through a transitional phase in which he, consciously
or not, tried to mediate and combine Heidegger and Barth. 54 By the late twenties and early
thirties, Bultmann is decidedly Heideggerian. With such rapid and drastic changes it is of course
easy to locate inconsistencies and contradictions across Bultmann’s works. In some respects it
would be unfair to hold Heideggerian Bultmann to Barthian Bultmann standards and vice versa.
As such, I will focus on Bultmann’s writings from the late twenties to the early thirties that took
Heidegger’s position as articulated in “Phenomenology and Theology” as authoritative. 55
Bultmann, in many ways, begins and executes his theological appropriation of Heidegger
correctly by Heidegger’s own standards at the time. In his 1930 article, “The Historicity of Man
[Dasein] and Faith,” written as a justification for his use of Heidegger in response to Kuhlmann’s
criticisms, Bultmann provides much of the same theoretical justification for the interaction of
theology and philosophy that Heidegger did in “Phenomenology and Theology.” For Bultmann,
philosophy is concerned with “natural man,” which is a “purely formal ontological designation,”
and theology is concerned with the “man of faith.” 56 Both philosophy and theology then share
human existence as subjects of investigation. 57 Of course, philosophy investigates the formal
ontological structures of human existence that can say nothing directly about existence in faith or
unfaith; while theology begins from and concerns itself with existence in faith. 58 Though their
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approaches to human existence are not identical, theology may still make “fruitful use of the
philosophical analysis of human existence.” 59 For Bultmann, existence in faith is a particular
possibility within human existence and therefore is dependent on the formal ontological
structures that philosophy discloses and investigates.
To justify this general use of philosophy by theology, Bultmann specifically appeals to
the theological concept of “simul peccator, simul justus.” 60 In nearly identical language to
Heidegger’s, Bultmann asserts that in entering faithful existence the formal ontological structures
are still operative: “If, through faith, existence prior to faith is overcome existentiell or ontically,
this still does not mean that the existential or ontological conditions of existing are destroyed.” 61
That is, all ontic or existentiell ways of existing, including existence in faith, are formally
determined by the ontological constitution of human existence. To understand existence in faith,
theology must, at least in part, turn to that practice that investigates the formal conditions of
existence, i.e. phenomenology. This leads Bultmann to make the fairly strong claim that “in a
certain sense, then, theology does ‘repeat’ the analysis of philosophy, insofar, namely as it can
only explicate its fundamental concepts of existence on the basis of an understanding of man’s
‘being’, and insofar as it is dependent on philosophy for the analysis of the meaning of being.” 62
Of course, Bultmann also accepts that theology can only be founded on faith and is then a
movement of faith itself, which complicates theology’s repetition of philosophy. 63 Because
theology is ontic and specifically arises from faith it “does not really learn from philosophy as
such, it does not simply take over some philosophical system of dogma, but rather lets itself be
referred by philosophy to the phenomenon itself; it lets itself be taught by the phenomenon, by
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man, whose structure philosophy seeks to disclose.” 64 So far, then, Bultmann lays down the
same theoretical framework as Heidegger for the positive use of philosophy by theology.
In practice, Bultmann also does fairly well. Bultmann learns from Heidegger that
phenomenology is the return to the phenomena or things themselves. For Heidegger, the nature
of phenomena is dictated by the world they are in. As we saw in chapter three, the being of a
particular entity is determined by its place in a web of involvements, which is Heidegger’s
meaning of worldhood. So to go back to the phenomena themselves at least in part means to go
back to the world that gives rise to them. What is particularly important about Heidegger’s
concept of world is that Dasein, human existence, by definition must be its world; Dasein is
being-in-the-world. This means that worldhood is a universally applicable concept to all forms of
human existence, including Dasein existing in faith, the primary subject of theological
investigation. World should then be in some way an important phenomenological concept that
theology should be able to use to gain conceptual clarity on its subject matter. This is indeed the
case for Bultmann.
As Heidegger is developing his concept of worldhood, 65 Bultmann is beginning to use it
for theological purposes. In practice, what is particularly important about Heidegger’s worldhood
is its methodological conditions. If one wants to understand Greek concepts, then one should
investigate the Greek world from which they arise on its own terms. Or, and more to the point, if
one wants to understand Christian concepts, one must investigate the faithful world from which
they arise, ideally in its earliest form, and in such a way that it is uncontaminated either by
supposed ‘objective’ methods or foreign worlds, such as Greek philosophy. This is just what
Bultmann attempts to do with his interpretation of Paul’s epistles as the earliest accounts of
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faithful existence and its world. As Bultmann says, a real understanding of Pauline concepts “is
therefore only possible through the search for the understanding of existence basic to the text.” 66
If, for example, according to Bultmann, we look to Paul’s account of faithful existence
we see key anthropological concepts such as ‘body’, ‘flesh’, and ‘spirit’. These concepts,
however, are not understood according to Greek substance ontology. 67 ‘Body’, according to
Bultmann, designates not a natural object among others in an objective world, but “man’s
being.” 68 This existence may then be determined by God and live according to the ‘spirit’ or it
may be determined by sin and live according to the ‘flesh’. What is important here is that these
concepts do not designate things but ways of existing as seen through faith. So, for example,
because ‘flesh’ is not, as Bultmann reads Paul, human physical existence, sin is not equivalent to
sensuality. 69 Rather, sin is determined by human finitude and being-guilty and the rebellion
against the recognition of that finitude and guilt. 70 As we saw in chapter four, Heidegger’s guilt
is characterized by Dasein’s radical finitude that does not allow Dasein to get behind its
thrownness and become its own creator and simultaneously severely curtails Dasein’s ability to
choose every possibility open to it. The uniquely ontic or existentiell understanding of guilt as
sin in faithful existence, is that humans are creatures, i.e. created, before God and that there is
only one authentic possibility, the possibility of being directed at God.
Whether or not Bultmann’s biblical interpretation is accurate is not the immediately
relevant point. The immediately relevant point is that there are many respects in which, the
above example of worldhood as one example, Bultmann has stayed within the appropriate
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bounds of theology’s and phenomenology’s interactions as outlined by Heidegger at this time.
According to Heidegger, theology should follow phenomenology’s lead by investigating actual
human existence and the concepts that arise from that existence. The formal structures of
existence, such as ‘world’ and guilt, may be provided by phenomenology in order to aid theology
in focusing on the actual existence it is tasked to investigate, i.e. existence in faith. However, the
actual content of the existence and its concept must be and can only be derived from that
existence itself.
So far, then, Bultmann has rightly followed the positive-appropriative route for
theology’s use of phenomenology; however, there is an important respect in which Bultmann
takes this route too far by granting phenomenology access to faithful content Heidegger strictly
forbids. That is, one can read Bultmann as recognizing the tension in Heidegger’s position,
choosing to emphasize Heidegger’s phenomenology as an authoritative source for theology, and,
therefore, presenting a position in which phenomenology has greater access to theological
matters than Heidegger allows. Bultmann believes there are essential theological truths contained
in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. For example, “If the pre-Christian existence includes an
unknowing knowledge of God, then it also includes a pre-understanding of the Christian
proclamation. And if philosophy [i.e. phenomenology] explicates this understanding of
existence, it also explicates this pre-understanding [of the Christian proclamation].” 71 These
hypotheticals are no small matter. If Bultmann’s answer is “yes,” then he essentially grants
phenomenology formal access to faithful content that it should not have. Revelation is what
transitions one from pre-Christian to Christian existence and reveals the world of faith. It is only
after such an event that beings such as sin, Christ, God, and so forth become available. If one
grasps revelation, then one has at the very least a pre-ontological understanding of faithful
71
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content. Granting phenomenology access to revelation is the door by which Bultmann grants
phenomenology access to all other faithful content. This is Bultmann’s means of overcoming the
tension in Heidegger’s position. Here Bultmann is attempting to bring theology’s two masters,
faith and phenomenology, closer together.
Bultmann’s argument is essentially this: Philosophy uses pre-Christian existence in its
various existentiell or ontic forms to come to the ontological understanding of the existential
structures that make possible such pre-Christian existence. According to Bultmann, existentiell
pre-Christian existence has a pre-ontological or, in his words, pre-understanding of revelation. 72
This then means, according to Bultmann, that revelation is a possibility of Dasein. Fundamental
ontology as the enterprise of coming to know the structure of such possibilities also then has
access, even if only formally, to revelation. This then leads Bultmann to assert that Heidegger’s
phenomenology is a ‘natural theology’ or preamble to faith useful not only for conceptual
clarification, but for coming to know revelation or the Christian proclamation and the entities
that appear thereafter in faith. 73
By making revelation a possibility of Dasein, Bultmann is already at odds with
Heidegger. More interesting, however, is how Bultmann supports this assumption by arguing for
a pre-ontological understanding of revelation in pre-Christian existence. This assertion is in fact
the key to the above argument that phenomenology has access to revelation and thereby
theological content. As far as I can discern Bultmann has three sub-arguments for this, all of
which in one way or another contravene some fundamental insights of Heidegger’s
Daseinanalytik.
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In Bultmann’s first argument, he draws on everyday experience and the apparent fact that
even pre-Christians have some basic understanding of the propositions of faith. 74 Regardless of
any position on the truth of such propositions, a pre-Christian can understand what “forgiveness”
means, the basic historical facts of the Roman practice of crucifixion, the meaning of the
command “love thy neighbor,” and so forth. Since they are not utterly meaningless to preChristian existence, pre-Christian existence must have a pre-understanding of them and
revelation that provides a faithful understanding of them.
Here, Bultmann, however, does not take into account one of Heidegger’s more
fundamental insights, which as we demonstrated above forms an important foundation for his
proper use of Heidegger. The meaning of such propositions is derived from the particular world
or form of existence in which they are contained. While Heidegger does believe there is a
continuity of existential structures between pre-Christian and Christian existence, as existentiell
ways of existing they are “mortal enemies.” 75 Propositions of faith as they occur in these two
opposed forms of existence would superficially appear to be similar, but the meaning of such
propositions would be equally different. If the faithful meaning of such propositions are not, as
Heidegger asserts, rationally available to pre-Christian existence, then they also do not seem to
be available to phenomenology either.
Bultmann does attempt to maneuver around this by arguing that such propositions of faith
are understood in pre-Christian existence because the life of faith as a possible way of existing is
understood by the unbeliever. 76 Bultmann uses the analogy of friendship to support his point.
According to Bultmann, a friendless person’s understanding of friendship as a concept and
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possibility is, in an important sense, equivalent to that of a person with a friend. One might add
particular content concerning one’s self and the friend to the possibility of friendship, but the
earlier understanding of friendship as a possibility is not further clarified or understood in some
appreciably different way. 77
This is a troubling analogy for a number of reasons. First, in terms of basic experience
this seems obviously false. I, living a childless existence, of course still have some understanding
of fatherhood as a possibility. However, with actual fatherhood I would expect my understanding
of the possibility of fatherhood to gain more than mere particular content. This seems, again, to
be evidence of Bultmann contravening the earlier accepted point that the understanding of a
possibility arises from a particular way of living. Second and more importantly, friendship is
disanalogous to revelation. For Bultmann, the reason a friendless person can understand
friendship, despite not having one, is that friendship is a possibility in human existence. Again
however, for Heidegger revelation is not a possibility within Dasein. It comes neither through
nor from Dasein.
In his second sub-argument, Bultmann takes as evidence of a pre-understanding of
revelation in pre-Christian existence the fact that revelation is understood when received. 78 If
there were not some pre-formed existential structure which revelation matched, then when
received there would be no possibility of understanding it. 79 This option is at least implicitly
ruled out by Heidegger’s circular characterization of how one receives revelation and faith. Faith
comes through “that which is revealed in and with this way of existence, from what is believed.
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For the ‘Christian’ faith, that being which is primarily revealed to faith, and only to it, and
which, as revelation, first gives rise to faith, is Christ, the crucified God.” 80 Not until the
Christian recognizes the central content of faith, that Christ is the crucified God, does that
Christian live in faith, yet one cannot recognize and know this content of faith until one is in
faith. Faith would not then be a structure to be actualized and filled with faithful content. If there
is no structure within pre-Christian existence to which revelation conforms, then fundamental
ontology cannot, as Bultmann advocates, function as a preamble to faith.
Third and finally, using the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition that revelation or the Word
must come through human words, Bultmann argues that revelation is open to phenomenology via
such human words. 81 Discourse, as a fundamental existential structure of Dasein, is an important
subject of phenomenology. If revelation comes through discourse, then there should be a way in
which revelation, according to Bultmann, is also open to phenomenological investigation. This
would only work, however, if there were a necessary relation between words and the Word.
According to the tradition with which Heidegger is working, however, the relation is contingent.
It is a contingent and free act of God that links any particular instance of reading or hearing
human words to the Word. Since any particular ontic instance of discourse would only be
contingently linked to revelation, I think this, coupled again with revelation not being a
possibility of Dasein, is an indication that revelation is only contingently linked to the existential
structure of discourse. Neither an ontic investigation into language nor an ontological
investigation into discourse would seem to guarantee any grasp of revelation.
These are some notable problems with Bultmann’s account of how phenomenology can
have access to revelation and therefore to faith and its contents. However, it arises out of a
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genuine concern to make good on Heidegger’s assertion that phenomenology can aid theology in
its conceptual practices. But in doing so Bultmann must deemphasize the unique cause of faith
and faith as a unique way of life with unique content, all of which make theology an autonomous
ontic science. Bultmann must emphasize phenomenology over faith. Though it is an attractive
route for the justification for the theological use of Heidegger, it is not the only one.
Bonhoeffer and the Adaptive Route
In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer is quite critical of Bultmann; however, these critiques are not
necessarily equivalent to critiques of Heidegger. Bonhoeffer critiques Bultmann for making the
existential structures of Dasein the mediators of revelation, 82 a position that Heidegger did not
seem to hold. Because these structures mediate revelation, Bultmann is able to maintain the
continuity of sinful and faithful existences, but only, as Bonhoeffer evaluates it, by downgrading
the new existence, or existence in faith. 83 This also means, as Bonhoeffer reads Bultmann, that
we may know God through knowing ourselves, 84 which is at least partly rejected by Heidegger’s
position that one cannot work from the existential structures to faithful content. All of this is
predicated on phenomenology being a fundamental starting point for theology. If the previous
chapters have demonstrated that Bonhoeffer indeed finds Heidegger’s early philosophy
theologically useful, then we should expect an alternative approach to that position vis-à-vis
Bultmann’s option. 85
Bonhoeffer is certainly not as devoted to Heidegger’s early phenomenology as Bultmann
was. As we saw, Bonhoeffer has some fairly severe critiques of Heidegger. And a theologically
appropriate use of Heidegger involves coordinating him with Kant and reorienting this
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coordinated position from the perspective of revelation. Bonhoeffer is also not as knowledgeable
as Bultmann on Heideggerian matters. He did not have the extended and intimate personal access
to Heidegger during the final formative years leading up to Being and Time that Bultmann did.
And it is quite unlikely that Bonhoeffer had any access to “Phenomenology and Theology.” 86 He
would have had to glean Heidegger’s position from the opening sections of Being and Time and
its few footnotes and comments related to theology. Despite this, they share remarkable
foundational similarities concerning the nature of theology.
Bonhoeffer agrees that theology is a positive science. 87 At least at this stage in his
corpus, Bonhoeffer still sees theology as a university discipline; though it is unique among such
disciplines given its necessary and intimate relation to the church. As a positive science it reflects
on that which is disclosed in faith and known pre-theoretically by a life in faith. 88 His analysis in
Act and Being of the church, confession, baptism, the structure of faith and sin, preaching, and,
preeminently, the person of Christ are all instances of conceptually grasping that which is pretheoretically believed and understood in faith.
Faith, according to both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, is a partaking or being in the history
revealed and occurring in Christ. Heidegger describes faith as rebirth: “[R]birth does not mean a
momentary outfitting with some quality or other, but a way in which a factical, believing Dasein
historically exists in that history which begins with the occurrence of revelation.” 89 Though
Bonhoeffer makes this partaking necessarily communal as the church, 90 participation in the
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history arising from revelation is the hallmark of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology. One’s
being in sin or faith is determined by one’s existence in Christ’s history (Geschichte).
These fundamental agreements lead to the crucial agreement that theology, as a positive
science, is subordinate to philosophy. In his “Thesis Fragment about M. Heidegger and E.
Grisebach” Bonhoeffer says,
For the relationship between philosophy and theology, this means that philosophy
precedes theology in both cases (Heidegger and Grisebach). 91
(1) Theology agrees to this insofar as
(a) it makes use of philosophical terminology and thereby places itself
under the claim of the omnipotence of the concept; 92
(b) in this respect it is actually a positive science subordinated to
philosophy, even as a systematic one;
(c) philosophy can do nothing other than view it as such. 93
That is, theology is the practice of reflective thought that requires conceptualization in order to
understand its objects. 94 The ‘master’ of conceptual, reflective thought is philosophy. Theology
must, therefore, turn to philosophy for such “technical” conceptual aid, 95 hence the time he
spends in Act and Being explicating genuine transcendentalism and genuine ontology and the
theological use to which he puts them.
To what use does theology put philosophy, however? For Bultmann, both
phenomenology and theology are primarily concerned with human existence. For the former it is
existence in general; for the latter it is existence in faith. For Bonhoeffer, existence in faith,
theological anthropology, is undoubtedly important. Act and Being expends much effort on that
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task. But that is not the foundational task. In fact, beginning with the anthropological is the
fundamental mistake that both dialectical theology and liberal theology share, even if
unknowingly. The foundational task is to get conceptually clear on revelation, on theology
proper, for this is what determines human existence in faith. If theology is going to use
philosophy for its own projects, then the application of philosophy to revelation seems to follow.
Heidegger does not say this explicitly, but it seems a plausible outcome of his position in
“Phenomenology and Theology.” Theology’s primary task is the explication of faithful
existence. Revelation is that, and only that, which creates faith, and it is that which is primarily
revealed in and believed by faith. It would seem then that the theological adaptation of
philosophy could not help but first and foremost adapt philosophy to the understanding of
revelation.
Of course, it cannot be a simple application of philosophy to revelation. This risks
devolving into Christian philosophy, which Heidegger’s sees as a bald contradiction, and
Bonhoeffer sees as only an eschatological possibility. 96 Theology, using the church’s memory
and with an eye to its application in the church through preaching, 97 must weed out that which is
unacceptable to revelation. The primary characteristic of revelation is the fact that it comes
neither through nor from Dasein, i.e. revelation is not a possibility of Dasein. Any theological
adaptation of philosophy must maintain and work in light of this important characteristic of
revelation vis-à-vis philosophy and theology. As we saw in chapter four, Bonhoeffer’s critiques
of Heidegger, and therefore that which he finds unsuitable to theology, are those aspects of
Heidegger’s philosophy that risk making revelation a possibility of Dasein.
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There is, however, a problem. Despite the attempt to maintain the uniqueness of
revelation, even the best theology can never in fact get at revelation or Christ, and this must be
read also as a reflexive comment on Act and Being itself. Theology always turns revelation into
a Seiend, an entity. For Bonhoeffer, revelation is neither an entity nor a nonentity. Revelation is
not something graspable by human understanding alone, nor is it something beyond the selfimposed limits of human understanding, which would thereby throw such understanding back on
itself (cor curvum in se). Revelation is the person of Christ who “graciously” 98 chooses to cross
the limit of human understanding Christ himself imposes. 99
This also means that faith itself cannot be a direct object of theology. Faith is only in
one’s direct act of relating to Christ. Theology, when it looks at faith, sees not faith, but
credulity or religion. 100 Both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer agree that theology is in an important
respect subordinate to philosophy. Because theology must conceptually articulate the life in
faith, theology must turn to philosophy. But underlying this important agreement is an equally
important disagreement. For Heidegger, theology is the science of faith that arises out of faith
and, in a negative manner, fosters faith. In contrast, for Bonhoeffer, theology is not faith itself
nor is it an act of faith. It is because philosophy and theology are similarly distant from faith that
the two are brought closer together and that theology is conceptually subordinate to philosophy.
Though this distance from faith is what brings philosophy and theology closer together,
thereby allowing theology to make use of philosophy, it is still faith that separates them. Proper
theology still assumes faith and revelation. 101 It still assumes that revelation and a life in faith are
98

Ibid., 46.
Though Bonhoeffer maintains revelation as the person of Christ in contradistinction to revelation being an entity
or nonentity, it is still a conceptual distinction. In Act and Being, his theology turns ‘person’ into an entity,
something that one can conceptually grasp versus the actual encounter in faith with the person of Christ (cf. DBWE
4: ch.2). Bonhoeffer must maintain this reflexive view of Act and Being to be consistent.
100
DBWE 2: 128 (DBW 2: 126).
101
DBWE 10: 452 (DBW 10: 423-4).
99

250

the actual arbiters of truth. With the help of philosophy, theology constructs its system all the
while knowing that such a system, if theology is proper, must be submitted to the church through
preaching to be affirmed or denied. And here Bonhoeffer has taken the second positive-adaptive
route opened in Heidegger’s “Phenomenology and Theology.”
Faith and philosophy are, for both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, mortal enemies. Faith, for
both, necessarily opposes “the free appropriation of one’s whole Dasein.” 102 In contrast, faith, at
least for Bonhoeffer, is the appropriation of one’s Dasein by the person of Christ. Rather than
philosophy’s “posing the question” and “providing the answer” about the human being from
within human existence, 103 Christ questions and answers concerning such existence from
outside. 104 Theology, even at its best for Bonhoeffer, always risks merely asking about and
answering the question of human existence from within. To avoid this it must submit itself
obediently and humbly to faith in the church. Faith, or more properly revelation, is then the true
determiner of theology’s required use of philosophy.
If we return to the overall structure of Act and Being, we see this relation to philosophy
determined by revelation as a guiding method. Towards the conclusion of Act and Being
Bonhoeffer says, “The objection that categories of a general metaphysical [i.e. philosophical]
kind have also been employed in what has preceded overlooks the necessity of a certain formal
‘preunderstanding’, on the basis of which alone questions—even if wrong ones—can be raised,
whose answer is then returned by revelation, along with a fundamental correction of the
question.” 105 That is, many may object, as they have to Bultmann, that Bonhoeffer’s Act and
Being has been overly determined by philosophical concepts foreign to theology. However,
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Bonhoeffer has, by his estimation, begun not with a formal preunderstanding of human existence
drawn from philosophy, but with a formal preunderstanding of revelation drawn from faith. On
this basis theology must mine philosophy for concepts adequate for conceptualizing the faithful
preunderstanding of revelation and the existence in faith it creates. This conceptualized
understanding of revelation and faith are then offered back to revelation in the church for
judgment. Philosophy is, according to Bonhoeffer, a means, but neither the beginning nor the end
of the theological enterprise.
Conclusion
It is difficult to overestimate the current and likely-to-continue importance of Bonhoeffer’s work.
A cursory survey of the most recent publications demonstrates Bonhoeffer’s importance to
theological concepts of peace and pacifism, church/state relations, biblical hermeneutics,
theological ethics, ecclesiology, theological education, ecumenicism, and so on. There is
essentially no area of theology in which Bonhoeffer is not influential. Though Bonhoeffer
located himself firmly in the Lutheran tradition, his influence is not confessionally limited.
Reformed, ‘Anabaptist’, and Catholic theologians find Bonhoeffer to be a useful resource as
well.
As one of the giants of twentieth century philosophy, Heidegger’s continued relevance is
felt even more strongly. There is perhaps no major branch or school of philosophy that does not
either trace its lineage back to Heidegger or have to grapple with his legacy. This is nearly
equally true in theology. Whether it is a direct influence on such figures as Bultmann, Tillich,
Rahner, Marion, or Westphal, or a secondary influence through such individuals, it would be
difficult to locate an area of theology untouched by Heidegger or his legacy.

252

Bonhoeffer and Heidegger are not, however, important merely in isolation. First, they
shared a common cultural and intellectual environment. Though Heidegger is seventeen years
Bonhoeffer’s senior, much of their early intellectual development occurred between the times,
between the wars. Though the relevance of their roots is reversed, they had similar roots in
philosophy and theology. Both were influenced by the traditions of neo-Kantianism and
phenomenology. Both found Luther an important source. And they saw the decline of liberal
theology and the rise of dialectical theology. This alone would make understanding the relation
between Bonhoeffer and Heidegger worthwhile.
As we have seen, however, it is deeper than simply a shared context and heritage.
Bonhoeffer tackles, with genuine concern, Heidegger’s early philosophy and its possible relation
to theology. Though Bonhoeffer does make some notable mistakes in his reading of Heidegger,
his overall understanding is perspicacious. He gets the essentials correct and cuts to the heart of
Being and Time’s project, that being is temporal. This forms a core conceptual tool in
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the person of Christ. If one wants to understand Bonhoeffer’s
concept of person, then one must understand Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger, particularly his
understanding of temporality. The concept of person is central to Bonhoeffer’s early theology; it
accounts for revelation and Christ, it accounts for Christian existence and the church, and from
there theological epistemology. Understanding the presence of Heidegger in Bonhoeffer’s early
work is not then an inessential task.
Though Bonhoeffer’s explicit and intense engagement with Heidegger was brief, it is not
irrelevant for understanding Bonhoeffer’s later works. Much of Bonhoeffer’s influence is
derived primarily from his later works such as Discipleship, Life Together, Ethics, and Letters
and Papers from Prison. The foundation for these more mature and popular works were set,
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however, in his earlier, more academic works. It is certainly true that Luther and Barth have
stronger and more enduring effects on Bonhoeffer’s theology, but the conceptual nuances in
Bonhoeffer understanding of time, history, and theological anthropology may still be felt in these
later works long after Bonhoeffer drops explicit references to Heidegger. Through his grappling
with Heidegger, Bonhoeffer developed answers to the problems of continuity and concreteness
that still inform his later work. Heidegger is a relevant voice throughout Bonhoeffer’s works.
Though influence was unidirectional, relevance is not. Bonhoeffer’s explicit use of
Heidegger’s Being and Time offers us a valuable and underappreciated look into how theology
might appropriate Being and Time’s core concepts on theology’s own terms. While Bonhoeffer
does make some mistakes, it is important to remember that Bonhoeffer had little time, a little
over a year between the publication of Being and Time and the completion of Act and Being,
with which to grapple with such a lengthy and difficult work. He also did so without the benefit
of the industry of commentaries, courses, or personal interactions with Heidegger. Bonhoeffer
saw key insights in Being and Time, such as the necessity of turning to an analysis of Dasein
prior to developing a theory of knowledge, that existence is ecstatic (thrown-projection), and that
temporality is the existential core of Dasein. Yet, at least for Bonhoeffer’s theology, this is
theologically inadequate if Christ or revelation does not become the focal point for theologically
appropriating philosophy.
Among Bonhoeffer’s contemporaries this is, again, unique. With few exceptions Barth
remained silent on Heideggerian matters. Though Brunner does cede the point that Heidegger
deserves more attention, he does not genuinely do so himself. Tillich is famous for taking
‘existential’ philosophy seriously; however, the roots of his theology are well-developed prior to
knowing Heidegger, and what influence Heidegger does later have on Tillich seems to be
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mingled with other ‘existentialist’ philosophers, such as Sartre and Kierkegaard. Bultmann quite
obviously takes Heidegger seriously and is a viable option for how Protestant theology might do
so. Bonhoeffer, however, offers an alternative to Bultmann, one which is less beholden to
philosophy and places revelation at the center rather than Dasein, as Bultmann does. Yet,
Bonhoeffer does not jettison philosophy as a valuable resource for theology. Bonhoeffer can tell
us much, then, about a theological adaptation of Heidegger’s early philosophy.
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